

communities came to naught faster than in the European part of Russia. Initially founded by settlers, it was distinguished by the weakness of intra-communal ties, which were constantly undermined by more and more new settlers who arrived in Siberia from

other regions of the country. The state policy of supporting the poor caused, on the one hand, the resistance of the kulaks, and on the other hand, it strengthened the anti-kulak sentiments of the poor sections of the village, who were ready, as L.M.

Zakovsky, "to get rich at the expense of [the kulak](#)"[677]63 In Siberia, the situation was further aggravated by the mood of red banditry. This peculiarity in the life of the Siberian village, which was clearly revealed by 1928, must be

considered in more detail. Red banditry in Siberia has its roots in the partisan movement, when the peasantry fought against the Kolchak troops. The situation in the countryside during the civil war was very complex and contradictory. Among the peasantry there were different moods - not only anti-Kolchak, but also pro-Kolchak. The Bolsheviks simplified, ideologized these sentiments in their propaganda and directed them against the wealthy peasants who secretly or openly supported Kolchak's policies. As a result, the poor partisan formed a general idea of the kulak as a class enemy, "a bastard who needs to be crushed." With the beginning of the surplus-appropriation policy, anti-kulak sentiments in the countryside received an additional impetus from the authorities. At the disposal of the poor was transferred 25% of the bread confiscated by the surplus appropriation. Thus, the authorities paid for "a whole range of services of these poor peasants in ripping off the kulak economy," as G.I. Lomov in his speech at the IV Siberian Party Conference in August 1921 [\[678\]64](#) This complicity in the robbery made the poor the mainstay of communist power in the countryside. The poor took an active part in the surplus appropriation, not shunning the methods of violence against the kulaks. Therefore, she painfully perceived the transition to the NEP, especially in those areas where there was a strong partisan movement. These sentiments resulted in red banditry, which in 192

province, certain districts of the Kuznetsk, Shcheglovsky and Tomsk districts of the Tomsk province, in the Achinsk and Minusinsk districts of the Yenisei province, in the area of the Cheremkhov mines of the Irkutsk province hidden deep, acquired a criminal character.

Recently, red banditry in Siberia has become the object of special study[680]66. In the article by V.I. Shishkin made a number of important general remarks, for example, that red banditry existed throughout the 1920s. and played his role "in the implementation of the 'revolution from above' begun by Stalin"[681]67. This

the remark made as an assumption "needing verification on archival sources" withstands such a verification.

Relapses of red banditry persisted in the Siberian countryside throughout the 1920s. In closed letters from the secretaries of district and provincial party committees to the Sibkraikom and the Central Committee, in reviews of the political and economic state of Siberia, compiled according to the GPU, more than once reported not only about the mood, but also about the facts of red banditry - about clashes between the poor and kulaks, arson of wealthy households peasants, etc. Here is the characteristic reaction of one village communist to the policy of revitalizing the Soviets in the countryside at the beginning of 1925: "The poor peasants and communists who did not dare to vote, the influence of the kulaks was so strong that only a change in this policy and the introduction of a second dictatorship of the proletariat would correct the situation otherwise terror threatens. I myself heard from the poor and the communists that if the state does not change policy, then we c let's take up arms and deal with the

bloodsuckers"[682]68 . In a letter from the authorized representative of the OGPU in Siberia, I.P. Pavlunovsky to the chairman of the OGPU F.E. Dzerzhinsky on June 9, 1925, gave the following description of the situation in Siberia: "There are all signs that in Siberia we are entering a period of red banditry, the fight against which will also require great effort from the OGPU organs in their work. Larin's sentiments about the need for a second revolution in the countryside[683]69 in Siberia are beginning to be realized so far in the form of individual murders. It is still difficult to say how events will unfold further. But in any case, a vigorous fight against

the banditry of the Party and Soviet apparatuses will certainly significantly weaken this [phenomenon](#)"[684]70. —

However, events began to develop not in the direction suggested by I.P. Pavlunovskiy. Instead of fighting red banditry and eliminating the very basis for its emergence, the communist government, on the contrary, began to cultivate this basis from the end of 1925 with all its policy of favoritizing the poor. As a result, for example, the reduction of the agricultural tax for the poor by 1927/28, as a contemporary of those events noted, led to the fact that "at present, the poor are nowhere expressing dissatisfaction with the tax, and most importantly, they are more and more actively helping to open the kulak machinations with the shelter of sown areas and livestock, and this despite cases of revenge and threats [from the](#)

[kulaks](#)"[685]71. The formation of the prerequisites for the subsequent wave of violence during the NEP period, which interests the historian ~~V.P. Buldakov~~ [\[686\]72](#), happened not by itself, but with the active assistance of the authorities. In this case, the role of the secretary of the Sibkraikom of the CPSU (b) S.I. Syrtsova is exceptionally great in fomenting the class struggle in the presence of the mood of red banditry in the Siberian countryside. To understand how the ideas of the authorities about the use of these sentiments in the fight against the kulaks have evolved, it is necessary to quote some passages from the speeches of the

From a speech at the March 1926 plenum of the Sibkraikom: "... Excesses on the part of the poor are an act of despair of the poor, this is a manifestation and indicator of their helplessness. If this poor peasant is given the opportunity of an organized action, an organized resistance to the kulak, then he will not have to resort to such measures - to take the path of excesses. It seems to me that considerations regarding the possibility of a recurrence of red banditry and spontaneous actions of the poor are turning in our favor, in favor of the conclusion that we need to master this mood and use it in order to direct the poor peasants onto the path of organization and rebuffing the ~~kulaks~~ ... "[687] 73 .

"... There is no doubt that the partisans in the conditions of Siberia are, to a large extent, a healthy revolutionary force that will help us work in all areas. They have great revolutionary experience, tempering - they are very valuable if this experience is used ... And these old party members from

former partisans must remember that only by deploying more and more forces around themselves can they remain and be the real bearers of the revolutionary idea, revolutionary work in the countryside..."[688]74.

Rumors about the upcoming war played a big role in inciting anti-kulak sentiment in the countryside. The deterioration of international relations in 1927 did take place. This is not only the fact of the announcement by the British government on May 27, 1927 of the severance of diplomatic and trade relations with the USSR, but also the murder in Poland of the Soviet plenipotentiary P. Voikov [689]75. However, these events did not mean that the situation had become so aggravated that there was a real threat of war. At least, they did not influence the foreign policy actions of the Soviet leadership. On May 28, 1927, along with the approval of the text of the note addressed to the British government, the Politburo decided to satisfy "the demands of the British comrades for the issuance of 16,000 pounds for special expenses until the end of the year to expand agitation (oral and printed) and organizational work." At the same time, additional secrecy measures were taken, in particular, a special commission was created "to put in order the financial operations of the State Bank for servicing the revolutionary movement in other countries from the point of view of maximum secrecy"[690]76.

However, inside the country, the ruling elite tried to extract the maximum benefits from these events for themselves. At the beginning of June 1927, explosions and accidents took place in different cities of the country for several days, which, according to the historian J. Goland, were provocative[691]77. All these actions were blamed on British spies and White Guards. In connection with this decision of the OGPU collegium, without any appearance of court, 20 hostages were shot, "prominent White Guards guilty of crimes against the Soviet power," as it was called in the decision of the emergency meeting of the Politburo of June 8, 1927, which instructed the OGPU to conduct new mass searches and arrests of White Guards[692]78.

All these events determined not only the statements of Zinoviev and Stalin about the threat of war at the July 1927 plenum of the Central Committee, but also the actual actions of the government. June 27, 1927

recognized it as “necessary to publish the appeal of the Central Committee in connection with the increased danger of war and the attempts of the White Guard to disorganize our rear” and recommended turning the “Defense Week” scheduled for July 10-17, 1927—“into a big political campaign”[693]79. Trial mobilizations took place in August-September. Thus, the provocation of military alarm made it possible for the ruling elite not only to justify the urgent need for forced industrialization with an emphasis on the development of the military industry, but also to artificially aggravate the socio-political situation in the country in order to then toughen their political actions. S.I. Syrtsov

directly spoke about this at the plenum of the Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on October 12, 1927: “Of course, the biggest, real test was the circumstance that was associated with military danger, with military anxiety.” And what did this test show? Syrtsov answered this question: “The position of the kulaks in relation to the war, in relation to the military danger, can be characterized as defeatist or conditionally defensive. With regard to the attitude of the kulaks to the war, we have symptoms in which this attitude of the kulak coincides with others that were on the part of the opposition ... “From this, according to Syrtsov, followed” the task of raising the activity of the poor and middle peasants as much as possible, which in the countryside will be ours. a support not only in a peaceful timeof

economic construction, but also in the event of military complications”[694]80. A direct consequence of the provocation undertaken by the authorities with a propaganda campaign and preparatory measures for the upcoming war was the aggravation of the economic situation in the country. In the city there was a rush demand for food and manufactured goods. The amount of bread coming to the market was noticeably reduced. The reason for this was not only low, as in previous years, purchase prices for bread, but also a sharp reduction in the ability to buy anything with the proceeds. Head of the Siberian Trade Department A.N. Zlobin bluntly called “insufficient supply of goods to the countryside” as the main reason for the poor progress of grain procurements[695]81. In additio

Under such conditions, the behavior of the peasantry was qualified as a "kulak grain strike." In his manner, Stalin accused the

kulaks of "not just waiting for higher prices, but demanding higher prices three times higher than state [prices](#)"[696]82. The real situation did not interest him. It was important to inflame anti-kulak sentiments. And the ~~gov~~government achieved it. Here are a number of characteristic statements on the part of the poor: "Although there are many abnormalities in power, I will go to the defense of power at any moment, since it has done a lot to the poor ... Before we go to the foreign bourgeoisie, we must destroy our own on the spot." From different regions of Siberia it was reported

What "partisan population configured everywhere militantly"[697]83. ~~Spea~~Speaking at the plenum of the Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in October 1927, L.M. Zakovsky warned that "banditry and all sorts of other crimes in our Siberian village are now taking place more than they did in the spring." A few months later, at a meeting of the Bureau of the Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he directly said that "the poor peasants, building their illusions about the future prospects for defending Soviet power ..., raised the question of how, before going to defend Soviet power, which they will certainly go to defend, first of all, to deal with the kulaks in the countryside,

in order to improve the financial situation of his household..."[698]84.

It is quite probable that Stalin had sufficient ideas about the situation in the Siberian countryside. He was regularly informed of the contents of closed letters from local secretaries. When he was chairman of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), at one of the meetings in July 1921, a special report was heard from the secretary of the Sibburo Central Committee V.N. Yakovleva about red banditry in [Siberia](#)[699]85. Stalin usually used those tendencies that were beneficial to him in his political ~~inter~~interests,

in the struggle for power. Not only used, but also pedaled just such trends. Sending threatening directives to the localities demanding that grain procurements be increased through violence and robbery, he knew that he would find support in the social ranks of the Siberian village. The ground for this was prepared by the entire previous policy of flirting with the poor, inciting the mood of red banditry, breaking up the already weak

intra-community connections. The easiest way, he thought, was to start in Siberia. That is why he went to Siberia.

But these factors alone might not be enough. Additional measures were taken to satisfy the dependent mood of the poor. Among them, the main one, as in the period of "war communism", was the transfer to her of 25% of the grain confiscated from the kulaks at low prices or in the form of a long-term loan. In addition, it was planned to create seed funds for the poor, stocks of food grain for the poor, additional taxation of the kulaks by reducing or completely exempting low-power [groups from tax](#)^[700]⁸⁶. All this ensured the support of the peasant poor in carrying out a policy of emergency measures—

against the kulak. Not only did a general peasant uprising not break out in Siberia, but, on the contrary, the village became even more polarized. The reports of the GPU on the course of the grain procurement campaign in January-February 1928 regularly recorded the mood in the countryside. Here are some of them: "Basically, the poor and middle peasants approve of the repressions applied to the kulaks and themselves help to identify the malicious holders of the kulaks' bread. There are facts of approving resolutions by the general meetings of villages on the ongoing trials of kulaks. ... Especially the poor and part of the middle peasants approved the deductions to the peasant committees of 25% of the confiscated bread of the kulaks: "Although we were glad about the arrest of the kulaks and the seizure of bread, they were still afraid to be completely without bread, and now, having 25%, we will not bow to the kulaks ... The poor - these are everywhere after the ongoing operations triumph ... It would be a long time ago for the Soviet government to take this kulaks ... "»^[701]⁸⁷. It should not be assumed that—

literally in every Siberian village the situation was the same as it was recorded by the above reports of the GPU. Life is much richer and more varied than any schemes. There were villages in which different social groups lived relatively calmly and were not opposed to each other. Thus, on May 22, 1928, at a meeting of the poor, the poor peasant of the village of Krivoi, Minusinsk district, Yenisei province, said at a meeting of the poor: "Why are we peasants divided into poor peasants, middle peasants and kulaks? We don't have poor people, we don't have kulaks either. We do not want to quarrel with the peasants. Don't need an

meetings of the poor”[702]88. But the general trend was exactly as it is presented in the reports of the GPU and as L.M. Zakovsky at a meeting of the bureau of the Sibkraikom on June 26, 1928: “The poor took up this (confiscation of 25% of the kulak bread in favor of the rural poor) with great zeal and did not hesitate especially with the kulaks ... Here we saw the economic incentive for the confiscation of bread, the poor sought the main how to increase their incomes, increase the well-being of their economy”[703]89. However, she acted voluntarily. “The village is literally upside down,” said the chairman of the Siberian regional branch of the State Bank of the USSR A.M. Pevzner in a letter to R.I. Eikhe in March 1928 - They sit in ten-yard meetings, family meetings, gatherings, a village council with an asset, cooperators, groups of the poor, etc. But what is most surprising of all is that attendance is exceptional... Thus, the activity of the

population, which makes peasant thought work, is extremely high...”[704]90. The mechanism for the future liquidation of the kulaks as a class was launched. The decisive factor was the complicity of the peasant poor in the policy of plundering the countryside. The authorities firmly “tied up” the poor with 25% of the grain confiscated from the kulaks, made them not only an accomplice, but also a conductor of their policy. Speaking with a report on the results of the April 1928 plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin summed up with satisfaction the first results obtained as a result of the campaign of emergency measures: against the kulak-speculatory elements of the countryside with the struggle for the vital interests of the broad masses of the working people and, having tied them, managed to lead the majority of

the working masses of the countryside, isolating the kulaks”[705]91. It is important to emphasize that Stalin's trip was productive from a purely utilitarian point of view - with the help of emergency measures, grain procurement was significantly increased. Undoubtedly, this made violence not only attractive, but also the only possible way for the communist government to solve economic problems. In the first quarter of 1928, 75.6% more grain wa

increased, compared with December 1927, by 84.4%, and in February, compared with January, by 46.4—

%[706]92. As always, it was not without "excesses". Article 107 of the Criminal Code was actually applied not only to the kulaks, but to the middle peasants and even the poor. In the circular of the Siberian Regional Court and the Regional Prosecutor of Siberia, all the chairmen of the district courts and district prosecutors dated June 12, 1928, provided information about repressions against the middle peasants and the poor: in the Omsk District, out of the total number of those convicted under Article 107, there were 1.2% of the poor and 11.9% of the middle —

peasants, in the Biysk district - 0.7% of the poor and 12.9% of the middle peasants[707]93. At the July 1928 plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin made a concession to the Bukharin group - the emergency measures were suspended. A resolution of the Council of People's Commissars dated July 19, 1928 on the abolition of emergency measures for grain procurement followed. Additional clarifications were contained in the circular of the People's Commissariat of Justice dated July 17 - criminal liability under Article 107 could now only take place in relation to buyers and traders of bread, and then only if there were attempts to disrupt grain procurements on their part. The circular of the regional prosecutor of Siberia dated September 14, 1928, instructed the prosecution authorities to establish "strict monitoring of the observance of revolutionary legality in the localities, steadily preventing and eliminating any attempts to repeat emergency measures (bypassing yards, illegal searches and arrests, apportioning surpluses, liquidating bazaars, etc.). etc.), ensuring an immediate response to all sorts of distortions by bringing the perpetrators to justice and, in appropriate cases, raising questions before the relevant governing bodies. It was also forbidden to give an overly broad interpretation of agitation against the surrender of bread (which was qualified under Article 58-10 of the Criminal Code),—

summing up all sorts of casual conversations and expressions of simple discontent [708]94 under it. Such a retreat before a decisive offensive was in the tradition of Stalin's political practice. As Bukharin said, "... he has now yielded in order to kill us"[709]95. Indeed, despite the temporary prohibition of emergency measures, the policy of attacking the kulaks

In Siberia, the so-called Ural-Siberian method of grain procurement was used. According to this method, at meetings of the poor and middle peasants of the village, a commission was elected, which distributed the grain procurement plan as follows: 65% - to the kulak households and 35% - to the middle peasants. Those who refused to carry out the task were fined five times the amount of the task or imprisonment, followed by confiscation of property [710]96. For a long time it was believed that the initiators of this method were the peasants of the Siberian village of Zavyalovo. However, the acquaintance with the protocols of the Politburo, which has become possible in recent years, has made more understandable the "kitchen" of preparing this initiative, which, most likely, was carried out in Stalin's Secretariat. On March 20, 1929, the Politburo approved the proposal of the Ural Regional Committee on the adoption of a new method of harvesting grain and decided to apply it in Siberia, the Urals and Kazakhstan. The essence of this method was set out in the decision of the Politburo "On Measures to

Strengthen Grain Procurement" as follows: "a) an open initiative to fulfill the task established by the plan - grain procurements in each village should come not from direct procurement organizations or government agencies, but from public organizations (from the assets of the poor) and be carried

out through general meetings of citizens, b) in carrying out the grain procurement plan for each village, adopted by the general meetings of citizens, it is necessary to distinguish the kulak elite of the village from the rest of the mass of peasants, and then oblige the kulaks to hand over grain to the state from their grain surpluses or with the help of general meetings of citizens or through

special commissions created by the general meeting; c) the amount of grain that remains in excess of the obligations imposed on the kulaks in accordance with the plan for a given village is divided among the mass of peasants at a general meeting of citizens through the procedure of assuming obligations. All work must be accompanied by the development of intense and energetic agitation and the mobilization of proletarian social —

influence on the bulk of the peasants..."[711]97. "The Ural-Siberian method," Stalin said at the April 1929 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, "is actually good because it facilitates

fists; makes it easier to break the resistance of the kulaks and forces them to hand over their grain surpluses to the organs of Soviet [power](#).

The decisive offensive began after the November 1929 plenum of the Central Committee, which, as you know, decided to expel Bukharin from the Politburo and at the same time to start carrying out complete collectivization. And on December 27, 1929, at a conference of Marxist agrarians, Stalin publicly announced the transition from a policy of limiting the kulaks to a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. The robbery of the countryside at the beginning of 1928 was a necessary stage in the building of Stalinist socialism. After the then unleashed terror against the kulak, supported not only by local party workers, but also by the peasant poor, it was no longer possible to return to the previous situation in the countryside. The logic of the development of events dictated to go only by intensifying terror against the wealthy sections of the countryside and uniting the rest in

collective farms.

3. THE DEVELOPMENT OF STALIN'S VIEWS OF SOCIALISM IN THE 1930s

The trip to Siberia strengthened Stalin's confidence in the possibility of the rapid implementation of the "construction of socialism" he had planned. On July 2, 1930, speaking with a closing speech at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, he remembered this time. "Or, for example, the question of emergency measures against the kulaks," he said. - Do you remember what kind of hysteria the leaders of the right opposition threw at us on this occasion? "Extraordinary measures against the kulaks? Why is that? Wouldn't it be better to pursue a liberal policy towards the kulaks? See what might come out of this undertaking." And now we are pursuing a policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class, ~~a~~ policy in comparison with which emergency measures against the kulaks are nothing. And nothing – [we live](#)^[713]¹. It was during his trip to Siberia that Stalin tested the mechanism of political power that he had created and fine-tuned in the course of the inner-party struggle and drew a number of conclusions for himself, which later guided him: 1) about his deputies as reliable executors in carrying out the undertakings of the Center; 2) about the lumpen strata of the population as a support in the implementation of the so-called socialist transformations; 3) about repression as a necessary way of action of the authorities;

4) about the "offensive-retreat" tactics, shifting responsibility for excesses to "scapegoats" and thus channeling the negative moods of the masses. Soviet historians have written many works on the construction of socialism in the 1930s as a result of industrialization, collectivization and the cultural revolution, calling it "Lenin's plan for building socialism in the USSR." At present, in historiography, the opposite trend has actually been determined, the representatives of which, considering this period, refuse to see anything in

pragmatic motives, moreover, arising from the needs of the country's development.

The real problem lies in understanding the essence of what happened under the slogan of building socialism. If we discard great-power arguments about the concept of National Bolshevism, in which many modern authors see not only a return to national traditions, but also a guarantee of the rapid revival of a strong Russia, then we have to admit that a radical break in social relations in the late 1920s and early 1930s ., which surpassed the events of the October Revolution in its scale, was caused not by the needs of the country's development, but by the goals of the authorities themselves. Therefore, in the pro-Stalinist scheme of historiography, which affirmed the idea of the existence of a plan for the construction of socialism, there was a certain meaning. In this case, they more adequately reflect the situation of the 1930s. not today's historians who are trying to modernize the intentions and actions of the party elite, but Stalin's associates. When L. Kaganovich, in his declining years, said: "I know only one thing about Stalin: he was all in the idea. And this is the main thing"[714]2, then this statement of a man who has been next to Stalin for almost three decades is worth listening to. When V. Molotov argued that socialism is the management of the state economy, on the one hand, and on the other, that "socialism is the destruction of classes"[715]3, then this ~~is~~ is worth thinking about, because this is how Stalin's associates understood socialism and precisely this is what they sought to achieve through their political actions. But what was the real

meaning of the construction of socialism, the philosopher M.K. Mamardashvili. "Socialism", in his opinion, "in fact, is not at all a concept (socio-historical), meaning the solution of certain social problems (historical-organic, grown out of the real mass of human stories) and the social system or a new form of life established by for this. This is neither its purpose nor its content. This concept denotes a certain type of power and its exercise and reproduction. There are no goals outside of power itself. Just to keep it and reproduce it is necessary to bring society to the form that the given government would reproduce, which is called "socialist". Otherwise not

the tasks of this power are carried out as something self-sustaining. Then socialism is "built" ... "Building socialism" ... this is the most convenient, almost ideal form of bringing society to the conditions for the reproduction of power in itself, an inorganic or non-historical state (which is not a state in the exact sense of this concept), which has become a phenomenon of the 20th century..." The apparatus of the language of the "class struggle" at the same time "justifies the war between the state and society: everything is clear,—

even [treason](#)"[716]4. This "phenomenon of total power, the total phenomenon of power," Mamardashvili believed, "is still not—[understood](#)[717]5. To reveal the real meaning of the policy of the Stalinist government in the 1930s, it is necessary to realize that all its actions were aimed at achieving the main goal - the creation of a military industry. "Stalin was not a military man, but he coped well with the leadership of the armed forces. Good, said Molotov. - No people's commissar was in charge of aviation, but Stalin was in charge, and Stalin was in charge of naval affairs, and Stalin was in charge of artillery. There were also mistakes. They are inevitable, but everything went on, and this is the pumping up of new military equipment - under ~~his~~ command. Almost no one knows this" (emphasis mine. – I.P.) [\[718\]](#)6. Molotov's last remark

very clearly characterizes the mechanism of Stalinist power. However, much has become clear in this regard in recent years. A number of new facts were cited by the historian N.S. Simonov, however, did not give them a proper assessment. However, the facts themselves are very revealing. Back in 1925, the NKVM (People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs of the USSR) developed a draft "Regulations on the preparatory period for war", dividing this period into two stages: 1) from the moment of complications in international relations until the possibility of an armed clash was identified and 2) from the moment of revealing the possibility of an armed clash to the announcement of mobilization. At the same time, M.V. Frunze, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee in May 1925, explained what this provision meant: "The early and gradual implementation of preparatory measures for war facilitates the maintenance of secrecy in the implementation of mobilization work, does not disrupt the normal operation of the state apparatus. A sudden transition to

except for results of a dubious nature, giving potential adversaries a clear idea of what is happening"[719]7.

This provision is extremely important because it was adopted by the country's leadership. On June 27, 1927, the Politburo instructed A.I. Rykov "in closed meetings of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the RSFSR, raise the question of the immediate development in the people's commissariats (each in his own line) of measures that contribute to raising the country's defense, and measures that ensure an accelerated pace of all work and the rapid elimination of the most significant shortcomings, especially intolerable in the present conditions" . The Council of Labor and Defense (STO), its Assignment (RZ STO) became the one that coordinated all mobilization work with the state. The Revolutionary Military Council (RVS) and the State Planning Committee of the USSR were subordinate to him. The RVS was supposed to be engaged in the development of plans for the conduct of the war, the preparation of assignments for all people's commissariats to ensure the mobilization of the Red Army, the linkage and unification of administrative mobilization plans (NKVD, NKpros, NKJ, NKID, NKZdrav) and economic (VSNKh, NKPS, NKTorg, NKF, NKPiT, NKtrud, NKzem) people's commissariats. The task of the State Planning Commission was to link the long-term plans for the development of the armed forces with the general long-term plan for the development of the national

economy of the USSR in the event of war, the unification of the mobilization plans of the people's commissariats into a single mobilization plan of the USSR[720]8. By a happy coincidence, an excerpt from the speech of F.P. Gryadinsky, with whom he spoke after the XVII Party Conference (it is impossible to date the document more precisely) at the courses of employees of the mobilization departments. In his speech, Gryadinsky spoke about the essence and purpose of the country's general mobilization plan to the extent that he himself was privy to this plan as chairman of the West Siberian Regional Executive Committee of Soviets. "We," Griadinsky shared with his listeners, "have an insufficient network of people who would know what an exact military plan is, how and with whom to link it, and what kind of work needs to be done in order to link this plan with a growing economy. Your courses have brought together the most qualified staff of our staff ... your courses have been

qualified in terms of developing mobilization work in individual sectors of our economy ... Our mobilization plan cannot be

published in newspapers, this is a great complexity of work, and therefore we need to have people for whom the mobilization plan would be a newspaper, who would know this plan daily. Therefore, those people who are called to lead must not only know their duty, but they must prepare assistants for themselves according to a more detailed plan by the time of the war. If today we have practical tasks in all branches of our economy, then we are compelling these practical tasks to be invested in a definite program included in the peaceful program of work, so that it could be turned from peaceful into military and from military into peaceful. You are the cadre of economic units that will now become the main element of our military economy in Siberia. To do this, you need to educate people on a mobilization plan, and you must receive the appropriate qualifications in this area "(highlighted by me. - I.P.).

Gryadinsky's revelations are extremely important, since they lift the veil over the general plan of the Stalinist leadership - not just to create a military industry, but to create it under the guise of a peaceful industry, i.e. the country had to be constantly in a state of mobilization readiness. If the civilian industry was considered only as the reverse side of the military industry, then what are the calculations of economists and historians who tried to determine the scale of military production in the USSR, especially on the eve of World War II! Gryadinsky shared the general idea of creating this type of economy:

"Then we will be able, having an accurate mobilization plan by the time of the war, to turn our entire economy into a military economy serving the tasks of the war, and to carry out with great success the maneuver that the war decides, i. e. maneuver organizing preparations for war. You will make every effort to increase your knowledge in a short time and, on the basis of this knowledge, educate cadres of mobilization workers who understand the significance of mobilization work and thereby build a socialist economy, now adapt it to the tasks of socialism, to the tasks of the struggle against capitalism. (highlighted by me.

- I.P.). The key words in the last passage of the speech are "socialist economy", "socialism" and "struggle against capitalism". This is how the representatives of the Stalinist government understood in the 1930s. the main purpose of the announced construction of socialism: "If you really want to build a socialist enterprise," Gryadinsky emphasized, "you must take into account the defense of the country ... in this way, all economic work is closely linked with our movement against capitalism"[721]9.

It was the program for the creation of a military industry that became the basis of the first five-year plan. On July 15, 1929, a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On the state of defense of the USSR" was adopted, which, according to Stalin's instructions, due to its special secrecy, was to be kept "as a cipher", and a special resolution of the Politburo on the military industry[722] 10. Unlike the first versions of the five-year plan for the construction of the armed forces, which did not provide for the achievement of military superiority over a potential enemy, the Politburo indicated to the military department: "In terms of numbers - not to be inferior to our probable opponents in the main theater of war, in technology - to be stronger than the enemy in two or three decisive types of weapons, namely, the air fleet, artillery and tanks. By the end of the first five-year plan, it was planned to create 3.5 thousand aircraft and 5.5 thousand tanks. At the same time, deployment of about 3–3.5 million people was envisaged[723]11. The existence of such intentions is evidenced by a number of subsequent resolutions of the Politburo: "On the implementation of the tank building program" of December 5, 1929, on the mobilization preparation of industry of January 15, 1930, "On the elimination of sabotage at military industry enterprises" of February 25, 1930 ., on the aviation industry of March 5, 1930, on tank building of September 5 and November 30, 1930, "On the tank program" of February 20, 1931, "On airship building" of April 20, 1931, etc. [724]12 The Defense Commission adopted a number of additional resolutions on the build-up of the army and its power, including a program for the production of 10 thousand tanks in 1932. [725]13

But, as rightly noted by N.S. Simonov, in the literature, with the exception of the memoirs of G. K. Zhukov, the significance of the first

mobilization plans for the development of Soviet industry, arising from the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of July 15, 1929 "On the state of the country's defense", for the main directions of the country's socio-economic development in the 1930s, as a rule, is not taken into account. Yes, and Zhukov emphasizes the significance of this decree only for the development

of the military industry proper[726]14. At the same time, Zhukov also had no general idea of the state of affairs, as evidenced by the following excerpt from his previously unpublished memoirs: no special attention was paid to the creation of military potential - and, first of all, to the rapid development of military plants for the increased production of aviation, tanks and other equipment of the latest design. We were told that the government could not satisfy the demands of the People's Commissariat of Defense without causing much damage to the national economy, but we cannot agree to this. We were told: "... when necessary, we will overwhelm the army with equipment", forgetting that the start of production of equipment at factories for the introduction and development of it by the troops will take a lot of time"[727]15.

Moreover, Soviet historians could not know about the state of affairs in the military industry, since all "military issues, and even more so of operational-strategic significance, were resolved in the Politburo"[728]16, and decisions on these because many decisions were made orally) until recently were kept under the heading "special folder". One can cite a characteristic statement by S. Ordzhonikidze at the 16th Congress of the CPSU(b): "... defense is beyond self-criticism at the congress. But at the same time I will report to you that when we had to get into questions of defense in order to point out all the shortcomings and outline the measures necessary to strengthen the defense capability of our country, we at the meetings of the Politburo laid out everything that was necessary to strengthen our defense capability. The work we have done in this area has been, in my opinion, significant"[729]17. At a meeting of party organizers of the Central Committee of military factories on July 14, 1935, which was held at the secretary of the Central Committee A.A. Andreeva, I.P. Pavlunov

The Main Naval Directorate (GVMU) admitted that "the entire defense industry is secret"[730]18.

The creation of a military industry, and one that would allow "to catch up and overtake the economically advanced countries", Stalin considered as "a matter of life and death of our development." This is how he posed and substantiated "the question of the rapid pace of development of industry" at the plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on November 19, 1928 [731]19 "We are 50–100 years behind the advanced countries," he said. - We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we will be overwhelmed"[732]20. To solve this main problem, accelerated industrialization was proclaimed. The leaders of the Party could talk as much as they liked about the need for such industrialization "to erect the majestic edifice of socialism," but they themselves clearly understood what its re

The lag that Stalin spoke of was by no means a 100-year or even a 50-year technical gap. Namely, this is what he had in mind, exaggerating the backlog. After all, it was not the socio-economic and, even more so, not the socio-cultural lag that he emphasized. In technical and economic terms, the USSR lagged behind the developed countries by 15–20 years, of which 10 fell just in the initial Soviet period. Russia's industry boomed before the First World War, as is irrefutably shown by the unbiased data of Edmond Thery, who, after visiting some of the new Russian factories, concluded that "they can stand comparison with the most well-equipped enterprises of large industrial countries"[733]21 . It was quite realistic to catch up with Europe in technical and quantitative terms on the basis of the industrialization of tsarist Russia, especially given Stalin's ability to mobilize funds for such a cause. This did not require even 8-fold Peter's acceleration. They managed with triple Stalinist, but with what sacrifices! Speaking about lagging behind the advanced countries by 50-100 years, Stalin did not so much justify the acceleration as he escalated the situation, asked ahead and justified "mistakes and shortcomings." At the same time, as usual, he was not aware of the processes and phenomena that he spoke about, pursuing only his own goals, lying and intimidating.

To solve this main task, it was necessary to carry out the nationalization of agriculture in order to force the peasantry to hand over grain to the state in the quantities necessary for it. And bread, as Stalin said, is "not a simple commodity. Bread is not cotton, which cannot be eaten and cannot be sold to anyone. Unlike cotton, bread in the present conditions is a commodity that everyone takes and without which it is impossible to exist. ... bread is the currency of currencies"[734]22. This bread, despite the difficult situation in the country due to "collectivization", the Stalinist government sold on international markets at prices below its cost. It was this circumstance that caused the boycott of Soviet goods in the USA[735]23. And having received the currency, the Soviet government was guided only by selfish considerations, placing orders for the purchase of the latest equipment for industry in the capitalist countries and receiving unconditional political dividends from economic cooperation with the countries of the "hostile environment". This topic requires special consideration[736]24. In the early 1930s

The USSR ranked first in the world in imports of machinery and equipment: in 1931, about 1/3, and in 1932, about 1/2 of all world exports of machinery and equipment went to the USSR[737]25. R. Tucker cited in his book data from A. Sutton's study "Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1930 - 1945 (Stanford, 1971), which identified 217 technical assistance agreements concluded between the USSR and foreign firms during the period under review. Based on them, it was concluded that not a single large technology, not a single large plant among those that were created then, can be considered as a purely Soviet

achievement[738]26. There is a lot of confirmation of this conclusion in the declassified materials of the "special folder" of the Politburo. So, in the directive of the Politburo of the delegation for negotiations on the automobile plant with Ford, or in the second case with General Motors, adopted at a meeting of November 12, 1928, an indispensable condition for signing the contract was set - "if Ford takes financial and technical participation in the organization of enterprises for the development materials and semi-finished products

high quality steel and electrical equipment. The conclusion of an agreement is also possible if the commission ensures the participation (technical and financial) in the organization of these auxiliary enterprises of other American ~~firms~~^[739]²⁷. In fairness, it must be added that the Soviet government tried to "keep face" at the same time. So, in addition to the resolution of the Politburo of January 25, 1930 "On Orders in America", which provided for an additional import plan of 200 million dollars to the already adopted plan for the current 1929/30, a special directive was attached to the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of the RSFSR P.A. . Bogdanov, approved by the Politburo on January 30, 1930. Its text read: "Based on this directive, you must enter into negotiations with the relevant supplier firms ... in no way conduct any negotiations with the government of the United States or with any government —

agency ...»^[740]²⁸. Under an agreement with the Supreme Council of National Economy, signed at the beginning of 1930, the American firm undertook to design the entire Soviet heavy and light industry. Foreign planners, designers, engineers and technicians, skilled workers built enterprises of the first five-year plan. The firm of the well-known American hydraulic builder, Colonel Cooper, built the Dneproges; the British company Metropolitan-Vickers supplied most of the largest Soviet power plants with equipment; Western firms designed, built, supplied equipment to Magnitogorsk, Kuznetsk, Uralmashzavod and the 1st ball-bearing plant in Moscow (named after Kaganovich), an automobile plant in Nizhny and a truck plant in Yaroslavl, etc. and so on. The historians M. Geller and A. Nekrich, who cited these facts in their book *Utopia in Power*, supplemented them with the characteristic confessions of People's Commissar of Heavy Industry S. Ordzhonikidze in comparison with the statement of Count S.Yu. Witte. Ordzhonikidze: "Our factories, our mines, our factories are now armed with such excellent equipment that no other country has ... Where did we get it from? We bought from the Americans, from the Germans, from the French, from the British the most advanced machines, the latest achievements of world technology, and armed our enterprises with this. ... And many of their fa

“Indeed, what is the point of foreign states giving us capital? ... Why create an even more terrible competitor with your own hands? It is obvious to me that by giving us capital, foreign states are making a political mistake, and my only wish is that their blindness last as long as possible . Not only bread and raw materials sold abroad at dumping prices, but also

paintings and antique valuables (there was a special Commission for the selection and sale of antique valuables[742]30) were a source of currency . The position of the authorities in this matter was uncompromising. In the context of my presentation, one can cite the text of an urgent telegram of the “G” series sent on December 31, 1930 to the regional party committee signed by Stalin and Molotov to Novosibirsk, which demanded that all party committees and Soviet organizations “take decisive measures to immediately mobilize export resources and urgently sending them for export ... to wage a stubborn and persistent fight against the poor quality of exported goods, leading to market losses and shortfalls in currency, ... to organize the strictest supervision so that contingents of manufactured goods intended for export are allocated in the first place and not under what conditions

did not address the needs of the domestic market”[743]31.

According to Stalin's ideas about the sources of funds for the creation of the military industry, everything was allowed: double prices, endless "programs for loans and savings banks, especially in the countryside" (from 1 billion rubles in 1927 they grew to 17 billion by the middle of 1930- 1990s), the requirements for the fulfillment by “all industrial enterprises of tasks for mobilizing internal resources and payments to the budget”, but the most odious in this list is the “program for the production and sale of alcohol”, as it was called in the next telegram of series “G” from Moscow dated November 30, 1930, signed by Stalin[744]32. “Of course, generally —

speaking,” Stalin said in a conversation with foreign workers' delegations on November 5, 1927, “it would be better without vodka, because vodka is evil. But then one would have to go temporarily into bondage to the capitalists, which is an even greater evil. So we opted for the lesser evil. Now vodka gives more than 500 million.

rubles of income. To give up vodka now means to give up this income..."[745]33.

"Which is better: the bondage of foreign capital, or the introduction of vodka - that was the question before us. It is clear that we settled on vodka, for we believed and continue to believe that if we have to get a little dirty in the mud for the sake of the victory of the proletariat and peasantry, we will resort to this last resort for the sake of the interests of

our cause . And in a letter to Molotov dated September 1, 1930, speaking of the need to increase the army from 640 to 700 thousand in response to the fact that "the Poles are probably creating (if not already created) a block of Baltic (Estonia, Latvia, Finland) states, having in view of the war with the USSR", Stalin to the question "where to get the money from?", since "for the "reform" rather big sums of money will be required (more "shots", more equipment,

quantity additional command personnel, additional

expenses for clothing and food supply)", here he answered: "It is necessary, in my opinion, to increase (as much as possible) the production of vodka. It is necessary to cast aside false shame and directly, openly go for the maximum increase in the production of vodka in order to ensure a real and serious defense of the country. Therefore, we must take this matter into account immediately, setting aside the appropriate raw materials for the production of vodka and formally fixing it in the state budget for 30-31 years. Keep in mind that the serious development of civil aviation will also require a lot of money, for which, again, you will have to appeal to vodka. On September 15, 1930,

the Politburo decided: "a) In view of the obvious lack of vodka both in the city and in the countryside, the increase in queues and speculation in connection with this, to propose to the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR to take the necessary measures to increase the output of vodka as soon as possible. Assign to Comrade Rykov personal supervision of the of this resolution. b) Adopt a 90 mil

liquor program. buckets in 1930/31" [748]36. I.I. Schitz owns a sober view of the working class, devoid of

Soviet official tinsel (an entry made in his diary in October 1930): "Life is dull, gray, without ups and downs,

flowering, storming, one-time overcoming of any breakthroughs, etc. The crowd is gray, angry, dirty, people live like pigs. In the city of new socialist construction, in the former Tsaritsyn, where the "Stalingrad Tractorstroy" (already bankrupt in production) is deployed, people (mostly proletariat) live in an incredible situation, and, most importantly, they do not want it to change, they say that they feel good anyway (according to the survey of the People's Commissariat of Health, 28% of the inhabitants have no beds at all, and 72% with beds, the occupancy of which is something like 4-7, i.e. in other words, at different hours of the day there is always someone on the bed sleeps, and most often - sleep 2-3 people, no longer embarrassed by anything; and such observations are abyss (and observers are all interested, Soviet bureaucrats: you can't blame them for bias). also, if he is provided with dried fish, occasionally galoshes, more often vodka (even if it is four times expensive), he will be satisfied, if only the "bourgeois" or "intellectual" does not have this. " And in another place: "A striking general decline in culture directly even material. People blow their noses with their hands. Rarely change linen. Used to live, work, eat, sleep in the same room. In the apartments you meet in the hallway, kitchen, at the washbasin, strangers, of different ages and sexes - half-dressed, and it stopped bothering anyone. Like in a prison..."[749]37. —

This is not the gloating of a person hostile to the Stalinist regime, but pain for the irreversible changes that have already taken place in the course of the so-called socialist construction. There is nothing but this pain in the correspondence of former Russian diplomats. Here is what E.V. wrote. Sablin V.A. Maklakov on February 6, 1934, under the impression of a film shot by his Canadian friend who returned from Russia: "I saw Petersburg, I saw the streets I once walked along, I saw Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Tiflis, Vladikavkaz, the Georgian Military Highway. .. and I must say - I was amazed at the terrible state of cities, buildings, pavements, etc. What the embankment has become like... Nevsky is sad to the point of pain... The Gostiny Dvor is boarded up... the traffic on the streets is minimal... the clothes of the population are downright beggarly. I was struck by the appearance of the Caucasian inhabitants. No Circassians and, of course, no daggers, here and there tattered beshmets and torn hats. The Georgian military road, which I know well,

desperate state. You can see collapses and road structures washed out by water, and blatant poverty everywhere. I was struck by the skinny appearance of the cattle, especially the herd of cows was terrifying. Some rider in a Kuban hat was mounting his horse, and one should have seen how the unfortunate horse sat on its hind legs and began to rush about in both directions from obvious weakness. During the demonstration of this film, Kodakov's employees were present and they did not hide their amazement at the sad spectacle..."[750]38.

However, for Stalin, all these were only "shortcomings" of socialist construction, which "are not even worth talking about seriously "[751]39. It is difficult to say how the country's development would have gone if another person from Lenin's entourage, an intellectual, such as, for example, Bukharin, had taken up the formulation of tasks and their solution. In the late 1980s the issue of the so-called Bukharin alternative was actively discussed in the literature. In the case, Bukharin, fortunately, did not have a chance to show himself, but his consciousness was not much different from the stereotypes of other party leaders. Moreover, in contrast to the laconic Stalin, Bukharin spoke at length and with enthusiasm about the need to "remake people," about the need to "inject our norms of behavior into everyone," about how "we must imbue our economic development with the spirit of class struggle," and especially about that "we are creating and we will create a civilization in front of which capitalist civilization will look the same as a "dog waltz" looks in front of Beethoven's heroic symphonies"[752]40. But the general ideas of the leaders of the Communist Party about—

socialism were superimposed by the ideas of Stalin personally, the most unprincipled person from Lenin's entourage, with obvious criminal inclinations and with an irresistible desire for power. Accordingly, Stalin also selected his entourage. Stalin and Co. were distinguished not only by an extremely simplified black-and-white vision of the world, the idea of violence as the main means of solving social and economic problems, the desire by any means not only to stay in power, but also to spread it, to subordinate society to their will and their interests. They could not imagine either socialism or communism without power. It was power that they considered as the decisive factor of socialist

construction. Arguing on this subject on October 1, 1938, at a meeting of propagandists and leading workers in Moscow and Leningrad, Stalin said: "We started this business from the first years of the revolution, but it was a declaration. The transition from words to deeds began in 1930 and—

continued in 1931 and 1932 ..."[753]41. In fairness, it should be added that the cruelty with which collectivization was carried out influenced Bukharin in such a way that he abandoned many of his ideas, in particular, about the need to link the class struggle with economic construction [754]42—Moreover, he came to the conclusion that the theory of "continuous exacerbation of the class struggle" testifies to "idiotic illiteracy", which gives rise to "policeism", or rather, its ideological justification[755]43. He was very worried about the deep changes in the psyche of those communists who, carrying out collectivization, did not go crazy, but remained to live, turning into professional bureaucrats, for whom terror became the usual method of governing the country and who were ready to obediently carry out any order that came from above. "Not people," Bukharin said of them, "but really some cogs in a monstrous machine..."[756]44. It is quite natural

that such a person as Stalin, defending the concept of the possibility of building socialism in one, separately taken country, thought in terms of civil war. It is no coincidence that, speaking about the training of the necessary personnel, he spoke as follows: "Now we need to forge new regimental commanders and brigade commanders, division commanders and commanders for the — economy, for industry"[757]45. He presented the construction of socialism as a military operation, the need for which he substantiated primarily by the existence of an external threat, an external conspiracy against Soviet Russia. With these external conditions, he intimidated the population, insisting on the need for constant whipping-up of the country[758]46. The external conspiracy, according to Stalin, was in alliance with the internal one. The building of socialism presupposed the elimination of these conspiracies - the internal one had to be destroyed in the name of the victory of socialism in one, separately taken country, and the external one - in the future, in the name of the victory of the world revolution, th

Of course, life is always richer and more complicated than any schemes, but, nevertheless, this Stalinist scheme ominously "appeared" through the daily life of the Soviet society of the Stalinist period. She lived to one degree or another in the subconscious of every Soviet person, which was facilitated by the constant indoctrination of the entire population, which was seen as a necessary element of the so-called cultural revolution.

The very process of building socialism was presented by communist leaders as a constant struggle against class opponents. Stalin understood Lenin's definition that socialism is "the destruction of classes" literally. Only this can explain the appearance of his well-known maxim that as we move towards socialism, the class struggle will intensify, which, firstly, was first expressed not at the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, but much earlier. As early as July 9, 1928, in his speech at the plenum, Stalin declared that "as we move forward, the resistance of the capitalist elements will increase, the class struggle will intensify"[759]47. Secondly, such an idea was characteristic not only of the Stalinist entourage, but also of his deputies. Communists who had a different opinion on this matter were pushed out by the established system of power in the same way as it pushed out in 1932 by M.N. Ryutin and his supporters, who were accused of "creating the counter-revolutionary organization 'Union of Marxists-Leninists' in order to fight Soviet power and restore capitalism in the USSR, prepared the program document of this organization and actively engaged in anti-Soviet activities"[760]48. In this remarkable document, known as Stalin and the Crisis of the Proletarian Dictatorship. Platform of the "Union of Marxist-Leninists" ("Ryutin's group"), there is a special section "Classes and the intensification of the class struggle", where the directly opposite Stalinist point of view was justified not about the strengthening, but about the attenuation of the class struggle[7

For Stalin and the environment that he kept to himself during the socio-economic transformations of the 1930s, the forced years, industrialization and the "cultural revolution" violent collectivization, that unfolded at the same time were integral parts of the offensive process, which

was carried out "from above, at the initiative of the state power"[762]50. One link clung to another - industrialization was impossible without plundering the countryside, i.e. collectivization, the "cultural revolution" created new cadres for industry, including in return for the repressed "old" specialists and "saboteurs", while industrialization was aimed at creating, first of all, a military industry not only to protect the only country in the world building socialism, but in the long term for the realization of his final victory on a world scale. Of course, Stalin did not speak directly and did not specifically substantiate the role

of violence in the reorganization of society (frankness in politics was never inherent in him), but in his report at the 16th Congress of the CPSU (b) he quite extensively outlined his idea of the so-called socialist construction. In this sense, this report of his is remarkable. According to Stalin, "organizing the offensive of socialism along the entire front" meant "an attack on the capitalist elements along the entire front" [763]51. Thus, the two concepts of "construction

socialism" and "repression" were organically linked. Action through repression was the fastest, cheapest and most effective means of transforming the economy and society for such a type of government as Stalinism. Repression served as the main way of mobilizing society, its discipline, and the main incentive to work for the vast majority of the population. Using in full measure such a lever of pressure on society as repressions, the authorities each time, in the words of Stalin, "whipped" the country.

True, at the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin said that "repressions in the field of socialist construction are a necessary element of an offensive, but an auxiliary element, and not the chief"[764]52. But throughout his speech, he demonstrated the opposite - repression was put forward by him as the main way to build socialism. In agriculture, this was the "planting" of large farms, which involved the robbery of the wealthy sections of the peasantry, whose confiscated property just became the basis of the indivisible fund of collective farms. That is why Stalin declared at the congress without any equivocation: "The kulaks are doomed and will be liquidated"[765]53. The fate of the kulaks was shared by all more or less prosperous strata

villages, so-called. fist bumpers. Stalin spoke about them at the same time when he spoke about the advance of socialism, "breaking the back of the capitalist elements of our country and their petty-bourgeois sing-alongs"[766]54. The term "petty-bourgeois chanters" greatly expanded the circle of possible candidates for repression, and such an "expansion" was sanctioned from above.

In industry, the construction of socialism also meant not only the destruction of the remnants of the bourgeois classes, but also repressions against workers loyal to them. In Stalinist language, this meant "uprooting the roots of capitalism," because "the work of socialist reconstruction of the national economy, tearing the economic ties of capitalism and turning all the forces of the old world upside down, cannot but arouse desperate resistance from these forces"[767]55 . Already in 1930, Stalin quite definitely outlined those social groups that would

inevitably be repressed as they advanced towards socialism, as can be seen from the following excerpt from his speech: collective forms of economy in the countryside, sabotage of the measures of the Soviet government by the bureaucratic elements of the apparatus, which are agents of the class enemy ... ". Dissidents were added to this "list" - "people who talk about the need to reduce the rate of development of our industry are enemies of socialism, agents of our class

enemies"[768]56.

All these categories of the population, doomed to liquidation, Stalin in one fell swoop connected with the capitalist encirclement. For him, already in 1930, it was a priori unconditionally "proved that the sabotage of our specialists, the anti-Soviet actions of the kulaks, the arson and explosions of our enterprises and structures are subsidized and inspired from outside"[769]57.

On January 7, 1933, speaking with the report "Results of the First Five-Year Plan" at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin declared that "we have approved the principle of socialism in all spheres of the national economy, having driven out the capitalist elements from ~~there~~"[770] 58. AND

then he, firstly, revealed whom he meant by "the last remnants of the dying classes." These are "industrialists and their servants, merchants and their henchmen, former nobles and priests, kulaks and kulaks, former white officers and sergeants, former policemen and gendarmes, all kinds of bourgeois intellectuals of a chauvinistic persuasion and all other anti-Soviet elements"

(highlighted by me. - I.P.)[774]59. especially ominous for the future was the last category.

Secondly, he a priori, for all these groups, determined the corpus delicti: "These gentlemen are no longer capable of launching a direct attack against Soviet power. They and their classes had already led such attacks several times, but were defeated and scattered. Therefore, the only thing left for them to do is to harm and harm the workers, collective farmers, the Soviet government, the party. And they do dirty tricks as soon as they can, acting on the sly. They set fire to warehouses and break cars. Organized sabotage. They organize sabotage on collective farms and state farms, and some of them, including some professors, in their sabotage impulse go so far as to inoculate cattle on collective farms and state farms with plague, anthrax, promote the spread of meningitis among horses, etc. .d. But

that's not the point. The main thing in the "activities" of these former people is that they organize mass theft and embezzlement of state property, cooperative property, collective farm property. Theft and theft in factories and factories, theft and theft of railway cargo, theft and theft in warehouses and commercial enterprises - especially theft and theft in state farms and collective farms - such is the main form of "activity" of these former people. They feel, as it were, by a class instinct, that the foundation of the Soviet economy is public property, that it is precisely this foundation that needs to be shaken in order to harm the Soviet power—and they are really trying to shake public property by organizing mass theft and embezzlement.[772] 60 "A strong and powerful dictatorship of the proletariat," he concluded, "that's what we need now in order to scatter

the last remnants of the dying classes and smash their thieves' machinations" (emphasis mine. - I.P.)[773]61 .

Carte blanche on top of accusations of sabotage, sabotage, theft and embezzlement opened up the widest scope for reprisals against all people objectionable to the authorities, since in the 1930s. in the chaos of the ongoing reforms, almost anyone could be blamed for this. Moreover, in a society with strong patriarchal prejudices, such a struggle has become the most effective way to channel mass discontent. The Stalinist government took full advantage of it. On January 7, 1933, a program

was actually formulated to "cleanse" society from anti-Soviet elements, the real embodiment of which was the Great Terror. Moreover, Stalin planned to carry out the final operation to build socialism at the same time as summing up the results of the first five-year plan, but, as you know, this did not succeed. It is precisely the failure in the implementation of the original plan that can explain the content of the very telegram that was sent to Kaganovich and Molotov on September 25, 1936 by Stalin and Zhdanov, who were vacationing in Sochi. It provided for a number of personnel changes, and the first one concerned the NKVD: "We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent to appoint comrade. Yezhov was promoted to the post of People's Commissar. Yagoda was clearly not up to the task of exposing the Trotskyite-Zinovievist bloc. The OGPU was 4 years late in this —

matter..."[774]62. This initial plan was corrected at the 17th Congress of the CPSU(b) on February 3, 1934 in Molotov's report. As the first and at the same time the main political task of the second five-year plan, he called the "final liquidation of capitalist elements and classes in general, the complete elimination of the causes that give rise to class differences and exploitation, and the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in the economy and the minds of people, the transformation of the entire working population of the country in conscious and active builders of a classless socialist society"[775]63. The seriousness of the intentions could be understood from Molotov's closing words at that congress: "Our task is to organize victory, our task is to take this victory into strong Bolshevik hands"[776] 64.

At the famous February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, the entire Stalinist clique demonstrated complete unanimity in assessing repression as the most effective way (and others were not considered) of reshaping society and readiness to move further in the same direction. Here are some statements of these builders of Stalinist socialism -

- Voroshilov: "We are building a society that destroys classes: only a class enemy can come instead of us, no one else can come. The whole world is against us. Therefore, it would be simply naivety, and Comrade Stalin spoke about this recently, it would be naivety to think that there are still very few class enemies quantitatively and qualitatively. Quantitatively - this is everything that is not the USSR, qualitatively - this is everything that is not a communist, and the arsenal of means of fighting against us from our class enemy is colossal, the means of influencing not only non-party, but also party members (this event showed) the enemy has so are great, that, of course, this will always be done, constantly, as long as either we - them or they - us. We are them, of course."

- Kaganovich: "So it was in 1928, when they (the wreckers. - I.P.) tried to disrupt the first five-year plan - there was the Shakhty process. So it was in the middle of the five-year plan, when the enemies saw that we were winning - the Industrial Party. So it was on the eve of the deployment of collectivization in 1930 - the case of Kondratiev. So it was in 1932, when the enemy saw that collectivization was winning - they organized sabotage in collective farms and state farms. So now, socialism has won, and the crown of this victory is the Stalinist Constitution - we have now uncovered a new vile wrecking work of spies and agents of capitalism who tried to undermine the power of our party, but they failed, we defeated

them, we exposed them. - Molotov: "... the exposure of vile anti-Soviet groups will serve to further strengthen our construction and ensure an even greater victory for socialism."

- Stalin: "On the contrary, the more we move forward, the more we have successes, the more the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes will become embittered, the sooner they will go to sharper forms of struggle, the more they will harm the Soviet state, the more they will grab the most

desperate means of struggle as recent facilities
doomed"[777]65. The

ideas of these builders of socialism have not changed decades later. Molotov and in the 1970s. assessed the repression extremely positive. In his opinion, the fact that "socialism held out and then nevertheless went forward ... the greatest merit of that period, and this very epidemic played an important role in this repressions"[778]66.

The meaning of the repressions undertaken by Stalin and his associates in 1937-1938 is most adequately reflected by the military term "cleansing". Although semantically it is close to the widespread in the 1920s–1930s. the term "purge of the party", but in terms of meaning it is adequate precisely to a military or military-police operation, when the "cleansing" of a occupied territory or city is the liquidation of lagging behind or abandoned groups or individual enemy soldiers, as well as civilians resisting the invaders. This is exactly how - as an invader in the occupied territory - the Stalinist government acted in its own country. Stalin quite definitely spoke about this in a report at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b), evaluating the results of the Great Terror extremely positively: , Tukhachevsky, Rozengolts, Bukharin and other fiends allegedly "shaken" the Soviet system, introduced "decomposition". This vulgar chatter is worth making fun of. How can the purge of Soviet organizations of harmful and hostile elements shake and disintegrate the Soviet system? ...Wouldn't it be more correct to say that the purge of Soviet organizations of spies, murderers, and wreckers should have led and actually led to a further strengthening of these organizations? What do the events at Lake Khasan say, for example, if not that the cleansing of Soviet organizations from spies and wreckers is the surest means of strengthening them? (highlighted by me. - I.P.) [779]67. The attitude of the Stalinist

authorities to the Great Terror in 1970 was specified by Molotov: "1937 was necessary. Considering that we

after the revolution, they cut right and left, they won, but the remnants of enemies from different directions existed, and in the face of the imminent danger of fascist aggression, they could unite. We owe it to 1937 that we did not have a fifth column during the war ...

... All this Molotov said in response to the prevailing opinion that if Tukhachevsky and Yakir had not died, we would not have had such a terrible start to the war. "It's a fashion falsification," [he replied.](#)^[780]⁶⁸
The Great

Terror was planned along with the preparation of a new Constitution. Speaking on November 25, 1936, at the Extraordinary VIII All-Union Congress of Soviets with a report "On the Draft Constitution of the USSR," Stalin declared that "the complete victory of the socialist system in all spheres of the national economy is now a fact," and "all the exploiting classes turned out to be, thus liquidated"^[781]⁶⁹. On—

December 5, 1936, the Stalinist Constitution was adopted, and in December 1937, simultaneously with the liquidation of all people who were at all potentially active in the socio-political plan, demonstrative elections were held to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The organs of the NKVD "worked" on the election day, [December 12](#)^[782]⁷⁰.

In Stalin's ideas about socialism, in addition to his own interpretation of the theoretical ideas of Marx and Lenin, the influence of Russian history is clearly visible. This has been written about many times. It seems to me that the most accurate remarks and comparisons of S.O. Schmidt. "It looks like," his article says, "that Stalin, who in his younger years did not receive a serious education and did not get acquainted with the writings of philosophers and sociologists then popular among the intelligentsia ... tried to literally follow the actions of persons who seemed to him worthy of imitation"^[783]⁷¹. The high Stalinist assessment of Ivan the Terrible is well known in a conversation with the creators of a film about him - director S. Eisenstein and actor N.K. Cherkasov. "Speaking of the state activity of Grozny, recalled Cherkasov, comrade I.V. Stalin noted that Ivan IV was a great and wise ruler who protected the country from foreign influence and sought to unite Russia. In particular, speaking of the progressive activities of Grozny,

comrade I.V. Stalin emphasized that Ivan IV introduced a monopoly of foreign trade for the first time in Russia, adding that only Lenin did it after him. Iosif Vissarionovich also noted the progressive role of the oprichnina, saying that the leader of the oprichnina, Malyuta Skuratov, was a major Russian military leader who fell heroically in the fight against Livonia. Touching upon the mistakes of Ivan the Terrible, Iosif Vissarionovich noted that one of his mistakes was that he failed to liquidate the five remaining large feudal families, did not complete the fight against the feudal lords, if he had done this, then there would have been no trouble in Rus'. time. And then Iosif Vissarionovich humorously added that "here God interfered with Ivan": Grozny liquidates one family of feudal lords, one boyar clan, and then repents and atones for "sin" for a whole year, when he should have acted even more decisively!]72.

Stalin did not repeat the "mistakes" of Ivan

the Terrible. In fact, his actions turned out to be quite comparable with the actions of his historical predecessor. Therefore, it is quite reasonable that R. Tucker called one of the sections of his second book about Stalin "Joseph the Terrible". In it, he cited irrefutable evidence that Stalin felt his kinship with this particular Russian statesman. According to the version of R.P. Khmel'nitsky of Stalin's unofficial speech during a banquet at Voroshilov's apartment, which took place after the parade on Red Square on November 7, 1937, Stalin raised a toast "To the health of people, the builders of the new Soviet state, who gave freedom to the USSR, to workers and peasants who live freely and can live well, if they work honestly! For the destruction of traitors and their vile kind. Indeed, "it was Joseph the Terrible who spoke that night in [the Kremlin](#)"[785]73.

Stalin was impressed not only by the policy of the oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible "with the disgrace of the most prominent courtiers, governors and clerks and mass executions of residents of cities and villages", but also "the sacralization of the first tsar in his lifetime, and the conviction that, defending himself"), he defends Russia, and demagogic appeals to the people, and the creation of the appearance of his representation (members of the Zemsky Sobor then became ex officio; in elections to the Supreme Soviets there was only one candidate). Consolidation of higher

positions in the country are not behind state structures, but behind the party, and a comparison of the party with medieval orders ... Ivan IV attempted to rewrite the history of the time of his reign, with a change in the positive characteristics of disgraced figures to negative ones, and sticking out personal merits: it is appropriate to compare editing (if not with the direct participation of the tsar, then on his instructions and using his "messages") of the official annals and the compilation of the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks". Like those who adhered to the theory of "Moscow - the Third Rome" in the 16th - 17th centuries, Stalin affirmed the belief that what he created in the USSR was for centuries, as well as the assessments of the present and the past proclaimed by him ("no

other way")" [786]74. "From the point of view of the internal situation of the Soviet Union," he said, summing up the results of the complete victory of socialism in one, separately taken country, in a report at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b) on March 10, 1939, "the reporting period presents a picture of a further upsurge of the entire national economy, the growth of

culture, the strengthening of the political power of the country ... In the field of the socio-political development of the country, the most important achievement for the reporting period must be recognized as the final liquidation of the remnants of the exploiting classes, the rallying of the workers, peasants and intelligentsia into one common labor front, the strengthening of the moral and political unity of Soviet society , strengthening the friendship of the peoples of our country and, as a result of all this, the complete democratization of the political life of the country, the creation of a new Constitution ... As a result of all this, we have complete stability of the internal situation and such strength of power in the country-

that any government in world..."[787]75. After the victory of socialism in one country, the time has come, according to Stalin, to think about resolving the issue of his final victory. Moreover, the speaker from the delegation of the CPSU (b) in the Executive Committee of the Comintern at the XVIII Congress D.Z. Manuilsky voiced what the party leadership had long been waiting for. Speaking about the path of struggle of the communist parties, the proletariat, and the working people against world reaction, he bluntly stated that "they want socialism"[788]76. "For the Soviet people, for

progressive mankind," he continued with reference to the "Collection of Lenin and Stalin (vol. III, p. 10)", "this will be the most just, holy war that has never happened in the history of mankind, a a number of revolutionary knots in the rear of the opponents, decomposing and demoralizing

ranks of imperialism."[789]77

But more on that in a special chapter.

CHAPTER IV

PARTY AND STAFF LEADERSHIP IN THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

*Socialism means power, power and more
power {4}*

O. Spengler

1. THE MECHANISM OF POWER IN THE USSR IN THE 1930s

By the end of the 1920s, Stalin, having fully used the mechanism of power he had debugged, secured a monopoly in the leadership of the party. The symbol of this victory was the celebration of Stalin's 50th birthday on December 21, 1929. On that day, the Pravda newspaper hailed him in an editorial article as "the most outstanding theoretician of Leninism, not only for the CPSU (b), but for the entire Comintern." In the last issue of the Proletarian Revolution magazine for 1929, for the first time, a portrait and a selection "On the 50th Anniversary of the Birth of Stalin" appeared, which opened with a letter from the Lenin Institute to "The Greatest Theoretician of Leninism." These confessions were a kind of legitimate justification for further actions to put into practice Stalin's ideas about building socialism. One can agree with R. Tucker that "to go down in history as the builder of a socialist society in the USSR was one of Stalin's most cherished desires"[790]1. By this time, members of the highest bodies of the party - the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee, consisting almost entirely of his supporters, recognized Stalin's indisputable primacy in determining the main directions of the country's development, although they made certain objections on certain issues. It is noteworthy that in the memorandum "On Measures for the Protection of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" dated October 9, 1930, Stalin's reception room was already simply called the reception room of the "Master"[791]2. And in a special decision of the Politburo of October 20, 1930, a touching concern for his safety was shown: "To oblige Comrade Stalin to immediately stop walking around the city on foot "[792]3.

Throughout the 1930s, the unconstitutional, but officially recognized body of power in the USSR continued to be the Politburo. At the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in February 1934, L. Kaganovich publicly declared: "Our Politburo of the Central Committee is the body of operational management of all branches of socialist construction"[793]4.

Information about the composition of the highest party bodies in recent years has been repeatedly published, therefore, to complete the picture, one should not only reproduce the data on the Stalinist Politburo, but also indicate the education of its members, especially since the picture is impressive[794]5.

Politburo from the 15th to the 16th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (December 19, 1927 - July 13, 1930). Members: N.I. Bukharin (gymnasium, studied at Moscow University - was expelled due to his arrest, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1928); K.E. Voroshilov (studied at a rural zemstvo school), M.I. Kalinin (village school), V.V. Kuibyshev (studied at the Military Medical Academy, from which he was expelled for participating in a student strike); V.M. Molotov (Kazan real school, studied at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute - expelled due to arrest); A.I. Rykov (gymnasium, studied at Kazan University - expelled due to arrest); Ya.E. Rudzutak (two classes of the parish school), I.V. Stalin (Gori Theological School, studied at the Tiflis Theological Seminary, from which he was expelled for revolutionary activities); M.P. Tomsk (elementary school). Candidate

members: A.A. Andreev (two classes of a rural school), L.M. Kaganovich (self-taught), S.M. Kirov (Kazan Mechanics and Technical School), S.V. Kosior (elementary factory school), A.I. Mikoyan (theological seminary in Tiflis, studied at the theological academy); G.I. Petrovsky (two classes of the school at the seminary in Kharkov), N.A. Uglanov (village school), V.Ya. Chubar (Alexander Mechanical and Technical School). On April 29, 1929, he was relieved of his

duties as a candidate member of the Politburo N.A. Uglanov, K.Ya. became a candidate member of the Politburo. Bauman (Kyiv Commercial Institute). On June 21, 1929, S.I. became a

candidate member of the Politburo. Syrtsov (commercial school, studied at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute - expelled for revolutionary activities).

On November 17, 1929, N.I. was removed from the Politburo.

Bukharin. Politburo from the 16th to the 17th Congress (July 13, 1930 - February 10, 1934). Members: K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, M.I. Kalinin, S.M. Kirov, S.V. Kosior, V.V. Kuibyshev, V.M. Molotov, Ya.E. Rudzutak, A.I. Rykov, I.V. Stalin.

Candidate members: A.A. Andreev, A.I. Mikoyan, G.I. Petrovsky, S.I. Syrtsov, V.Ya. Chubar.

On December 1, 1930, S.I. was removed from the Politburo. Syrtsov, December 21, 1930 - A.I. Rykov. G.K. became a member of the Politburo. Ordzhonikidze (Tiflis Medical Assistant School), A.A. Andreev was relieved of his duties as a candidate member of the Politburo.

On February 4, 1932, Ya.E.

Rudzutak. A.A. Andreev, on the contrary, became a member of the Politburo.

Politburo from the 17th to the 18th Congress (February 10, 1934 - March 22, 1939). Members: A.A. Andreev, K.E. Voroshilov, L.M. Kaganovich, M.I. Kalinin, S.M. Kirov, S.V. Kosior, V.V. Kuibyshev, V.M. Molotov, G.K. Ordzhonikidze, I.V. Stalin.

Candidate members: A.I. Mikoyan, G.I. Petrovsky, P.P. Postyshev (self-taught), Ya.E. Rudzutak, V.Ya. Chubar. On December

1, 1934, S.M. was killed. Kirov. On

January 25, 1935, V.V. died (or was helped to die). Kuibyshev. On February 1,

1935, A.I. became members of the Politburo. Mikoyan, V.Ya. Chubar, candidates for membership in the Politburo A.A. Zhdanov (real school) and R.I. Eikhe (elementary school). On February

18, 1937, G.K. passed away (or was helped to leave). Ordzhonikidze. On May 26,

1937, Ya.E. was expelled from the Central Committee and, accordingly, the Politburo. Rudzutak. Shot on July 29, 1938. On October

12, 1937, N.I. became a candidate member of the Politburo. Yezhov (incomplete lower education). Shot on February 4, 1940

On January 14, 1938, P.P. was removed from the list of candidates for membership in the Politburo. Postyshev. He was shot on February 26, 1939. Instead of him, N.S. became a candidate member of the Politburo. Khrushchev (workers' faculty, studied at

the Industrial Academy). On June 16, 1938, V.Ya. was removed from the Politburo. Chubar. Shot on February 26, 1939, together with S.V. Kosior and P.P. Postyshev.

Politburo from the XVIII Congress until June 22, 1941. Members: A.A. Andreev, K.E. Voroshilov, A.A. Zhdanov, L.M. Kaganovich, M.I. Kalinin, A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Molotov, I.V. Stalin, N.S. Khrushchev.

Candidate members: L.P. Beria (Baku Secondary Mechanical and Construction Technical School), N.M. Shvernik (city school). On February 21, 1941, N.A.

became candidates for membership in the Politburo. Voznesensky (Y.M. Sverdlov Communist University, since 1935 - Doctor of Economics), G.M. Malenkov (studied at the Moscow Higher Technical School), A.S. Shcherbakov (Y.M. Sverdlov Communist University, Institute of Red Professors). The above data confirm the fact of the constant "cleansing" of the Politburo and replenishing it with new

people loyal to Stalin. Moreover, people were deliberately selected who were able to execute, but not make decisions, people with a certain flaw in their biography, since it was easier to manipulate them. For his darkest deeds, Stalin deliberately selected people who were uneducated and flawed, like N.I. Yezhov, with his incomplete lower education and a height of 154 cm. Not all of the named members and candidate members of the Politburo constantly took part in his activities. CM. Kirov, S.V. Kosior, G.I. Petrovsky, P.P. Postyshev, R.I. Eikhe was represented by the local leadership - respectively, the North-Western region, Ukraine and the West Siberian Territory, and therefore attended meetings of the Politburo from time to time. Ya.E. Rudzutak and V.Ya. Chubar from the very beginning were not privy to all the problems of the party leadership. According to Molotov, Ya.E. Rudzutak "was on the sidelines, on the sidelines"; as for V.Ya. Chubar, then "Stalin could not rely on Chubar, none of us could"[795]6. According to numerous testimonies, the chairman of the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee M.I. Kalinin.

The circle of those initiated into the day-to-day administration of the country and into the development of decisions was much narrower than the actual composition of the Politburo. The practice of secretly solving the cardinal issues of the country's development, which had developed in the course of the intra-party struggle, was finally consolidated in the 1930s. These issues were resolved not at party congresses, as prescribed by its charter, and not even at meetings of the Politburo, but in Stalin's office in the Kremlin or at his "Near" dacha[796]7.

It is unlikely that Stalin sought to legislate his secret "Politburo," or "leading group of the Politburo," as [Molotov called it](#)[797]. Case with S.I. Syrtsov confirms this. Elected as a candidate member of the Politburo on June 21, 1929, he held this position only until [December 1, 1930](#). The main reason for accusing Syrtsov of anti-party actions with all the ensuing consequences was that he understood the real mechanism of decision-making in the party leadership. At a meeting of his supporters on October 22, 1930, Syrtsov said that "the Politburo is a fiction. In fact, everything is decided behind the back of the Politburo, a small group that gathers in the Kremlin, in the former apartment of Zetkina (as in the text. - I.P.), that outside this group there are such members of the Politburo as Kuibyshev, Voroshilov, Kalinin, Rudzutak and vice versa, the "bunch" includes non-members of the Politburo, for example, Yakovlev, Postyshev, and others." Thanks to the denunciation of B. Reznikov, who participated in the meeting on October 22, 1930, the real leadership of the Politburo immediately became aware of this. At a meeting of the commission of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on October 23, Syrtsov confirmed his words that "a number of decisions of the Politburo are predetermined by a certain group", "abnormal"[798]9. On November 4, 1930, at a joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Ordzhonikidze spoke on this case: "Syrtsov began by saying that not everything is fine in the party, that the leadership is closed, that such Politburo members as Voroshilov, Kalinin, Kuibyshev, Rudzutak are isolated, these are not members of the Politburo, these are mechanical members, etc. and so on. In a word, he made all sorts of nonsense..."[799]10. Ordzhonikidze, chairman of the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks,

assessed the principled formulation of the issue as "nonsense." This vividly confirms the fact that everyone participated in the creation of the Stalinist mechanism of power, but they themselves caught on only when it came to their own interests. Then Stalin showed integrity, which happened, in particular, in response to the request of Ordzhonikidze to release his older brother Papulia from the dungeons of the NKVD. The accusation of factionalism in the Bolshevik Party has always been regarded as the most serious crime. Therefore understanding

Raw real decision-making in the country cost him dearly. He himself was accused of factionalism and expelled from the Politburo, in 1937 he was arrested and shot.

In this regard, the conclusion of the compilers of the collection "Stalin's Politburo in the 30s" that in 1937 "the practice of identifying a "leading group" was actually legalized by a special decision of the Politburo"[800]11 is doubtful. As confirmation of this, they consider a document dated April 14, 1937 entitled "Resolution of the Politburo on the preparation of questions for the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks." It said: "1. In order to prepare for the Politburo, and in case of particular urgency - and to resolve - questions of a secret nature, including questions of foreign policy, create a permanent commission under the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, consisting of comrades. Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich and Yezhov

2. In order to successfully prepare for the Politburo urgent current issues of an economic nature, create a permanent commission under the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, consisting of comrades. Molotov,

Stalin, Chubar, Mikoyan and L. Kaganovich"[801]12. Traces of the activities of this commission have not been found. Moreover, it is not clear what kind of secret questions were meant, the task for the implementation of which had to be drawn up in the form of a kind of mandate-decree? And why did it take precisely April 14, 1937? As if before that, the authorities had no secret questions. Perhaps this is one of the mysteries, or rather misinformation, left to future historians. Most likely, the creation of these commissions just before the Great Terror should be regarded as Stalin's desire to shift responsibility for the planned campaign of mass arrests and murders to others. At present, journals with records of

persons who visited Stalin's office in 1924–1953 have been published. [802]13 But who recorded the conversations that took place in this office behind closed doors?! What, for example, did Stalin and Yezhov talk about during regular meetings in 1937-1938? - it is known that Yezhov visited Stalin's office more than 270 times and spent more than 840 hours with him [803]14. Who recorded the conversations at Stalin's Kuntsevo dacha, where he liked to invite his comrades-in-arms? Here is another evidence - D.T. Shepilova: "Usually, after a meeting of the Politburo, Stalin invited

their employees to the "near" dacha. Here they watched a new (or beloved old) film. We had supper. And throughout the night there were discussions of numerous issues. Sometimes necessary people were additionally called here. Sometimes the decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee were formulated here, or it was agreed to prepare such and such [a question by such and such a date](#)"[804]15. These were the relations of the "brotherhood", which is well confirmed both by the surviving oral testimonies of contemporaries and by the correspondence of the members of the Politburo themselves, the touching and caring relations of brothers who were ready to betray each other at any moment, especially if an order was received from the "parent" or "master", as L. Kaganovich called

Stalin in his letters to "dear, dear [Sergo](#)"[805]16. The already mentioned J. Arch. Getty did not see in these informal meetings anything fundamentally different from the practice of narrow offices in the system of political power in [the West](#)[806]17. Indeed, the external organizational forms of decision-making could be similar in Russia and in the West. However, the content of the activity was fundamentally different. In the West, any actions of the authorities were carried out within the framework of existing legislation. Violations of the law that became public knowledge, as a rule, ended in a political scandal. In Russia, not only a narrow group of members of the Politburo, but the Politburo as a whole acted outside the Constitution and formal legislation, and decided the fate of the country by lawless

Therefore, the historian O.V. Khlevnyuk as a result of the study "Politburo. The Mechanisms of Political Power in the 1930s" quite naturally came to the conclusion that the well-known archival documents do not confirm the existence of factions in the Politburo - supporters of tough measures and adherents of a relatively "moderate" course, as well as the fact that Stalin "oscillated between two groups (had to reckon with the presence of opponents of a hard line in his environment) until the mid-30s, until he finally took the side of the adherents [of terror](#)"[807]18. Members of Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s were absolutely dependent political figures, compared with such opponents of the Stalinist course in the party as Trotsky,

Kamenev, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Rykov, although they, too, were exceptionally inconsistent in the inner-party struggle of the 1920s.

[808]19 The only thing that Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev, who are classified as “moderates”, and “radicals”, which include Kaganovich, Molotov, Yezhov, turned out to be capable of somehow defending their departmental interests, which, in fact, speaking, it was required of them. A special place in the history

of the Politburo in the 1930s. occupy Stalin's relationship with Ordzhonikidze, who tried to defend the employees of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry under his jurisdiction and prove the groundlessness of their accusations of sabotage. About the fate of the secretary of the Magnitogorsk City Party Committee V.V. Lominadze had a special conversation with Stalin, about which he told in his closing speech at the plenum of the Central Committee on March 5, 1937: “How much blood he spoiled for himself to flirt with Lominadze. How much blood he spoiled for himself, he kept hoping that he could straighten Lominadze, but he cheated him, let him down at every turn. How much blood he spoiled in order to defend against all such, as you can see now, bastards like Vardanyan, Gogoberidze, Meliksetov, Okudzhava - now it has been revealed in the Urals. How much blood he spoiled for himself and for us how much blood he spoiled, and he made a mistake on this, because he suffered more than all of us and worried that these people, whom he trusted most of all and whom he considered personally devoted to himself, turned out to be the last scoundrels ... ”. However, no evidence that Ordzhonikidze “tried to openly oppose the terrorist course in general, sought condemnation, and even more so the removal of Stalin” could not be found [809]20. All representatives of the party elite in the

1930s. did not have independent thinking. That is why they passed the most severe selection and were quite suitable for Stalin as the executors of the plans he had conceived. Accordingly, acting in relation to their subordinates, they could only “press”, issue

“pressing directives”, in the words of L. Kaganovich[810]21.—

All of them even psychologically suited each other. According to the recollections of Stalin's surviving contemporaries, who could closely observe him along with their associates,

"Swearing was in high esteem with him. And following his example, the whole environment"[811]22. Rudeness was considered a special valor among the top party leadership. Even Sergo Ordzhonikidze, whom contemporaries remembered with more sympathy than other members of Stalin's entourage, was harsh and unrestrained, which is confirmed by many documents[812]23. And here is an unknown episode from the history of the inner-party struggle of the 1920s, which from an unexpected side characterizes such members of the Politburo as Kalinin and Molotov, who behaved in the same way as Voroshilov, known for his antics. From a letter from I. Kastritsky, Deputy Managing Director of the Red Triangle Plant, to G. Zinoviev about the meeting in Leningrad on January 15, 1926 (the meeting was dedicated to the XIV Party Congress that had just passed): "Voroshilov rudely and sharply attacked the Komsomol members, running to another end of the Presidium table, he said: "I will grind you to powder." Such a statement by Voroshilov provoked violent protests from the Komsomol, to which Comrade Voroshilov again declared: "I will take you to the Red Army and we will talk there," to which the Komsomol replied: "Here is a good agitation for the Red Army." When Voroshilov spoke about democracy in the party, he said: "You are seeking democracy, we will give you such democracy that in three days you will not recognize your relatives." Further, he called the meeting "buzoters" and so on. harsh expressions. T. Kalinin also constantly used harsh expressions, which caused excitement in the meeting. For example, addressing women, he said: "Well, you are crazy, we will least of all reckon with you," and addressing the Komsomol members, he called them "brats." Molotov called the chairman of the meeting "a bastard, a saboteur, a counter-revolutionary, I will grind you to powder, I will attract you to the Central Control Commission, I know you." In the end, Molotov—

said: "We are leaving and we will put our resolution in print..."[813]24. Stalin and his entourage very unequivocally characterize their resolutions in the suicide letters of party members close to them who were repressed during the years of the Great Terror. In a letter to I.E. Yakira Stalin wrote: "A scoundrel and a prostitute", Voroshilov added: "A completely accurate definition", Molotov signed this, and Kaganovich attributed: "Traitor, bastard and ... (followed

Such people represented the highest party authority in the 1930s. The fact that it was a model, a decoration of the real secret power of Stalin and his henchmen, whom he selectively and from time to time brought closer to him, is evidenced not only by the collection of documents "Stalin's Politburo in the 30s" published in 1995, but also authentic protocols of the Politburo, including those that went under the heading "special folder". The most important military and foreign policy issues for him, Stalin did not trust even the "special folder", preferring not to leave any traces at all.

A similar practice of secret solution of issues existed in local party committees. "I must declare," said M.M. Khataevich, - that about 95% of all decisions that were made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine on appointment, relocation, etc., I learned about them, although I was a member of the Politburo, post factum, either from the protocol that I receive, or from newspapers, from comrades, from conversations"[815]26. Not to take this most important circumstance into account means not only not to understand the mechanism of action of communist power (these traditions are still alive today and are constantly manifested in the actions of the post-communist Russian government), but also the essence of the processes that took place in the history of Soviet society, and not only in the Center, but and on the ground.

In itself, the activities of the Politburo in the 1930s. demonstrates the fact of the finally completed merger of party and state bodies. What Trotsky and Lenin insisted on before the 11th Party Congress in 1922, and which, according to Trotsky, threatened "with the most grave consequences," Stalin called in 1931 "the rotten attitude of non-intervention in , a new directive corresponding to the current period to intervene in [everything](#)"[816]27. By the end of the 1930s. local government bodies could not take—

practically a single step without the approval or approval of this or that issue at the Politburo. There were decisions of the Politburo even on the following issues: "On the prices of vegetables in a number of cities of the USSR", "On the program for the production of champagne ...", "On the castration of surplus bulls on collective farms and state farms", "On seeds for collective farms ...", "On the opening of new stores "Gastronom"" , etc. etc. [\[817\]28.](#) —

Unlike L. Kaganovich, who proudly declared at the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that the Politburo was interfering in everything, N. Khrushchev, speaking at the June 1957 plenum of the Central Committee, quite legitimately took credit for the abolition of this practice. "... For example, in recent years not a single telegram has been sent to the localities from the Central Committee of the CPSU about intensifying sowing, about autumn plowing or manure removal," he said. – We unleashed the initiative of local organizations, provided the opportunity for the localities to resolve these issues in the way that the interests of agricultural development suggest. After all, local people know better when to haul manure, where to haul it, and how to plow it in"[818]29. However, it was not easy to move away from such leadership practices in the established system, since the laws of the system constantly prevailed over attempts to go beyond its framework (Khrushchev himself soon showed this as well). Speaking again in the words of L. Kaganovich, "if you want to keep at the achieved level, then you must always keep the threads from

all the keys, even [small ones](#)"[819]30.

The Politburo stamped decisions on a huge number of issues. In the early 1930s at each meeting it reached 50, moreover, of a very different nature. In order to streamline the current situation, on January 7, 1931, the Politburo, at the initiative of Stalin, decided "on the 10th, 20th and 30th to hear only questions of the GPU, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, defense, currency (secret) and some internal party questions, deferring consideration of the remaining issues to the regular meetings of the Politburo on the 5th, 15th and 25th of each month. To entrust the preparation of the agenda of the meetings of the Politburo to the secretary of the Central Committee together with Molotov "[820]31. On September 1, 1932, also at Stalin's suggestion, the maximum number of questions for discussion at one meeting was set - no more than [15](#)[821]32. The meetings of the Politburo themselves were meetings, in

which were attended not only by members and candidate members of the Politburo, but also members and candidate members of the Central Committee, members of the bureau of the Commission of Party Control under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the bureau of the Commission of Soviet Control under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, people's commissars of the USSR and other specially invited persons. Even after the Great Terror, when more and more often Politburo decisions were approved by poll, extended meetings of this highest party body were also convened. All this speaks of the desire of the ruling party elite

maintain the image of a democratic discussion of issues at the Politburo, at party congresses, etc.

Part of the questions at the meetings of the Politburo were introduced directly by Stalin himself or jointly with Molotov, sometimes with Kaganovich as a result of their preliminary discussion orally or in letters. They, too, "were secret, they were delivered by courier, the Chekists brought them," V. Molotov told F. Chuev [822]33. Since Stalin often left Moscow at that time for vacation, he constantly gave written instructions to his subordinates. O.V. Khlevniuk quite accurately noted that, fortunately for historians, telephone communication in those years between Moscow and the southern resort areas was imperfect. Here is the testimony of S. Ordzhonikidze: "It is not easy to talk on the phone - you have to roar, you can hear very badly, although sometimes you can hear

pretty decently"[823]34. Therefore, it was necessary to write, and letters, as a rule, were exchanged by all members of the Politburo. And although not all letters have reached us, primarily because they were simply destroyed, we should be grateful that at least something has come through. This is despite the fact that the most secret questions in the letters were not touched upon at all. There is evidence left by L. Kaganovich in a letter to S. Ordzhonikidze (not earlier than September 24, 1933): "Things on the CER are getting more complicated. It's a pity you didn't take the CC code with you. I wanted to send you ciphers, but I thought that it was somehow awkward not using the cipher

of the Central Committee" [824]35. However, even such letters, like no other genre, reveal a person's personality. So, reading the letters of People's Commissar of Defense K. Voroshilov with his "think", "know" (without a soft sign) or absolutely illiterate letters of a member of the Central Control Commission, and since 1934 the CPC M. Shkiryatov with his "come" and "agree", physically you feel fear at the thought of being completely dependent on these people who have taken upon themselves the right to

remake the life of a vast country[825]36. Stalin most often wrote to Molotov and Kaganovich, who, after Molotov's appointment to the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, became the second secretary of the Central Committee. "We still receive regular and frequent directives from the owner, which gives us the opportunity not to miss, however, in fact, h

otherwise," Kaganovich wrote to Ordzhonikidze in 1932. [826]37 "Stalin works 24 hours a day," was said at the time in Moscow. To the perplexed question: "How is this physically possible?" - they answered: "Very simply - for eight hours he works under his real name, and for sixteen hours - under the pseudonyms "Kaganovich" and "Molotov"

"[827]38. However, Stalin was closest in the 1930s. was Molotov. One of the evidence of this is Stalin's letter to Molotov dated September 1, 1933: "To be honest, I (and Voroshilov also) didn't like that you were leaving for 1 1/2 months, and not for two weeks, as was agreed when we made up vacation plan. If I knew you wanted to go away for 1 1/2 months, I would suggest a different vacation plan. Why you changed the plan - I can not understand. Escape from Sergo? Is it really difficult to understand that it is impossible to leave the PB and SNK for a long time to—

Kuibyshev (he can drink it down) and Kaganovich..."[828]39. To prepare decisions on a number of practical issues, special commissions were created, which were formed from members of the Politburo, who attracted other party, state or economic leaders to work. These commissions worked on the issue, and based on the results, a decision was made, which was approved by the Politburo. Such commissions were created for various periods - from days to several months and even years. Let's give some examples. On May 13, 1929, the Politburo decided: "Switch to a system of mass employment of criminal prisoners with a sentence of at least three years in the Ukhta, Indigo, etc." The development of this issue was entrusted to a special commission consisting of N.M. Janson (People's Commissar of Justice of the RSFSR), G.G. Berries (deputy chairman of the OGPU), N.V. Krylenko (Prosecutor of the RSFSR), V.N. Tolmacheva (People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR) and N.A. Uglanova (People's Commissar of Labor of the USSR). As a result, a project was prepared, based on the experience of organizing and operating the Solovetsky camp. On June 27, 1929, the Politburo approved the Janson Commission's proposal to establish mass camps under the control of the OGPU. The only clarification was: "In the future, the concentration camps will be called forced labor camps." On July 11, 1929, this decision was formalized already "in the Sovi

Labor of Criminal Prisoners", on the basis of which amendments were made to the criminal legislation and the Regulations on labor camps were adopted

in April 1930 [829] 40 collectivization. The commission included: V.M. Molotov (chairman), A.A. Andreev, S.A. Bergavinov, I.M. Vareikis, F.I. Goloshchekin, N.N. Demchenko, E.G. Evdokimov, M.D. Carlson, I.D. Kabakov, M.I. Kalmanovich, S.V. Kosior, F.G. Leonov, M.I. Muranov, S.I. Syrtsov, M.M. Khataevich, B.P. Sheboldaev, R.I. Eikhe, T.A. Yurkin, G.G. Yagoda, Ya.Ya. Yakovlev, Ya.D. Janson. On January 16 and 18 K.Ya. Bauman and G.N. Kaminsky, and on January 20 and 23 - N.M. Goloded, A.V. Odintsov and N.M. Ancelovich.

The secretaries of the party committees of the grain regions and part of the districts of the consuming strip, as well as the heads of central institutions and organizations, including the OGPU, the People's Commissariat of Justice, and others, were thus represented in the commission. On January 26, the prepared draft resolution of the Central Committee was sent to the Politburo, which The city approved it as a resolution of the Central Committee "On measures for the liquidation of kulak farms in areas of complete —

collectivization", on the same day it was telegraphed [830]41. By resolutions of the Politburo of February 20 and March 11, 1931, a commission was created to direct the work "on the eviction and resettlement of kulaks." The commission included A.A. Andreev (Chairman), G.G. Yagoda and P.P. Postyshev. October 5, 1931 instead of A.A. Andreev, Ya.E. Rudzutak. The Commission dealt with issues related to settlers: their distribution by regions and assignment to certain economic bodies, supervision of the arrangement of special settlers and the use of their labor[831]42.

Such commissions to address specific issues also operated in subsequent years, such as, for example, the commission on child homelessness chaired by M.I. Kalinin, created by a resolution of the Politburo of December 27, 1934 [832]43-In

the 1930s. there were also a number of standing commissions, one of which was the Politburo Commission on Political

(judicial) cases. The regulation on it was approved by the Politburo as early as September 23, 1926. Local Soviet and party organizations were to send indictments to the Commission in all those cases to which local party organizations attach social and political significance or consider it necessary to listen in the order of show trials. Only the Politburo could give directives to judicial and investigative bodies in these cases[833]44. O.V. Khlevnyuk notes that this Commission was especially active in 1937-1938. - on average, ~~once~~ a month, she submitted her protocols for approval by the Politburo, which no one has yet seen. Further, there are suggestions that, perhaps, the protocols meant those 383 lists "for many thousands of party, Soviet, Komsomol, military and economic workers", which, as Khrushchev said at the XX Congress of the CPSU, Yezhov sent Stalin for approval[834] 45. However, the frequently changing composition of this commission headed by Kalinin (at different times it included, along with well-known people - Yagoda, Yezhov, Vyshinsky - people little known and of little influence - one by one the prosecutors of the USSR Akulov, Pankratiev, Bochkov, etc.) suggests about her fake character during the years of the Great Terror.

The level of competence of the Defense Commission, which was a joint Commission of the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars, raises serious doubts. This commission was created by a decision of the Politburo of December 23, 1930, instead of the Administrative Meetings of the STO of the USSR and the Politburo Defense Commission chaired by Rykov, formed in July 1925 and abolished at the suggestion of Stalin in April 1930. The new Defense Commission included Molotov, Stalin, Voroshilov, Kuibyshev and Ordzhonikidze. Then Kaganovich and Mezhlauk were included. By a Politburo resolution of April 27, 1937, the functions of this Commission were transferred to the USSR Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in the amount of seven people: Molotov - chairman, Stalin, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Chubar, Rukhimovich, Mezhlauk; ~~candidates~~ - Gamarnik, Mikoyan, Zhdanov, Yezhov[835]46. As a reason for doubting the real activities of this committee is not so much the fact that such members as Chubar, Rukhimovich, Mezhlauk, Gamarnik, Yezhov became victims of terror, but the decision of the Politburo of November 18, 1940, according to which the

aviation industry of the USSR A.I. Shakhurin had to send daily encrypted messages from the directors of engine and aircraft factories about the number of engines (for each type) and aircraft (for each type of aircraft) accepted by the military representatives to only two addresses - Stalin and Molotov [836]47 . There were also joint commissions of the Politburo and the Council of People's

Commissars of the USSR - the Currency Commission, which dealt with the distribution of currency and the preparation of export-import plans, the Commission for Railway Transport, the Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for Traveling Abroad, and the Mongolian Commission of the Politburo, which oversaw the order in pro-Soviet Mongolia [837]48. In the 1930s not only the Soviets, but also their executive

bodies - the Council of People's Commissars and local executive committees, as already noted, were completely deprived of independent power. The following practice was established - the Politburo approved all any significant decisions of the Council of People's Commissars or transferred to the Council of People's Commissars for implementation "in the Soviet order" the decisions of the Politburo. All correspondence with the Politburo was conducted by the secret department of the Administrative Department of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Sometimes the Politburo refused to approve the decisions of the Council of People's Commissars [838]49.

Politburo resolutions were drawn up, as a rule, on behalf of the Council of People's Commissars, the Council of Labor and Defense, or simply the Central Committee. Even the decision of the STO on measures "to combat locusts in Central Asia and the meadow moth in the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR" should be based on the decision of the Politburo of May 30, 1929—

[839] 50 However, in the 1930s . Stalin, especially after the appointment of Molotov as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, while maintaining the established order of relations between the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars, formally included the Council of People's Commissars in his system of power as an equal partner. All directives from the Center followed two signatures - first, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov, then Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin (sometimes Kaganovich signed instead of Stalin). In a number of cases, Stalin alone signed as secretary of the Central Committee. Since there were a lot of outgoing documents, the employees of the Secretariat of the Central Committee certified them simply by facsimile of the signatures of the indicated persons. Following these signatures, urgent ciphered telegrams of the "G" series were also sent to the places. Moreover, the instructions to the local authorities that were contained i

touched on almost all aspects of activity, and secondly, they went on constantly. Here are a few examples of such telegrams to the West Siberian Regional Committee and Regional Executive Committee R.I. Eikhe and F.P. Gryadinsky:

August 14, 1933: The decision of the Central Committee of August 13 is reported: "First. Reduce the price of baked bread for free sale from state stores in all cities, except Moscow, Leningrad and the cities of the Far East, by setting the following prices: for rye sour two rubles per kilo instead of the current two rubles fifty kopecks, for custard and Ukrainian rye two rubles fifty kopecks instead of the current three rubles per kilo, for wheat from eighty-five percent grinding three rubles fifty kopecks instead of the current four rubles. Second. The new prices will come into effect on August 20. Secretary of the Central Committee [Stalin](#)"[840]51. September 27, 1934: "When carrying out grain deliveries in the areas of the Tara district, we allow taking rye instead

of wheat in the equivalent - 1 pood of wheat - 47 pounds of rye. We set up a replacement fund of five thousand tons. Molotov. Kaganovich"[841]52. November 16, 1934: "We are allowed to accept wheat with an admixture of frost-bitten grains up to thirty percent at grain purchases.

Stalin. [Molotov](#)"[842]53.

Not only short telegrams were sent to the places, but also letters-telegrams. One of these messages dated August 31, 1934 to Novosibirsk to the same addressees took up three pages of typewritten text. At least the directive part should be cited from it, which vividly illustrates both the administrative-mandatory style of leadership, and interference in everything, and the desire to achieve grain procurement at any cost. This message is typical of the 1930s. and at the same time clearly confirms the key position of the party leadership, expressed in the words of L. Kaganovich: "I must say that the state will take its own anyway and will not give up a single pound" [843]54.

"... 1. Immediately identify lagging areas by taking appropriate measures of influence and report to the Central Committee [and] SNK both the list of lagging areas and the measures taken against them. To take the necessary measures of influence in relation to the Party and Soviet leadership in those areas, state farms and collective farms, where the work of harvesting, threshing and grain procurement is poorly organized, opening each case up to the removal from work and expulsion from the Party of those guilty of disrupting state tasks. 2. To take all legally prescribed measures of influence on non-deliverers of grain: fines and early recovery of the unfulfilled part of the entire annual grain delivery plan in relation to faulty collective farms, and in relation to individual farmers - fines up to five times the market value of the unfulfilled part of the grain delivery obligations with involvement in the court liability under article 61 of the Criminal Code (the article provided for imprisonment for a term of one to two years with confiscation of property. - I.P.). 3. Immediately send to the field two-thirds of the members of the bureaus of the regional committees, regional committees and members of the presidiums of the regional and regional executive committees for the entire month of September with the assignment of duties to achieve the necessary rates of harvesting, threshing and grain procurement, as well as the best use of machines and the establishment of labor discipline on collective farms and state farms. 4. Propose to the regional committees, regional committees and regional executive committees to immediately recall the secretaries of the party committees and chairmen of the executive committees and other leading employees of the regions of the regions of the regions from vacation, due to the unsatisfactory progress of grain procurements. 5. The Central Committee [and] SNK decides to send comrades Molotov to Western Siberia, Kaganovich L. to Ukraine, Kirov to Kazakhstan, Voroshilov to Belarus and the Western region, Mikoyan to the Kursk and Voronezh regions, Chubar to the Middle Volga region, Zhdanov to the Stalingrad region, Chernov to the Chelyabinsk region, Kalmanovich to Bashkiria, Kaminsky to the Karaganda region, Kleinar to

And

With

Saratov Territory and, in addition, to send to the same regions and territories to control the implementation of the directive of the Central Committee [and] SNK by local organizations of the [following] members of the commission of party and Soviet control ... Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov. Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. [Stalin](#)"[844]55.

Regarding these signatures, Molotov's statement has been preserved: "At one time, when there were general decisions of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee, they wrote this: "Presovnarkom Molotov, Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin." That's how it was printed. This is a Leninist rule... It turned out a little awkward here, because decrees were usually signed like this: the chairman and the secretary. Secretary - the manager turns out, there is awkwardness in this. Then they found a way out, they began to write in one line: the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the Secretary of [the Central Committee](#). In such a sequence, ~~and~~ also in the fact that Stalin signed simply as "Secretary of the Central Committee", there was a characteristic nuance: those who took this at face value were irrevocably mistaken. However, there were few such naive people, but everyone played on false modesty.

By analogy with the resolutions of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, the regional and regional committees of the party and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics drew up their directives. Just like the directives of the Center, the resolutions of the local authorities reflected everyday petty interference in literally every detail of economic life. Here, for example, are the titles of some resolutions of the Bureau of the Zapsibkrai Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Zapsibkrai Executive Committee, signed by Eikhe and Gryadinsky in 1937: "On the repair of tractors" of February 4, "On the progress of filling seeds" of February 16, "On the progress of logging in Izhmorsky District" dated March 5, "On the fight against agricultural pests of sugar beet" dated June 9, "On the progress of weeding crops" dated June 22, "On the care of grass seed plants" dated July 3, "On the progress of the repair of grain combines" dated July 15, "On the dispatch of authorized representatives of the regional committee and the regional executive committee for grain harvesting and grain delivery" of August 21, "On the progress of harvesting ~~and~~ spreading flax" of [September 5](#)[846]57.

All documents that were sent to the places signed by Molotov, Stalin, Kaganovich and other secretaries of the Central Committee were prepared in

apparatus of the Central Committee. New cadres were accepted into the apparatus of the Central Committee only after they were approved by Stalin and Kaganovich[847]58. In the early 1930s The apparatus of the Central Committee consisted of six departments: organizational instruction, distribution, department of culture and propaganda, department of agitation and mass campaigns, secret department, administration of [affairs](#)[848]59. After the reorganization carried out in accordance with the decisions XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Central Committee had the following departments - agricultural, industrial, transport, planning, financial and trade, political and administrative department, department of leading party bodies, department of culture and propaganda of Leninism, Marx - Engels - Lenin Institute and two sectors: sector Office of Affairs and the Special Sector. In the regional and regional committees - agricultural, industrial and transport, Soviet trade, culture and propaganda of Leninism, leading party bodies (city and district) and the Special [Sector](#)[849]60.

The 18th Congress introduced new changes in the structure of the apparatus of the Central Committee, in which from that time there was a Personnel Department, a Propaganda and Agitation Department, an organizational and instructor department, an agricultural department, and a school department. (A special sector in the resolution of the congress "Changes in the Charter of the CPSU (b)" on the report of Comrade Zhdanov was not indicated, which indicated an even greater classification of its activities). In the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties there was a personnel department, a propaganda instructor agitation department, ~~department of culture and propaganda~~ and a special sector (not specified in the resolution). In city committees and district committees - the personnel department, the department of propaganda and agitation, the organizational and instructor department (a special sector was not indicated). In addition, in the district committees, city committees, district committees, regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, by decision of the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), military departments were created, the duties of which, as stated in the resolution, were "assistance to military bodies in the establishment of registration of those liable for military service, organization of conscription , mobilization in case of war, in the organization of air defense, etc ."[850]61.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee was in charge of the apparatus of the Central Committee. The composition of the Secretariat of the Central Committee also did not remain unchanged throughout [the period under](#)

[review](#)[851]62. Secretariat in the period from the XV to the XVI Congress of the CPSU (b):

I.V. Stalin (General Secretary), S.V. Kosior, N.A. Kubiak, V.M. Molotov, N.A. Uglanov. Candidate members of the Secretariat: A.V. Artyukhina, A.S. Bubnov, I.M. Moskvin.

On April 11, 1928, A.P. was approved as Secretary of the Central Committee. Smirnov, relieved of these duties by N.A. Kubiak, K.Ya. Bauman.

July 12, 1928 instead of S.V. Kosior was introduced to the Secretariat by L.M. Kaganovich.

April 29, 1929 instead of N.A. Uglanov, K.Ya. became the secretary of the Central Committee. Bauman. Secretariat in the period from the 16th to the 17th Congress of the CPSU(b): I.V. Stalin (General Secretary), K.Ya. Bauman, L.M. Kaganovich, V.M. Molotov, P.P. Postyshev.

Candidate members of the Secretariat: I.M. Moskvin, N.M. Shvernik. December 21, 1930 V.M. Molotov was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee in connection with his appointment to the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the

USSR instead of A.I. Rykov. On October 2, 1932, K.Ya. Bauman and I.M. Moskvin.

Secretariat in the period from the XVII to the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b): A.A. Zhdanov, L.M. Kaganovich, S.M. Kirov, I.V. Stalin (after the 17th Congress of the CPSU(b), Stalin referred to himself modestly as "Secretary of the Central

Committee"). After the murder of S.M. Kirov, the secretaries of the Central Committee were N.I. A.A. Zhdanov - February 1 and 28, 1935, respectively.

Secretariat in the period from the XVIII Congress to June 22, 1941:

AA. Andreev, A.A. Zhdanov, G.M. Malenkov, I.V. Stalin. On May 4, 1941, A.S. became Secretary of the Central Committee.

Shcherbakov. In addition to the Politburo and the Secretariat, the Orgburo of the Central Committee continued to exist in the structure of the highest party bodies during this period, which was mainly responsible for organizational issues. Since at that time the formation of the structure of party bodies in the Center and in the localities was finally completed, the Organizational Bureau duplicated many issues that were within the competence of the Secretariat, and vice versa. After the XIX Congress of the CPSU

The Orgburo was no longer in the structure of the highest party bodies. In the apparatus of the Central Committee, these functions

were performed by the Organizing Department of the Central Committee. The main structure of the apparatus of the Central Committee was the Secret Department - the Special Sector. At the beginning of 1930, it had 103 employees. In total, ~~the~~ staff of the apparatus of the Central Committee at that time was 375 people[852]63. The employees of the Secret Department had great privileges compared to the rest of the employees of the Central Committee apparatus: the salary was higher by 30-40%, all employees were provided with apartments, five summer cottages were also transferred to their disposal with the service of their apparatus of the Central Committee Affairs Department. ~~In~~ addition, additional rations were provided for, etc.[853]64 In accordance with the proposals of the head of the Secret Department of the Central Committee, I.P. Tovstukha dated May 10, 1929, approved by Stalin and Molotov, "in order to better conceal the functions of the Secret Department, as well as to avoid possible abuse of names such as the Politburo, Orgburo, Shifrburo, etc.", as The note stated that the sectors of the department were renamed "in numerical order:

Sector I - assistants of the secretaries of the Central Committee and their apparatuses (referents, commissioners);

II sector - the secretariat, conducting the paperwork of the P / B;

III sector - office work O / B;

IV sector - cipher record keeping;

V sector - accounting and control over the return of secret documents;

VI - secret archive of the Central Committee; And

VII - office (registration, external and internal communications, typing and shorthand)"[854]65. —

The secret department reported directly to Stalin. In documents, it was sometimes referred to as the "Secretariat of Comrade Stalin." They also knew him as "Stalin's Cabinet" or "Stalin's Office". When he left for the South, in the early 1930s. left behind Kaganovich. After the reorganization of the Secret Department into the Special Sector of the Central Committee after the XVII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, A.N. Poskrebyshev, officially appointed on March 10, 1934 by the Politburo to the post of head of this department, was already subordinate only ~~to~~ Stalin[855]66. In the Special Sector of the Central Committee, whose activities from that time were even more secretive, not only were all documents prepared for meetings

Politburo, protocols and resolutions of the Politburo were drawn up, decisions were made by "polling" its members, permission was issued to attend closed meetings of the Politburo and plenums of the Central Committee, and in 1937-1938. voting forms were filled in by polling members and candidate members of the Central Committee for the expulsion of one or another member of the Central Committee from the party, followed by arrest. Among the surviving materials of the June 1937 plenum of the Central Committee are notes by G.M. Malenkova, G. Dimitrova, S.E. Chutskaev, addressed to Stalin and Poskrebyshev, with a request to be allowed to attend the plenum. Not everyone who made such a request received a positive response. So, Chutskaev, who since 1935 held the post of chief state arbiter at the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR, was refused. As a rule, this was a sign, and indeed, he was soon repressed. Preserved voting forms by a poll for the arrest of Ya.E. Rudzutak and M.N. Tukhachevsky dated May 24, 1937, I.E. Yakira and I.P. Uborevich dated May 30, 1937. As a rule, everyone wrote "for". So, on the form of voting by a poll for exclusion from the party and the arrest of Rudzutak and Tukhachevsky A.I. Egorov signed "I agree completely", N.K. ____

Krupskaya "agrees", and I.A. Pyatnitsky, who was arrested immediately after this plenum, signed [in favor](#)^[856]⁶⁷. Many documents were prepared exclusively in Stalin's Cabinet and immediately, without any approval by the Politburo, went as directives to local party bodies. So it was with the closed letter "Lessons from the events associated with the villainous murder of S.M. Kirov" dated January 18, 1935, the text of which was compiled personally by Stalin. The closed letter dated July 29, 1936 "On the terrorist activities of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist counter-revolutionary bloc", also sent to local party bodies even before the end of the investigation and the start of the trial of the so-called Anti-Soviet United Trotskyist-Zinovievist Center, was a draft letter prepared in the department Yezhov and edited by Stalin (the original draft of this letter with Stalin's corrections has been preserved ~~in the~~ Presidential Archive) [\[857\]](#)⁶⁸. The text of the famous encrypted telegram dated January 10, 1939, which was sent to the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics, the people's commissars of inte

"The use of physical force in the practice of the NKVD was allowed from 1937 with the permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks," was also written by

[Stalin\[858\]69](#). From the beginning of the 1930s through the Secret Department - the Special Sector of the Central Committee passed all secret and strictly secret correspondence, subject to registration in the secret registry:

1. All correspondence addressed to the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. (All correspondence addressed to the Cipher Bureau was registered with the Cipher Bureau).

2. All protocols and extracts from the minutes of meetings of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the national republics, district committees and ukoms (districts - after zoning - I.P.), as well as the protocols of the bureaus of the district committees of Moscow and Leningrad.

3. Verbatim records of meetings, party conferences, organizations listed in § 2. 4. All closed letters. 5. All reports of the instructors of the party committees on the survey organizations.

6. Answers to documents coming from the Secret Department. 7. All characteristics for nomenclature workers. 8. Inquiries from the punitive authorities about individual members of the party. 9. Information materials of the OGPU - NKVD. 10. Reports of people's commissariats and large commercial, industrial and public organizations. 11. Correspondence about the movements and appointments of individual workers passing through the Organizing Bureau. 12. Correspondence about debts of party members, if the debt was discreditable. Correspondence about embezzlement.

13. Correspondence with the field corps of the OGPU-NKVD about the transfer secret correspondence and dislocation bonds.

14. Correspondence on the rules of secrecy, subordination of receiving materials from the Central

Committee, etc. 15. All correspondence of foreign

[cells\[859\]70](#). In the 1930s This list has been amended from time to time. Thus, since 1931, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture had to send regular "reports on the progress of preparations for the sowing campaign with an assessment of the progress of preparations for the regions and events" to the Politburo[860]71. —

Since 1935, due to the huge influx of documentation into the Special Sector from local party bodies, it was limited to sending, in addition to protocols, materials on the following issues: 1) reshuffling nomenclature workers; 2) issues requiring approval or approval of the Central Committee; 3) issues of particular importance, on which it is necessary to inform the Central Committee before the arrival of the protocols; 4) issues of mass party work; 5) decisions related to the implementation of activities carried out by [the Central Committee](#)[861]72.

However, the flow of materials from the NKVD to the Special Sector of the Central Committee, on the contrary, increased. Creating in 1922 - 1923. his mechanism of power with a system of secret office work, Stalin thus concentrated in his hands all the power in the country, since everything was "on the hook" with him. It was this circumstance that made Stalin's power all-encompassing and all-penetrating. Such a statement does not in the least contradict evidence of the depressing atmosphere of disorder in which this power operated. The disorder was also manifested in the activities of the authorities themselves, even in their "holy of holies" - secret office work. Largely due to this mess, some of what, according to the rules, was required to be destroyed or sent to the Center, was preserved. Chaos and disorder, of course, interfered with the ruling regime, but they were an incommensurably smaller evil than orderly resistance, and therefore had only to be kept within certain limits through the same repressions. This is what demonstrates the strength of the regime, its strategy and tactics of political domination: the social energy of the masses was scattered in the daily struggle for existence and extinguished by repression. In addition, chaos and disorder played a politically camouflage role in Stalin's politics and continue to play it historically. Thanks to all-encompassing secrecy, on the one hand, and chaos and disorder, on the other, Stalin managed to hide the main state secret of the Soviet Union, which consisted, as V. Suvorov rightly noted, in the implementation of a plan to secretly transfer the country to a [_____](#)

wartime regime. True, this happened in practice already from the end of the 1920s, and not only in 1937-1941. [862]73. Since that time, in c

People's Commissariats, as well as in all republican, regional, regional and district governments, in institutions, at all enterprises, like secret departments, mobilization departments were created that prepared mobilization plans, or rather, exercised control over the preparation for war. After, according to G. Georgievsky (Kartsev), the mobilization plan began to play an ever-increasing role in the production of goods in the USSR, and since 1934 it began to completely dominate, the secret mobilization office work also increased[863]74. There are data in the literature by N.S. Simonov that by 1931 the total number of employees of the mobilization bodies in the center and in the localities amounted to 31,858 people . thousand people, of which 480 thousand were registered on a permanent basis [865]76. If we agree with these figures, it turns out that this is more than the entire government apparatus of tsarist Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, which was approximately 385 thousand people.[866]77 However, it is not possible to establish a reliable figure also because with In 1930, in many departments, independent —

mobilization office work was liquidated, becoming part of the office work of secret departments. There was no strict directive on this issue, but there was a circular of the Special Department of the OGPU signed by G.I. Boki, agreed with the People's Commissariat of the RCT, the Headquarters of the Red Army, the RZ STO and SNK (the attitude of the STO of June 14, 1930). According to this circular, independent mobilization office work remained in the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukrainian SSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the BSSR, the Council of People's Commissars of the ZSFSR, the Defense Sector of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the Supreme Economic Council, the NKPS, the NKTorg of the USSR, and the NKTorg of the RSFSR. For mobilization correspondence in the secret departments, special cases were opened, which were issued exclusively to workers involved in mobilization production. The merger of the clerical work of the mobilization bodies and the secret departments (units) did not mean a complete merger of their functions. "In this respect, both," as the document said published by government bodies"[867]78. —

Workers for conducting secret mobilization production, as well as employees of secret departments, were selected only in agreement with the bodies of the OGPU - NKVD. By the way, this department also had a mobilization [department](#)^[868]⁷⁹. All activities for the preparation of annual mobilization plans were strictly classified. Moreover, since 1930, within the limits of the Central Committee apparatus itself, not only the ordinary office work of the Secret Department, but also all office work on mobilization and military issues were considered secret. These materials were known only to the responsible executor and the circle of technical workers of the Secret Department who served the secret office work ^[869]⁸⁰. All documents on mobilization issues emanating from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks were sent through the Secret Department - the Special Sector, and, after registering and sending these documents, the leave of the latter was transferred by the secret registry to the secretary of the Organizing Bureau for storage in a special (mobilization) case and in special storage under personal responsibility of the ~~latter~~

^[870]⁸¹. Since 1930, courier communications, through which secret and secret mobilization correspondence was carried out, covered literally the entire country. According to the order of the OGPU dated August 23, 1930, on the reorganization of the OGPU field communications, in connection with the zoning, the task was set of "100% coverage of the service of all districts", since the district committees of the party also sent their secret and strictly secret correspondence to the regional or regional center through the field communications. The need for this was explained by the "increased pace of socialist ~~con~~struction"^[871]⁸². After the creation of the political departments of the MTS and state farms, all secret correspondence from higher bodies also came to the deputy heads of the political departments for the work of the NKVD, also through the courier connection. Maintenance of each route to the address of the political departments cost an average of 180-200 rubles. per month. For comparison, the average salary in cities, according to A.G. Mankov, a

The activity of the courier corps of the OGPU-NKVD was still strictly conspiratorial. "Each employee of the courier communications," it was said in the "Rules for organizing the work of the courier service," "is obliged to know his duties well and, when performing them, firmly remember that the slightest disclosure

the activities of the feldsvyaz as a whole or of a separate section of it may contribute to espionage and cause material damage to the Republic. As an employee of the OGPU, each employee of the field communications is obliged to keep the nature of the work he performs strictly secret, even from his closest relatives"[873]84. Needless to say, there were heroes here too. So, by order of the OGPU of August 1, 1930, courier Orekhov was forever enrolled in the lists of field communications of the Ostrogozhsk district department of the OGPU for the fact that during the train crash on the South Eastern Railway on July 8, 1930, "despite the rising panic among the passengers who became thrown out through the windows and rushed to the door, Orekhov first grabbed the secret correspondence he had, collected it in one place, drew his weapon and did not let anyone near it. The subsequent pushes of the cars, - it was said further in the order, - comrade. Orekhov was squeezed chest and legs. In this already semi-conscious state, although still alive, comrade. Orekhov, without letting go of his weapons, handed over to the commissioner of the Bobrovsky district of the OGPU comrade. Janson the correspondence entrusted to him. When following from the crash site to the hospital Comrade. Orekhov died"[874]85. Thus, the

strictest secrecy and monopoly on information sharply limited the circle of people representing the real state of affairs in the country. There is no need to talk about information in the open press. On November 27, 1938, another decision of the Politburo on this issue was dated, which assigned the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Zhdanov "to monitor and control the press and give the editors the necessary instructions"[875]86. On October 16, 1938, another resolution was also adopted on the distribution of the minutes of the Politburo meetings to members of the Central Committee, candidate members of the Central Committee, members of the bureau of the Party Control Committee and the Committee of Soviet Control, the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics and the first secretaries of the Bashkir and Tatar regional committees of the CPSU (b) , as stated in document[876]87. However, by this time, the decisions of the Politburo were most often only formalized and, as a rule, by a survey. Moreover, Poskrebyshev interviewed persons exclusively trusted by Stalin, who remained alive and were not tainted by any suspicions during the Great Terror. However, these persons also received only ext

specific issues that concerned them directly and for the implementation of which they were to be responsible. It can be said

with confidence that in those years only two people had complete information about the state of affairs in the country - Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin and Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov. It was they who determined the foreign policy of the USSR on the eve of the war - on their conscience not only collusion with Hitler, but also the death and captivity of millions of Soviet people. It was to them that the daily most secret information about the state of affairs in the military industry was sent before the war. The secretary of the Central Committee Zhdanov, for example, did not receive such information, although he was privy to many secret affairs of the pre-war period. So, among the materials of his fund in RGASPI, documents confirming the direct participation of Zhdanov in the preparation of the Soviet-Finnish war^{[877]88}. He was privy to many things, but not to all the secret affairs of the Stalinist regime. As a result of such all-encompassing secrecy, even members of the Politburo of the Central Committee did not know about them. So, Khrushchev, who became a member of this body after the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), seems to have little idea of what was happening in the country then. The chapter of his memoirs, "The Difficult Summer of 1941," begins quite remarkably: "So, we came close to the war ... I can't say specifically what was done in the army, because I don't know. I do not know which of the members of the Politburo knew the specific situation, knew about the state of our army, its weapons and the military industry. I think that, apparently, no one knew, except Stalin. Or he knew a very limited circle of people, and even then not all the questions, but those that concerned their department or department sponsored by one or another member of the Politburo. The movement of personnel, which was of great importance for the preparation for the war, was also carried out by Stalin.

On May 4, 1941, a significant event took place in the history of the mechanism of Stalinist power. On this day, the Politburo adopted a resolution on strengthening the work of the Soviet central and local bodies. It said: "I. In order to fully coordinate the work of Soviet and Party organizations and unconditionally ensure unity in their leading work, as well as in order to further raise the authority of Soviet bodies in the present tense international situation, which requires every possible

strengthening the work of Soviet bodies in the defense of the country, - the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks unanimously decides:

1. Appoint Comrade. Stalin I.V. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. 2. Tov. Molotova V.M. appoint Deputy

Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and head of the foreign policy of the USSR, leaving him in the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. 3. In view of the fact that Com. Stalin, remaining at the insistence of the PB of the Central Committee the first secretary of the Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, will not be able to devote sufficient time to work on the Secretariat of the Central Committee, appoint comrade. Zhdanova A.A. deputy comrade. Stalin on the Secretariat of the Central Committee, with his release from the duties of monitoring the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. 4. Appoint Comrade. Shcherbakova A.S. Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and head of the Propaganda

and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, while retaining the post of First Secretary of the Moscow Regional Committee and the City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

II. The present decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to be submitted for approval by the Plenum of the Central Committee of

the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks [by a survey](#)^[879]⁹⁰. With this decision, the top of the Stalinist government was brought out of the underground, although the entire secret mechanism for making decisions and communicating with local party bodies remained unchanged. Stalin, as it were, returned to the times of Lenin, who, as you know, officially held the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. But why? According to O.V. Khlevnyuk, "the appointment of Stalin to the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars increased the importance of the government and its apparatus in leading the country and making [decisions](#)"^[880]⁹¹. However, this conclusion does not answer the question. Stalin's power by this time was unlimited and without any legitimate formalities. We must pay tribute to Stalin - in terms of ~~strengthening~~ power, he did not have senseless actions. It is no coincidence that the decree also determined the places for Zhdanov and Shcherbakov. During the entire pre-war period, they were engaged in the preparation of the so-called propaganda support for the future expansion of the "front of socialism"^[881]⁹². Under the direct supervision of Zhdanov, and, possibly, by himself (at least the final text of the rules he) prepared the "Declaration of the People's Government

Finland", the text of the military oath of the People's Army of Finland, which was based on the oath of the Red Army, as well as the "Appeal of the Finnish People's Government to the soldiers of the Finnish [army](#)"[882]93.

In addition to his longtime colleague Molotov, Stalin brought Zhdanov and Shcherbakov closer to himself, outlining a plan for the implementation of his further plans. In his opinion, such a moment has come. In one of his letters to L. Kaganovich, Stalin expressed his political credo: "You must not yawn and sleep when you are [in power](#)"[883]94. The true meaning of the decision to appoint Stalin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR is part of that state secret, which was hidden for decades thanks to the mechanism of power created by him and for which there is only one real explanation: war.

2. STALIN'S APPOINTERS

The secret party-state reform carried out in 1922-1923 turned out to be not just a set of measures aimed at improving the communication of the Secretariat of the Central Committee with local party bodies. As a result of this, at first glance, inconspicuous and boring work, the mechanism of communist power was fine-tuned, the effect of which was very soon felt by the opponents of the Stalinist course in the party.

Change something in the late 1920s. was no longer possible. The "tentacles" of the party apparatus literally permeated all the political and economic structures of society. No criticism of the established order was perceived in 1929, when representatives of the so-called right deviation came out against the inner-party policy of the top leadership. Bukharin's words at the joint meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission on January 30 and February 9, 1929 that "... in the twelfth year of the revolution, not a single elected secretary of the provincial committee; the party does not take part in the decision of questions. Everything is done from above", were met with shouts: "Where did you write it off, from whom? At Trotsky's!"[884]1

However, those who were directly involved in this organizational and political work of the Secretariat and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee felt its scale and significance. L.M. It was not by chance that Kaganovich dedicated a special chapter of his Memoirs to his work in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. He owns the following words: "The mighty musical "oratorio" about how the Bolsheviks of Moscow and Petrograd went into the depths of Russia for its socialist restructuring has not yet been written. But it lives in the hearts of the people, the proletariat, who says from the bottom of their hearts: glory to the Bolsheviks of Moscow, Petrograd and other industrial centers of the country, who, at the call of the Central Committee, at the call of Lenin, left for the most distant, deep regions to fight against the white agents of imperialism, against saboteurs, speculators, merchants, kulaks, with all class enemies of socialism - for successful, correct party and Soviet building, for dictatorship

of the proletariat, for the building of socialism throughout Great Russia - the Soviet Union, right down to its most backward corners!"[885]2.

Of great importance in this work, which Kaganovich rightly felt, was "not only the systematization and streamlining of accounting, but also the study of each leading respondent personally - from the all-Russian to the volost and cell scale"[886]3. The recruitment activity that began in 1923, when a unified accounting system was finally developed and approved, gradually captured more and more layers of responsible workers. From November 16, 1925, the apparatus of the Central Committee was guided by the decision of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee "On the procedure for the selection and appointment of workers." There were three lists of posts:

nomenclature No. 1 included posts that were appointed only by a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee, nomenclature No. 2 - with the consent of the Orgraspredotdel of the Central Committee; Nomenclature No. 3 included a list of posts, the appointment to which was to be carried out by state institutions by the Orgraspredepartement of the Central Committee. The resolution also obligated all provincial committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics "to start developing a nomenclature of positions of local bodies, appointments to which are made with the approval of these party bodies and in agreement with them, guided by the nomenclatures By harmonization of the Central Committee."

Attached to the decree was an "Instruction on the Forms of Approval of Appointments and Relocations of Leading Employees of Local Institutions." One of its points read: "All proposals of local party bodies on the transfers and appointments of workers listed in the nomenclature No. 1 and 2 must be put through the Orgraspred of the Central Committee on the decisions of the Central Committee of the Party. Local party bodies cannot independently appoint and dismiss these workers "[887]4.

In the mid 1920s. The Politburo approved the leadership the following party bodies:

Transcaucasian Regional Committee (Zakkraikom) - Presidium; Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine - Politburo and Orgburo; Sibkraikom - Bureau; Kazakkraykom? - The Bureau; Uralobkom - Bureau; Central Committee of Belarus - Bureau of the Central Committee.

The Politburo also approved the entire composition of the following bureaus of the Central Committee - the Northwestern, Central Asian and Far Eastern [888]5. Stalin personally controlled the nomenclature of positions that were registered with the Central Committee. Since the beginning

of the 1930s, with the development of fundamental socio-economic transformations in the country, the system of appointments has gained enormous scope. The number of appointments was already so great that, for greater systematization, the Orgaspredotdel of the Central Committee was divided into two departments: the organizational instructor, which was engaged in preparing appointments and movements in the party apparatus, and the appointments (distribution) department with a number of sectors (heavy industry, light industry, transport, agriculture, Soviet institutions, foreign personnel, etc.), who was in charge of issues of nomenclature in the state apparatus[889]6. All appointments were coordinated with the bodies of the OGPU-NKVD in the center and on

places.

For example, the "Nomenclature of positions" in the West Siberian Territory for 1932 included 150 leaders who were personally registered with the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks[890]7. In addition, thousands of nomenklatura workers were registered with the personnel department of the regional committee. This list in the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at the end of 1930 consisted of 3628 people.[891]8

Nomenklatura workers, regardless of which section they headed, were governors of a higher authority, its "temporary workers", as a rule, who were not born in the district, region, territory where they were appointed "from above" to lead. Moreover, during these years, the practice of transfers was widespread, deliberately aimed at ensuring that workers did not have time to become attached to one place. That is why with such ease they were transferred from the South of Russia to Siberia, and then to the Far East and vice versa.

Typical is the career of Stalin's appointee L.M. Zakovsky. By a resolution of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of January 11, 1926, the former head of the Odessa department of the OGPU was appointed to Siberia as the plenipotentiary representative of the OGPU in Siberia, and I.P. Pavlunovsky, on the contrary, is recalled from Siberia and transferred to Transcaucasia[892]9. Further, by the decision of the Politburo of April 1, 1932, L.M. Zakovsky is appointed plenipotentiary

OGPU in Belarus[893]10. After the assassination of Kirov, Zakovsky was already in the position of deputy head of the NKVD Directorate for the Leningrad Region, just before the arrest of the Politburo, by decision of April 14, 1938, he was relieved of his post and appointed head of the construction of the Kuibyshev hydroelectric complex[894]11. With the same amazing ease, the first secretary of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee (then Sibkraikom) S.V. Kosior first moved to work in the Central Committee, and from 1928 he was appointed General (First) Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine and ended up there just during the famine of 1932-1933. L.I. Kartvelishvili from Georgia, on the contrary, was transferred in 1932, first to the post of second secretary of the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in 1933-1936. he was already the first secretary of the Far Eastern regional committee of the CPSU (b), since December 1936 he headed the

Crimean regional party committee, where he was repressed. Nomenklatura workers were just as easily transferred from one branch of the economy to another. I.P. Pavlunovsky, for example, who headed in the 1920s. Plenipotentiary representation of the OGPU in Siberia, in December 1935 he was already appointed head of the Main Directorate of the military industry. N.N. Krestinsky in 1930–1937 first he was Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, then Deputy People's Commissar of Justice. G.N. Kaminsky, who occupied in 1930-1932. positions of secretary of the Moscow Region and chairman of the Moscow Regional Executive Committee, in 1934 he was appointed People's Commissar of Health of the RSFSR, in 1936 - the USSR. S.S. Dukelsky from the NKVD in 1938 was transferred to direct the cinematography after the arrest of B.Z. Shumyatsky (who also had a very distant relation to this area), and

in 1939 he became the people's commissar of the navy. In the 1930s the heads of the political departments of the MTS, state farms, railways, their deputies for the work of the OGPU-NKVD, and even

"cadres of mill enterprises and elevators"[895]12 were appointed. Of particular difficulty was the appointment of the heads of the political departments of the MTS and state farms, created by decision of the January 1933 joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. It was not easy to mobilize 25,000 people into the countryside in a short time. This campaign was not as rosy as it was presented at the XVII Congress

political detachment, "I had to let 5, and sometimes 10 people. And not because these people are bad, but because we selected the best for the political departments. It used to happen that people came, literally cried - why are you rejecting me in the political department? You called me, well, you don't want to send me as a chief, send me as a deputy, assistant, instructor"[896]13. In

fact, these positions were taken by random people or, as a rule, employees who had made a mistake or undereducated students (mainly from Moscow and Leningrad), who considered such an appointment as a forced exile and, naturally, did everything to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of higher authorities and come back. So, from the list of heads of political departments of the MTS for Western Siberia approved by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee on May 16, 1933, there were four students of the Institute of Red Professors, one deputy manager of Vsepromutilization, two from the Institute of Foreign Trade Monopoly, one teacher of the Industrial Academy. In the same list appointed by the heads of the political departments of the MTS to Ukraine, where famine was raging at that time, there were nine students of the Institute of Red Professors in Philosophy, three students, two university teachers, and the rest were full-time employees of the governing bodies (as the head of the propaganda group of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks) of Ukraine, responsible instructor of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee, secretary of the party team of the Kharkov Engineering and Economic

Institute) [897]14. N.L. Shinkarev, a graduate of the Military Academy of the Red Army, from 1930 to 1933 was in Japan as a vice consul. The time of his return to the USSR just coincided with the implementation of the decisions of the January 1933 plenum of the Central Committee on political departments in agriculture. And so the former vice-consul of the USSR in Japan, an expert in Japanese and English, the author of scientific works, turned out to be in the Beloyarskaya MTS. He told his story in a letter to L. Kaganovich dated December 16, 1934, in which he asked to be transferred to work in his specialty[898]15.

Stalin constantly "shuffled the deck" of personnel, not only in order to prevent corruption, but, above all, because he understood

psychology of the "temporary worker" and, we must give him his due, he was not mistaken in this. In addition, he was convinced that "victory never comes by itself - it is usually dragged along"[899]16. And to do this, in his opinion, only people checked, specially selected could do it. That is why he attached such great importance to personnel policy.

At the same time, the system of nomenklatura selection of personnel inevitably entailed even greater bureaucratization, an increase in the staff of the apparatus and irresponsibility in execution. Throughout the 1930s. the party leadership constantly talked not only about "selection of personnel", but also about "checking the execution" and repeatedly tried to fight the "clerical-bureaucratic method of leadership", as Stalin himself called this phenomenon, but in fact to no avail. Almost five years have passed since the decision of the Central Committee on September 5, 1929 on measures to streamline production management and establish unity of command, but at the 17th Congress of the CPSU (b) in 1934 these issues were still relevant.

The largest report at the congress entitled "Organizational Issues (Party and Soviet Building)" was made by Secretary of the Central Committee L. Kaganovich. The key word of this report was the word "perestroika". He cited the glaring facts of the "clerical bureaucratic method of leadership", or "functional", as they said then. So, only in one Narkomzem there were 29 departments and 202 sectors, and all of them were engaged in reports and reports. Directly at the enterprises, the "functionality" led to the erosion of responsibility for the production process and, as a result, to marriage, which in some places, according to the speaker himself, reached 30 and 40%. It is clear that with such a system of work organization, as, for example, at the Proletarka textile factory, where there were 20 bosses at the management level of the entire enterprise (not counting full-time workers in workshops and at sites), no one was actually responsible for anything: 1) director, 2) deputy director, 3) assistant director for work supply, 4) assistant director for mass work, 5) head of production, 6) head of the planning department, 7) head of the implementation department, 8) head of the labor organization department, 9) head technical control department, 10) head of the personnel department, 11) head of the supply department, 12) chief accountant,

13) head of the financial department, 14) head of the personnel desk, 15) business manager, 16) head of the technical industry, 17) head of safety engineering, 18) chief mechanic, 19) head of the control and execution sector and 20) head of the capital construction sector [900]17.

Especially a lot of bosses turned out to be in the distribution of products. A.G. On July 5, 1933, Mankov made an entry in his diary about the labor supply departments (ORSs): "This is the most complex bureaucracy, devouring huge sums of people's money. This apparatus is crowned by: director of nutrition, assistant director, head of the sales department. And how many different section heads, their deputies, finally, agents, economists, accountants, bookkeepers ... Suffice it to say that at our plant ORS occupies a very large office, completely lined with tables, and at each table - one, two people . In addition, there is another office, the door of which tells everyone passing by that it is here: "Bureau of Fence Books." This is a subdivision of the Department of Workers' Nutrition, which is in charge of issuing "fence" books exclusively. It employs eight people"[901]18. In general, according to the estimates of economists in the 1930s, the system of rationed card distribution required about 40 thousand people and more than 300 million

rubles. annually[902]19. Party leaders were aware of this problem, as evidenced by the speeches at the 17th Congress on the report of L. Kaganovich. However, this did not and could not lead them to abandon the established in the 1920s. mechanism of power. The facts of irresponsibility, marriage, accidents, theft, etc., with which even open official documents of the 1930s are full, only prove that such a government was unable to organize a normal life in society. It could not help interfering in the economy, because there were no other ways to achieve its goals in its arsenal, but it could also act in it only in the mode of emergency measures, while placing responsibility on the first persons. Stalin spoke directly

about this at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on January 11, 1933: "... The center of gravity of responsibility for managing the economy has now shifted from individual peasants to the leadership of the collective farm, to the l

concern for the economy and rational conduct of business not from themselves, but from the leadership of the collective farm, or, more correctly, not so much from themselves, but from the leadership of the collective farm. ... It is not in the peasants that we must look for the cause of the difficulties in grain procurement, but in ourselves, in our own ranks. For we are in power, we have the resources of the state, we are called to lead the collective farms, and we must bear full responsibility for work in [the countryside](#)"[903]20. —

However, the purpose of the socio-economic transformations of the 1930s. was not the organization of a normal life in society, but the achievement by the authorities of their own goals, one of which was industrialization. In the historical and economic literature of the period of perestroika, many noteworthy judgments were expressed about the goals and specifics of Stalin's industrialization, from which historians prefer to dissociate themselves in recent years, discussing the "normal" economic development in the 1930s, which, in their opinion, fit quite well in the context of the world development of that time. In the meantime, these statements should be remembered. L.A. Gordon and E.V. Klopov: "Industrialization in the USSR, despite all the enormous difficulties, was in a certain

sense, primarily in its technical and technological aspect, relatively simple. Since industrialization in the USSR developed later than in Western Europe, it was largely simplified by the use of ready-made, existing equipment and developed technologies. It is significant that 80–85% of investments in the active part of fixed production assets created during the period of industrialization, i.e. the main part of the machinery and equipment of enterprises built, expanded, reconstructed at that time fell to the share of imported equipment. Within the framework of global scientific and technological progress, industrial transformations of the 30–40s. were largely secondary and, in this sense, extensive in nature. Forced industrialization

assumed a concentrated approach on a few points. Over a number of five-year plans, the main emphasis was systematically and consciously placed on the priority industrial development of certain branches, mainly heavy and defense industries ... In a theoretical sense, it is precisely this concentration of efforts in a few

decisive points, and not the rates taken by themselves, form the difference between forced industrialization and "normal" industrialization, which implies a commensurate (albeit slower) change in all sectors of the economy. This concentration of growth in relatively homogeneous and few points also made the decisive processes of development visible (or rather, those processes that seemed to be decisive). These processes could be controlled from the center, direct targeted planning, in-kind distribution of resources and products could be carried out in relation to them ... self-regulation, diverse forms of public self-government and political initiative, customs, traditions, values that fill civil society with vital content. In the USSR, they were uprooted. This almost complete destruction of all elements of the market economy, socio-economic self-organization in general, greatly complicates the transition from administrative-directive, emergency methods of management to normal methods - economic and legal. We have to create them [anew](#)"[904]21. L.M. Batkin: "Stalin's industrialization based on the enslavement of the peasantry, mass repressions, forced oppression, labor inertia, revolutionary enthusiasm and illusions is, although

very fast, as in all such regimes, but one-sided and superficial modernization. It not only did not mean the ^{state} creation of socio-psychological, political, infrastructural and, finally, refined cultural foundations for permanent modernization in the future - on the contrary, Stalinism seemed to uproot the very possibility of such foundations"[905]22 B.P. Orlov: "Stalin's course to accelerate industrialization reduced it to two subgoals. The first, apparently, is a priority - the consistent creation of pyramids that united the entire chain of manufacturers-

of military equipment. Since the late 1930s, each type of military equipment has its own "pyramid". on them (or

implementation of the military-technical revolution) went the lion's share of the country's resources. The second sub-goal is the creation of new industries for the USSR: automotive, tractor, electrical engineering, tire industry, mechanical engineering for energy, mining, metallurgy"[906]23.

It was on these priority areas of development and, first of all, the military industry that the fixed assets, labor force and personnel were concentrated. All forces were thrown to the solution of precisely these tasks. The main pillar of Stalinist

power was represented by a relatively small cohort of leaders, which was considered the "golden fund" of the nomenklatura of the 1930s. It was she who was entrusted with the practical leadership of the "building of socialism." A typical portrait of the leader of the Stalin era is presented in the famous novel by A. Beck "The New Appointment". These people led a very peculiar way of life. Here is how the former candidate for the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU D.T. wrote about him. Shepilov, although his memoirs are directly related to the war and post-war period: Stalin "got up at 6-7 o'clock. evenings. Meetings and discussions were scheduled for even later hours. And the work went on until morning. The Council of Ministers, the apparatus of the Central Committee, ministries and all central institutions were forced to adapt to this. But the country, people, enterprises lived and worked in normal times. And this also had to be taken into account. Therefore, often the end of one working day (or rather, night) merges with the beginning of another. And each senior employee in the office kept ... a bed, so that, seizing the right moment, take a little nap. The work was worn out. Heart attacks, strokes and deaths rained down everywhere" [907]24.

A curious document has been preserved in which these leaders are listed. This is the decision of the Politburo on the flights of responsible workers in airplanes, adopted on September 11, 1933: "a) To prohibit, under pain of exclusion from the Party, flights in airplanes without a special decision of the Central Committee in each individual case, to responsible workers of the following categories:

1. Members of the Central Committee and candidates for the Central Committee.
2. Members of the Central Audit Commission.
3. Members of the Central Control Commission.

4. Members of the presidiums of the Central Executive Committee of the Union and the RSFSR. 5. Members of the Presidium of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. 6. Executive secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties. 7. Chairmen of the regional executive committees and Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republics. 8. People's Commissars and their deputies for the USSR and the RSFSR. 9. Heads of the Main Directorates of the Allied People's Commissariats. b) Violators of this ordinance are excluded from parties, regardless of their faces.

c) Instruct TT. Kuibyshev, Tukhachevsky and Berezin to develop mandatory rules for the departure of aircraft from airfields, which would give the heads of airports and airfields the right to prohibit flights under adverse climatic conditions"[908]25. "What does Stalin's cadres mean - these are the enemies who saw

it somewhere," said R. Eikhe, First Secretary * of the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, speaking at a meeting in the regional committee on December 26, 1936 following the results of the last plenum of the Central Committee. "These cadres know how to defeat many times stronger opponents. But we are not the Manilovs, who in laziness dream in words about good deeds. We are a Stalinist cohort, which, in the Bolshevik way, is fighting for the line of the party, for the fulfillment of the instructions of its leader, the great and beloved Stalin. ... Leninist-Stalinist vigilance, ruthlessness towards enemies, Bolshevik perseverance in the struggle for any task set by the party and our leader, the great Stalin, Stalinist love for people and loyalty to the last drop of blood to the Great Leninist-Stalinist Party - these are the qualities that we must demand from all party members"[909]26.

And here is their characterization by Bukharin, who was already an outsider in this cohort: "Not people, but really some cogs of a monstrous machine ... There was a process of real dehumanization of people working in the apparatus of Soviet power, the process of turning this power into some kind of the kingdom of the "iron heel"[910]27.

Since 1935, nomenklatura No. 1, which by 1937, according to G. Malenkov, numbered 5,860 party workers, also included workers from city and district party committees[911]28. After

carried out in 1930, the liquidation of the districts, it was the district that became the "main link in socialist construction." This reorganization, as was written in the resolution of the 16th Congress of the CPSU (b), was supposed to "lead to a decisive approach of the party-soviet apparatus to the village, to the collective farms, to the masses", and the district committee of the party, respectively, to the regional committee and the regional committee, to strengthen the party organization in the village, to improve and simplify the connections of the Central Committee and regions with localities[912]29.

With the deployment of fundamental socio-economic transformations in the country, other personnel were required in the government itself. On the need for such changes, Stalin wrote to Molotov on September 13, 1930, and on September 22 sent him a letter with concrete proposals:

"Vyacheslav!

1) It seems to me that by the autumn the question of the Soviet elite must be finally resolved. At the same time, this will be a solution to the question of leadership in general, since Party and Soviet are intertwined, inseparable from each other. My opinion on this matter:

a) it is necessary to release Rykov

and Schmidt and disperse the entire
their bureaucratic advisory and secretarial apparatus;

b) you will have to replace Rykov as Chairman of the SNK and Chairman of the SRT. It's necessary. Otherwise - a gap between the Soviet and party leadership. With such a combination, we will have complete unity between the Soviet and Party elites, which will undoubtedly double our strength ... All this is between us for the time being. We'll talk in detail in the fall.

In the meantime, consider this matter in a close circle of close friends and communicate your objections."[913]30

On October 8, 1930, Voroshilov sent a letter to Stalin, in which he reported the results of this discussion, which consisted in the fact that the members of the Politburo unanimously supported the decision to remove Rykov, but spoke in favor of "unifying the leadership" - "a person with the gift of a strategist should sit on the Council of People's Commissars" . Organs of the Soviet

power as a result of the secret party-state reform of 1922–1923. were already completely under the leadership of the party organs. In 1930, Voroshilov proposed to “legitimize” this order: “So, I am in favor of you taking on the “whole totality” of leadership openly, in an organized manner. All the same, this leadership is in your hands, with the only difference that in such a position it is extremely difficult to lead and there is no full return in work . Voroshilov let it slip: the totality of power at that time was indeed concentrated

in the hands of Stalin, but it was a secret, underground, illegitimate power. This was precisely the specificity of his mechanism of power, and the decoration in the form of a system of Soviet organs was its integral part, the facade of real power. At the December 1930 joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party

of Bolsheviks, at which a decision was made to release A.I. Rykov from the duties of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and from the duties of a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the idea of the need for close interaction between the party and state apparatuses was repeatedly

V.V. Kuibyshev: "There should not be the slightest crack between the Soviet apparatus and the comrades who head it and the leadership of the party."

S.V. Kosior: "We need the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, who is in charge of our entire Soviet and economic apparatus, to be at the head of the leadership in the struggle for the party line, so that, as the comrades rightly say here, he would fight with furious energy for the carrying out of the party line, in the first place in Soviet and economic work"[915]32. Such a person—

was a member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, an ally of Stalin Molotov. Their tandem developed from the beginning of their joint work in the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1922. In the 1930s, as already mentioned, Molotov and Stalin had complete mutual understanding on all issues, which also manifested itself during the preparation of the Soviet-German treaties of 1939: “The most important documents were worked out by Stalin and Molotov jointly, on the same text one can find the editing of both, not to mention the joint approval”[916]33.

In this tandem, Molotov always recognized the supremacy of Stalin. "His role was different," he said in one of his conversations with F. Chuev. - Stalin has a great role, unusual. He led, he was the leader... You can't equate me with Stalin." [917]34 Stalin, in turn, was satisfied then by Molotov. Here is the characterization that he gave Molotov in one of his letters to A.M. Gorky, written just before the plenum, between December 8 and 14, 1930: "... We are thinking of replacing Comrade Rykov ... replacing him with Molotov. Brave, smart, quite a modern leader. His real name is not Molotov, but Scriabin. He is from Vyatka. The Central Committee is completely for him." [918]35 This mutual understanding is also evidenced by Stalin's correspondence with Molotov.

The topic of special supply for nomenclature workers who worked not only for the idea, but also for the corresponding living conditions, which was an urgent need after the introduction of the rationing system in the country in 1929 and the famine that engulfed almost all regions of the country in the early 1930s, deserves special discussion. . In 1931, a network of closed distributors appeared for responsible workers. This was an extremely complex and ramified system with its own rules for certain groups, a kind of "state of abuses. To imagine how confusing this system was, which only the creators themselves could figure out, testifies to the order of the Administrative Organizational Directorate of the OGPU PP for the Zapsibkrai dated July 20, 1931:

V state", And with numerous

yes clients,

"1. Only employees of the OGPU PP, the commanding staff of the OGPU regiment, staff members of the Siblag apparatus (not prisoners), OGPU pensioners who are not in the service are attached to the closed distributor No. 1.

2. Service personnel and supernumeraries of the PGPU PP are attached to distributor No. 2, with the exception of operational workers and administrative staff who are attached to distributor No. 1. Siblaga service personnel and working printing houses.

3. Dependent family members are attached to the distributor at the place of attachment of the head of the family, and only those dependent family members who are included in the service record are attached. 4. Persons attached to dispenser No. 1 are also assigned to canteen No. 1, and, due to the congestion of the canteen, three categories are issued:

The 1st category (blue color) is issued only to the employees of the PP, Siblag, the command staff of the OGPU Regiment. The use of the canteen with this subscription is allowed at any time during the canteen's opening hours.

Category 2 (red color) is issued to family members with the right to use meals in the dining room from 3 to 5 pm. 3rd category (white color) is issued

to pensioners. By

Lunches in this category are only available at home.

5. Persons assigned to distributor No. 2 are attached to canteen No. 2. 6. For the correctness

of the lists of persons subject to attached to the distributors and the canteen, answer:

a) for the OGPU PP and OGPU pensioners - the OGPU Adm

Department, b) for Siblag - Nach. SIBLAGA,

c) for the OGPU Regiment - Regiment

Commander, d) for auxiliary enterprises of the OGPU PP - Economic Department PP..."[919]36.

Benefits in supply and catering were supplemented by other privileges. Responsible employees had benefits for rent and taxes. They relied on special "fence books" to receive literature from the State Publishing House at the expense of economic organizations. In 1931, a permanent commission on personal pensions was created under the People's Commissariat of Finance of the USSR. Responsible workers were also entitled to allowances for treatment and special sanatorium services. Chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the RSFSR, OGPU of the USSR, People's Commissars of the USSR, secretaries and members of the Politburo

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the district—

commanders had the right to use service cars^[920]³⁷. The study by the historian E.A. Osokina's materials from the People's Commissariat of Supply led her to the conclusion that a very small stratum of the union and republican leadership had real privileges. As the level (republic, krai, oblast, district) declined, the position of local party, Soviet, and trade union workers worsened. According to the established rules, the so-called "twenty" - twenty workers and 30 members of their families - were to be centrally supplied in the district. For them, closed distributors, a network of rest houses, etc. were also provided. Many employee benefits were allocated in the relevant higher department ^[921]³⁸. So, the head of the special sector of the Zapsibkraikom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Ya.Ya. Ozolin sent out so-called literal rations every month for the purchase of books: the secretaries of district party committees and chairmen of the district

executive committees of the Soviets received 20 rubles each, and the secretaries of the Komsomol Committee received 15 rubles each. testified to their complaints. So, in a characteristic letter from the secretary of the Biysk regional committee of the party, Ostroumova, to the second secretary of the West Siberian regional committee of the CPSU (b), Comrade Lavrenty (L.I. Kartvelishvili), there was a complaint against the leadership of Krayzagotzerno, which, by its decree, canceled all orders in the district up to the main leadership "twenty." "In the city," the letter went on to say, "not only are the members of the bureau of the city committee not deprived, but rather wide—

sections of workers at large enterprises are supplied"^[923]⁴⁰. Apparently, these complaints played a role in the fact that the decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee signed by Molotov and Stalin dated February 11, 1936 "On increasing the wages of leading district workers" appeared, according to which, from February 1, 1936, the rates of the first secretaries of district party committees and chairmen of district executive committees in half of the country's districts up to 650 rubles, and for the rest up to 550 rubles; deputy chairmen of district executive co

land, trade and financial departments, the manager of the regional branch of the State Bank, the head of the district committees of cultural propaganda and the secretaries of the Komsomol district committees, respectively, up to 500 and 400 rubles.

The chairmen of 250 district executive committees and the first secretaries of 250 district committees of the AUCP(b) of the largest districts, according to a special list approved by the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b), were set wage rates in the amount of 750 rubles, deputy chairmen of the district executive committees and second secretaries of the district committees of the AUCP(b) of these districts – 650 rubles[924]41 —

Prior to this, for example, in the West Siberian Territory, district party secretaries and chairmen of district executive committees received 300–340 rubles a month[925]42. But even after the increase, the salary of district party workers was significantly lower than the salary of the first secretaries of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics. According to data for 1938, the salary of the latter (there was a breakdown into four groups) was 2000–1400 rubles. A special line provided for the salary for the secretaries of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine - the first secretary received 2300, the second and third 2000 rubles. per month[926]43. At the same time, it is

difficult to imagine a more unenviable position than that of the district responsible workers, who were at the very base of the pyramid of Stalinist power - between the rock and the anvil. "From above" they were pressured by the higher regional or regional leadership, which demanded the implementation at any cost of the directives descending from the Center, "from below" - the population of the district, subjected to constant violence from the district authorities and therefore treated accordingly[927]44.

A special item of expenditure was the maintenance of congresses and conferences, which additionally turned these events for delegates, especially from the outback, into an unforgettable event at which they were completely disconnected from real life and which they later recalled "with tears in their eyes"[928]45. According to E.A. Osokina, to feed the participants of the September 1932 plenum of the Central Committee (500 people, including attendants, for 15 days), an assortment of products from 93 items was requested - more than 10 tons of meat products (meat, sausage, brisket, ham, chickens, geese, ducks), over 4 tons of fish products (perch, sturgeon, stellate sturgeon, salmon), 300

kg of caviar, 600 kg of cheese, 1.5 tons of butter, 15 thousand eggs, as well as vegetables, fruits, berries, mushrooms, dairy products, coffee, etc. Funds were also allocated to supply the delegates on the way. For a day, each was entitled to 100 g of cheese, butter, sugar, 200 g of sausage, a loaf of bread, a can of canned

food, 25 g of tea and 50 pieces of cigarettes [929]46. The unfolding industrial construction forced the leadership of the party to reconsider the question of rates for communist business executives and engineering and technical personnel. By the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of February 8, 1932, the existing practice of limiting the party maximum pay to communists working in their specialty "both in production and in managerial, cooperative-planning and designing organizations of the national economy"[930]47 was canceled. In

the instruction, signed, as usual, by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov and Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin, "directors, managers and heads of factories, enterprises, state farms, MTS, depots, stations, railway distances and the corresponding positions of water transport, meat processing plants, refrigerators, elevators, bakeries, kitchen factories, large warehouses, shops, etc." were divided into three groups:

a) 1st group: those working at enterprises of ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, gold-platinum, fuel, iron ore, basic chemical, machine-building, electrical, military industries, major construction and transport (railway and water) received up to 700 rubles per month (within the group categories were also provided depending on the size of the enterprise - directors and heads of the 1st category received up to 700, 2nd - up to 650, 3rd - up to 600 rubles per month);

b) 2nd group: those working at construction enterprises (refractory, silicate), textile, leather, knitwear, printing, flax-hemp-jute, timber-paper, confectionery, tobacco, glass-porcelain, woodworking, and rubber industries and enterprises of Tsudortrans, Narkomkhoz received 600 rubles in month (1st category up to 600, 2nd - up to 550, 3rd - up to 500 rubles per month);

c) 3rd group: those working at enterprises of all other industries, agriculture, transport and trade of the people's commissariats of heavy, light and forestry industry, the People's Commissariat of Supply, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade, the People's Commissariat for Communications, the Centrosoyuz, the People's Commissariat for Water, the People's Commissariat of Railways, etc. - received up to 500 rubles . per month (1st category up to 500 rubles, 2nd - up to 450, 3rd - up to 400 rubles).

Salaries of up to 600 rubles were established for members of the board of economic people's commissariats of the USSR, members of the presidium of the State Planning Commission, members of the board of the State Bank and the Centrosoyuz, heads of the main departments of economic people's commissariats, heads of the most important sectors, managers of associations, trusts and design organizations. per month, depending on the nature of the work performed, the preparedness and experience of this employee in the work performed by him, the size and complexity of the association, etc.

Heads of economic, trade, cooperative, financial, banking and other institutions of republican (with the exception of the people's commissariats of the RSFSR), regional and regional significance were set a maximum salary of up to 550 rubles. per [month\[931\]48.](#) —

This document on the abolition of the party maximum, which in fact did not cancel it, since the responsible workers indicated in it could not receive more than the salary that was prescribed to them by Molotov and Stalin, clearly confirms the lack of rights of the nomenklatura in the face of the higher party elite in the Stalin period. It is difficult to agree with Trotsky's assertion that Stalin was a "puppet of the bureaucracy." Historically, it is more accurate to say that the bureaucracy of that time was "Stalin's henchman", appointed, transferred, limited and, in the end, physically destroyed during the reign of terror. These were precisely the "powerful serfs," as the American Sovietologist M. [Levin called the bureaucracy under Stalin\[932\]49.](#)

—

At the same time, when starting this or that business necessary to achieve the set goals, the country's leadership recruited workers, primarily using the system of benefits. So, the order of the OGPU of April 25, 1930 "On the recording of volunteers from the KGB cadres for the leading work of newly organized camps" established an allowance of up to 50% depending on the location of the camps, a two-month vacation, monthly

free book rations and other perks. At the end of three years of service, a three-month vacation and a monetary reward in the amount of a three-month [salary](#)^[933]⁵⁰ were provided. In 1937, the salaries of workers of the republican NKVD were increased almost three times, respectively, and workers of the regional and regional departments of the NKVD. Separate clubs and dachas were also allocated for them [\[934\]](#)⁵¹. In

addition, the Politburo (and these issues were precisely its prerogative in the 1930s) generously awarded their appointees with orders. An example is the decision of the Politburo of January 17, 1936, when the people's commissar of the food industry A.I. Mikoyan, People's Commissar of the Forest Industry S.S. Lobov, people's commissars of local industry of the RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR K.V. Ukhonov, K.V. Sukhomlin, A.Ya. Baltin received the Order of Lenin, People's Commissar of Railways L.M. Kaganovich, People's Commissar for Heavy Industry G.K. Ordzhonikidze, People's Commissar of Internal Trade I.Ya. Weitzer, People's Commissar for Water Transport N.I.—

Pakhomov - Order of the Red [Banner of Labor](#)^[935]⁵². The higher leadership did not forbid the nomenklatura workers to build dachas, which they lost after they dropped out of this system. On February 3, 1938, the Politburo approved a demonstrative resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee "On the dachas of responsible workers", which stated: "In view of the fact, firstly, that a number of arrested conspirators (Rudzutak, Rozengolts, Antipov, Mezhlauk, Karakhan, Yagoda and others.) built themselves grandiose dacha palaces of 15–20 or more rooms, where they lived in luxury and squandered people's money, demonstrating by this their complete everyday decay and rebirth, and in view of the fact, secondly, that the desire to have such dacha-palaces still lives on and even develops in some circles of Soviet leaders, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides: 1. Set the maximum size of dachas for leading Soviet workers at 7-8 medium-sized rooms for families and 4-5 rooms for non-families. 2. Dachas exceeding the norm of 7-8 ~~rooms~~ shall be placed at the disposal of the Council of People's Commissars for use as holiday homes for executives"^[936]⁵³. Also, by the decision of the Politburo, they were also deprived of their orders, just as the former People's Commissar for Finance of the RSFSR V.N.—Yakovleva, who was arrested

renaming was carried out in the 1930s. in honor of Stalin's appointees!

During these years, the political system of the pyramid type was finally formed, which was set in motion by means of directive instructions from the Center. Moreover, it must be remembered that the main component in this system was the party-apparatus hierarchy, although it operated in the 1930s. in tandem with the hierarchy of Soviet organs. So, from Moscow to Novosibirsk, all documents signed by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars Molotov and Secretary of the Central Committee Stalin went to the name of the first secretary of the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks R. Eikhe and the chairman of the West Siberian Regional Executive Committee of the Soviets F. Gryadinsky, and from the regional center to districts also for two signatures of Eikhe and Gryadinsky and also to the secretary of the district committee of the party and the chairman of the district executive committee. Here, for example, is a typical passage from the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the 1930s: "The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars still place personal responsibility for the successful progress of grain and sunflower supplies and their exact fulfillment on time on the first secretaries of the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, regional committees and regional committees and chairmen of

the krai (region) executive committees and SNK of the republics, and in the districts - to the secretaries of the district committees and chairmen of the RIKs, directors and heads of the political departments of the MTS "[938]55. Lower-ranking leaders, appointed directly from the Center or in agreement with it, were to carry out these directives. "... We all, and I, in particular," said E.I. Veger, are accustomed to treating the directives of the Central Committee as such documents, for the implementation of these efforts, all skill, all abilities"[939]56. In post-Soviet

historiography, such a management system was called administrative, or administrative command. The term was introduced into scientific circulation by G.Kh. Popov in his review of A. Beck's novel The New Appointment[940]57. The appearance of this term should be attributed to a much earlier time. It was used to characterize the Soviet economic system as early as the early 1920s. So, one of the speakers on July 4, 1922 at a meeting of the association of figures of the Russian financial department abroad, which discussed the issue of the financial situation

Soviet Russia, made the following conclusion: "The Bolshevik administrative system (highlighted by me. - I.P.) never served real state goals, but was an apparatus for the bandit use of the remaining resources and the exploitation of the population"[941]58. To this it must be added that this system of power operated under the slogan of the struggle for socialism. "We are building socialism, Comrade Stalin," R. Eikhe reported to Stalin. "We are making a socialist Siberia out of convict Siberia..."[942]59. The real contours of that future, in the name of which a gigantic mobilization of resources was carried out, the strengthening of the regime and the militarization of the country, were determined by the units located at the very top of the power pyramid. Everyone in the USSR, including the most senior Stalinist appointees, were pawns in a game conceived and carried out by the authorities. At the same time, as Yu.N. Davydov, the

term "command-administrative system" hides the bloody essence of this totalitarian type of domination, which "differs from all others, including authoritarian, by the total, that is, the all-embracing nature of the suppression of the individual, the absolute oppression of his personality"[943]60. The main action of the Stalinist authorities, called "collectivization",

was so cruel in nature that even decades later it is difficult to read documents revealing the tragedy of the countryside without emotion. Today there is already a large amount of fiction, memoirs and scientific literature, as well as documentary publications that recreate the history of the struggle that the Stalinist government waged with the peasantry, "resolutely

uprooting the roots of capitalism"[944]61. It is known that not all party workers who carried out collectivization remained indifferent to the fate of people. Some could not stand it and went crazy. In a letter to S. Ordzhonikidze dated February 25, 1930, V.A. Balitsky reported that in Ukraine (Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson districts) dispossessed "both very old people and old women, pregnant women, disabled people on crutches, etc." and that some communists and Komsomol members "refused to carry out dispossession, and one Komsomol member went crazy when carrying out this operation"[945]62.

But on the whole, Stalin's appointees coped with the task set by the authorities. People's Commissar of Justice N.V. Krylenko, speaking on April 21, 1930 at a meeting of the Siberian Regional Committee in Novosibirsk, said that "there is no talk of there being any resistance, unwillingness to fulfill our directives – this is out of the question. It is broken, and there is certainly no such reluctance. And some comrades have only misunderstanding. But this is a minority, and the majority has an understanding"[946]63. Of course, it was more difficult for grassroots workers than for higher-ranking leaders, such as the first secretary of the Sibkraikom, R. Eikhe, who argued at a meeting of secretaries of district party committees in January 1930: "I think that the turn that the party is making can be compared at least with the October Revolution. We set ourselves the task of liquidating about 5% of the kulak farms. In Siberia alone, we have about 100,000 kulak farms, and in the Union, if we count the kulaks together with their families, we will have about 7-8 million people. The class of capitalists and landlords was economically more powerful, but in terms of numbers it was a handful. And here we have millions of capitalists..."[947]64. Eikhe's words are convincing evidence that representatives of the party and Soviet leadership of the 1930s. they were fully aware of the nature and scale of "collectivization" - they not only consciously went to the destruction of millions, acting according to the order issued

"from above", but also frankly spoke about it in their circle. However, the "plantation" of collective farms did not automatically solve, as it seemed to the ruling elite, the problem of grain procurement. And although, as a result of collectivization, all the harvested grain was at the full disposal of the state, this grain had to be taken. The problem was complicated by the fact that with "collectivization" began a rapid process of depeasantization, alienation of collective farmers from the process and results of their labor, their unwillingness to work on collective farm land. Documents of the 1930s are filled with these facts. [948]65 By now it is clear that the famine, which began as early as 1930 as a direct result of collectivization and became especially acute in 1932-1933, was a direct consequence of the struggle between the authorities and the peasantry. In this struggle there were both retreats and advances of power. The

Ukraine dated April 19, 1932, on a food loan of 24 thousand tons to the collective farms of Western Siberia dated April 21, on the delivery of bread to Ukraine dated June 5, on the reduction of the grain procurement plan in Ukraine by 40 million poods dated August 17, 1932 and by 70 million poods of October 30, in the North Caucasus by 37 million poods of September 29 and by 22 million poods of November 3, on the reduction in the export of bread from the harvest of 1932 from 165 to 150 million poods of October 20, 1932 G.; on seed and food aid to collective farms and state farms of the North Caucasus and Ukraine of February 18, 1933, as well as the Lower Volga, Middle Volga and Kazakhstan of March 2, on additional seismic court to the North Caucasus and Ukraine of April 16, 1933 [949] 66

Representatives of the ruling elite were aware of the unwillingness of the peasants to work on "no man's" land. Here are the lines from a letter from Voroshilov, who, having traveled through the territory of Ukraine and the North Caucasus in the summer of 1932, wrote to Stalin under the impression of what he saw: True, there are separate, literally oases with a small (relatively) weediness, but, as a rule, the North Caucasus is experiencing the greatest disaster ... The climatic conditions of the current spring and summer in the North Caucasus were exceptionally favorable. We were supposed to get an excellent harvest, but at best we got an average, if not worse. Passing through Ukraine, I observed (from the window of the car) the fields. The same, true, somewhat smaller, but still ugly contamination of

bread. Harvesting had already begun at that time, but things were going sluggishly, not smoothly, and did not at all characterize the hot season of the harvest ... My soul just hurts, - wrote Voroshilov, - and I don't know what to do to force the people in a different way, in a different

way. to our socialist attitude to business, to our duties"[950]67. These key words "we" and "force" from Voroshilov's letter extremely accurately reflect the intentions of the authorities. Therefore, it not only retreated, ~~but~~ also advanced, as evidenced by the decision of the Politburo of November 21, 1932 "on the eviction from the Kuban regions within two days of two thousand prosperous kulak families, maliciously disrupting sowing"; the decision of November 22, 1932 to submit to the Central Committee of the CP (b) U "represented by a special commission composed of Comrades. Kosior S., Redens and Kiselev (CCC) for the period of grain procurement right

a final decision on the issue of sentences to capital punishment so that the Central Committee of the CP(b)U reports once a decade on its decisions on these cases to the Central Committee of the CPSU(b)"; the decision to evict from the Lower Volga "two thousand individual farmers with their families, as well as collective farmers who were expelled for malicious sabotage of the task of filling seeds" dated February 20, 1933, etc.^[954]⁶⁸. In the same row is the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of August 7, 1932 on the protection of property of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperatives and the strengthening of public (socialist) property; the decision of the North Caucasian Regional Committee, adopted by the directive of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on grain procurement and sowing in the Kuban, directed to the places on November 9, 1932 by Stalin personally, along with the decision to purge rural party organizations in the North Caucasus, as well as the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars Union of the SSR of December 14, 1932, obliging the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine, the North Caucasian Territory Committee, the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine and the Territory Executive Committee of the North Caucasian Territory to

decisively eradicate "counter-revolutionary elements through arrests, imprisonment in a concentration camp for a long time, without stopping before applying capital punishment to the most malicious among [them](#)"^[952]⁶⁹.

Directly connected with these resolutions was the decision to create political departments of the MTS and state farms, adopted by the January 1933 joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. These were already real emergency bodies, and the heads of political departments, appointed "from above", were also endowed with emergency powers, which were enshrined in the decisions of the 17th Congress of the CPSU (b). The Charter, approved by the congress, stated: "In order to strengthen the Bolshevik leadership and political work, the Central Committee has the right to create political departments and single out party organizers of the Central Committee in the lagging sectors of socialist construction, which are of particular importance for the national economy and the country as a whole, as well as , as the political departments fulfill their shock tasks, turn them into ordinary party org

The political departments work on the basis of the rights of the corresponding production party committees and are guided by

directly to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks through the production and sectoral departments of the Central Committee or through specially organized political departments and political sectors"[953]70. The main goal of the political departments was to prevent such actions of the leaders of the MTS and state farms, which could lead to the opposition of the interests of this enterprise

to the interests of the state [954]71. The authorities won in this struggle against the peasantry. The words of M.M. Khataevich, in 1933 a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine, the first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk regional committee, said on this occasion: "A fierce struggle is going on between the peasants and our government. This is a fight to the death. This year has been a decisive test of our strength and durability. It took hunger to show them who's boss. It cost millions of lives, but the collective farm system has been created. We won the war" [955]72. These words must be memorized by anyone who speaks of collectivization. They are self-explanatory, but appeal to concentrated understanding. The historical line under them was drawn by the execution of Khataevich him

Stalin's reaction to the famine of 1932–1933 is well known. According to testimony of the editor who Izvestia I.M. Gronsky, to the accompanied Stalin to the South, when the train was traveling through the Ukrainian land, the population of which was experiencing especially severe suffering from hunger, he timidly suggested: "Joseph Vissarionovich, the peasants are dying of hunger, the grain growers ... We have some currency in reserve, we have to buy grain abroad." "No," the Master said harshly, "let them die. They sabotage." [956]73 From his point of view, there could be no question of any mercy, since it was a struggle between power and the peasantry. General (First) Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine S.V. Kosior, speaking at the February 1933 plenum of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U with a report on the results of grain procurements, said that Comrade Stalin revealed to us a new maneuver of the enemy, "silent glanders" [957]74. According to Stalin, "the enemy understood the changed situation, understood the strength and power of the new system in the countryside, and, realizing this, reorganized, changed his tactics, - moved from a direct attack against the collective farms to work on the sly" [958]75. When the secretary of one of the district party committees of Ukraine R.Ya. Terekhov, having shown "softness", allowed himself to talk about the famine, he not only received a sharp rebuke from Stalin, but also immediately, by a resolution of the

dated January 24, 1933, was removed from his post and recalled to the disposal of the Central

Committee[959]76. With the creation of collective farms, grain procurement remained a constant headache for Stalin's appointees. On the one hand, the collective farmers, who worked carelessly, and on the other hand, the higher authorities, who demanded the fulfillment of the grain procurement plan at any cost. "I, for example," said the secretary of the Odessa Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks E.I. Veger at the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee - held in his hands all the biggest and smallest questions of agriculture, all the threads were concentrated in the regional committee with me, with the first secretary. Without the regional committee, without the first secretary, not a single, literally, the smallest issue of agriculture was resolved. We were proud of the fact that we became almost specialists, we considered it a great advantage that we know agricultural technology. We studied the tractor with great enthusiasm, passed the exam for tractor drivers, etc. In a word, the headquarters of the management of agriculture was transferred to the regional committee, and the first secretary of the regional committee became the chief of staff.

This practice was ubiquitous. Here is the information that the secretaries of the district committees were supposed to bring by telegram from the first secretary of the West Siberian regional committee of the CPSU (b) R. Eikhe dated January 21, 1933 to the next joint plenum of the West Siberian regional committee and the regional executive committee: 1) backfilling of semfonds, 2) distribution of income from results of the harvest on collective farms, 3) on bringing the sowing plan of collective farms (a list of all collective farms must be provided with the justification for the plan established for each collective farm, especially indicate what percentage of the sown area in each collective farm is occupied by industrial crops), as well as materials on bringing the sowing plan to individual farmers, 4) on the progress of the repair of the tractor fleet, 5) on bringing plans for oil procurement, livestock procurement, 6) to provide district committees on the territory of which there are state farms, to provide materials on the progress of repairs, preparations for sowing in state farms. On all these issues, the secretaries had to report at meetings of special commissions[961]78. For Stalin himself, these were all

minor problems, "shortcomings." If hunger for him belonged to the category of such difficulties, which he called "a child's toy" at the First All-Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock Workers on February 19, 1933 and which "are not even worth

in order to talk seriously about [them](#)^[962]79, then what significance did other trifles have from the point of view of the socialism he conceived! "Of course," he said on January 7, 1933, at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, "everything is not all right with us yet. There are enough shortcomings and errors in our work. Mismanagement and stupidity still take place in our practice ... But this is not the point. The fact is that, despite the shortcomings and mistakes, the existence of which none of us denies, we have achieved such serious successes that arouse admiration in the working class of the whole world, we have achieved such a victory that is truly of world-historical significance.^[963] 80.

In the victory of Stalin's power, a special place belonged to representatives of the party-state nomenklatura, not only in the Center, but also in the localities. Being disenfranchised in the face of a higher authority, they had such privileges (material support, dachas, apartments with official furniture, etc.) that an ordinary Soviet person could not even dream of. The fact that they sometimes wore the same overcoat and boots, like, for example, the first secretary of the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks R. Eikhe, did not at all testify to their personal modesty - such was the demonstrative style of Stalin's time. But Eikhe and similar party secretaries had something more than material wealth. The system of Stalinist power, demanding unquestioning implementation of directives from its appointees, gave them in return the right to arbitrariness. And this, in turn, made them "Stalins" on the ground, satraps of the eastern type. The same Eikhe, heading the "troika" of the NKVD, took a personal part in the interrogations of the arrested. Having the right to sanction a sentence to death, he did not know pity, receiving permits for holding show trials of "saboteurs", he overfulfilled them. On those whom he could not deal

with personally, he wrote denunciations to the Center. The arbitrariness of Stalin's appointees manifested itself both in direct cruelty and in sophisticated bullying of subordinates - keeping them in the so-called "corridor baths", which involved many days (even for half a month) waiting for an appointment, while the necessary party worker could easily be nearby, in his [office](#)^[964]81. —

Numerous facts of the arbitrariness of local leaders were cited at the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee. So, the secretary of the Korsun district committee of Ukraine, comrade Soya, led a rude shout, abuse and swearing. Soya called the chairmen of collective farms and district workers fools, a fecal head, and so on. The members of the bureau of the district party committee, seeing these rudeness, were silent and obediently carried out Soya's orders. When once at a meeting of the bureau between Soya and the bureau of the district committee a disagreement arose on the practical issue of sending cars to take out the beetroot, Soya defiantly abandoned the meeting of the bureau of the district committee and took up his duties only after the members of the bureau confessed. After the adoption on January 13, 1937 of the decision of the Central Committee on the unsatisfactory party leadership of the Kiev Regional Committee of the CP(b)U and on shortcomings in the work of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U, 32 secretaries of the district party committee, including four secretaries of the district committee for city Kiev and the second secretary of the Zhitomir Okrug Committee [\[965\]82](#).

About such methods of leadership of the chairman of the collective farm Volkov in the Smolensk region is described in the book of M. Feinsod [\[966\]83](#). The secretary of the Northern District Party Committee in Siberia, Matrosov, acted in the same way. However, the chairman or director of the state farm, the secretary of the district committee or even the regional committee (regional committee) of the party in the system of Stalinist power, under the supervision of superiors and subordinates knocking on him, could not do what he pleases. No, their arbitrariness was sanctioned, it was a way of fulfilling the plans for grain procurements, sowing, etc. up to the organization of the Stakhanov movement without sufficient funds for material incentives. In those conditions, it was impossible to collect arrears and money for the next loan in any other way, except by arranging nightly alarms and describing peasant property for debts and confiscating peasant [huts\[967\]84](#).

How could the collective farmers be forced to work otherwise, when the authorities only demanded, giving practically nothing in return, except for propaganda? However, criticism of the government's policy cost dearly to the secretary of the Salton District Party Committee G.I. Aleksandrov, who, in his speech at the district party conference, allowed himself to say that "there are almost no goods in the district. Trade is on

mainly through wine. Collective farmers express their dissatisfaction with the closure of the last tannery in the region. Now there is no way to have any shoes and clothes. All commodities that go through the cooperatives with corresponding budgetary allowances, for the most part, arouse criticism from the collective farmers; they are not linked to the prices that the collective farms receive for handing over their products. The price per centner of delivered oats ranges from 59 kopecks. up to 1 rub. 20 kopecks, and a simple jacket costs 60 rubles, which, therefore, needs to be handed over for one jacket from 50 to 100 tsn. oats. The same must be said for the harness. A set of harness costs 52 rubles. Again, 6-11 hectares of crops must be handed over for one set of

harness..."[968]85. A special commission of the regional committee was immediately sent to the district, which revealed a lot of theft, and accused the secretary himself of the fact that his speech was "from the kulak arsenal. These are typical kulak counter-revolutionary conversations." On September 15, 1933, a joint meeting of the bureau of the Zapsibkraikom and the presidium of the regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks adopted a resolution "On the Soltonsky District", the leadership of which was accused of "deceiving the party and the state, squandering state funds and gross arbitrariness in the management of collective farms ..." By this decree, the secretary Salton district committee of the party G.I. Aleksandrov and chairman of the district executive committee P.T. Terentiev were removed from work, expelled from the party and put on trial [969]86. Such cases arose regularly. Only on December 8, 1933, the Presidium of the West Siberian

Territorial Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considered three similar cases - Tomsk, Sorokinsk, Uchpristan [970]87. However, it is very difficult to find out the true background of these "cases" in each specific case, since behind the general accusations of anti-state tendencies could hide not only the mercenary actions of the local leadership, but also an attempt to help the peasantry, especially in 1932-1933. happened to the secretary of the Achinsk district party committee G. Tolstikov. Appointed to this area at the end of 1932, the new secretary faced a difficult situation - a complete lack of seeds and the facts of starvation of collective farmers. Under th

having agreed on the exchange of horses, of which there were enough in the Achinsk region, for bread in the Cherepanovsky region, where, on the contrary, there were surpluses of bread on the collective farms. As a result of this exchange, the sowing plan was fulfilled by 98%, a relatively high harvest was obtained, and people were saved from starvation. However, the regional leadership accused G. Tolstikov of a political mistake, which consisted in "search for a way out of a difficult situation through confusing and complex combinations." In the State Archives of the Novosibirsk Region, a memorandum from Tolstikov to Eikhe is stored explaining his "crime", in which he assures the higher authorities of the following: "As a Bolshevik I say: Never again will I do such and similar things, under no difficulties and what kind of situation"[971]88. —

This story is extremely revealing. First, it convincingly shows that many people would have been saved from starvation in the early 1930s if both the collective farmers themselves and their bosses had not been afraid to take the initiative. Secondly, the political line of the Stalinist power is clearly visible - everything is for the state, but not for the people. Already in these years, not only the desire to take the initiative, but also the very ability to act independently were repulsed. There are many documents in the archives for 1932-1933, telling about the death of the collected bread intended for shipment to the Center, and at the same time about the death of people who were literally ten steps away from the warehouses full of this bread.

The same system of fulfilling the tasks of the Center at any cost has developed in industry. Archival documents are full of information about storming, campaigning, staff turnover, a huge number of accidents that amaze the imagination[972]89. All these facts testify not ~~only~~ to the indifference of the leadership to safety and the fate of specific people (although from time to time some leaders were defiantly punished and very cruelly), but to the inability of the Stalinist authorities to organize a normal production process, not to mention the life of the workers of that time[973] 90 . Instead, declarative resolutions were regularly adopted, such as the resolution of the Central Committee of May 16, 1930, "On the work of restructuring life" or of August 7, 1932, "On the work

party cells at enterprises. In the latter, in particular, it was proposed that "all party committees - regional, regional, city and district - as well as the bureau of factory party committees and cells should immediately study specifically, in relation to each plant and factory, the existing shortcomings in work, outline and carry out practical measures to their elimination and further improvement of party and mass [work](#)"[974]91.—

"Whipping" in the form of the Stakhanovist movement, initiated by enthusiasm, work day and night in order to deliver this or that object on time, were necessary because, other than "partisan methods", as I.P. Pavlunovsky, who assumed both campaigning and storming, it was impossible to achieve the goal. Therefore, in addition to the usual bosses, various kinds of commissioners, emissaries from the Center, periodic commissions to verify compliance, and, finally, permanent emergency bodies - political departments, were required. In 1933, in addition to agriculture, political departments were also created on the railways, in the civil air fleet, in 1934 - on water transport and in the system of the Main Northern Sea Route[975]92. In addition, party ~~organizers~~ of the Central Committee were personally appointed to industrial enterprises. Before the war there ~~were~~ more than [1000](#)[976]93.

Basically, they were sent to military factories, because problems could not be avoided even in the aviation industry, which enjoyed "tremendous attention from the Central Committee," as was said at a meeting of party organizers of the Central Committee of military factories, held on August 14, 1935 at the secretary of the Central

Committee A .A. Andreeva [\[977\]94](#). For the time being, Stalin looked through his fingers at the arbitrariness of his appointees, although he was aware of almost everything that was happening in the country. The leadership of the NKVD regularly sent reports on the state of affairs in various areas to the Special Sector, and the employees of the sector supplied this information to Stalin. He also knew about the clannish nature of the local leadership, and about the "small weaknesses" of his subordinates. From time to time, they were given populist instructions to develop criticism of bosses at all levels, as, for example, in a speech on May 4, 1935 for the "unheard of inhuman attitude of bureaucratized cadres" towards ordinary people, workers

the arbitrariness of the lower leadership "surfaced" at his direction only at the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, when they were needed to reinforce the Great Terror. It was then that it was told about a group of workers from the Far East who moved to Ukraine together with P.P. Postyshev, and about workers from Uzbekistan who migrated after A.K. Lepoy to Tataria and, conversely, about those who moved from Tatarstan to Irkutsk after M.O. Razumov, who was appointed to the post of first secretary of the East Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, etc. At the same time, the facts of small "personality cults" of local leaders were announced. In particular, it became known that on September 14, 1936, at the bureau of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, with the participation of the First Secretary of the Regional Committee L.I. Mirzoyan, the highest point of the Tien Shan, Khan-Tengri 6697, was renamed Mirzoyan Peak. And that a new writer, Postyshev, appeared in Ukraine, who wrote two works - "Marfa's Woe" and "Talk" - "exactly one printed sheet" in volume, but which became the center of a noisy campaign organized by the Komsomol and the local union of writers...[979]96 . —

Stalin's appointees did their job. They should have now make them "scapegoats" for all the "shortcomings" of socialist construction and thus channel the dissatisfaction of the masses with their position. It is no coincidence that the campaign of criticism of bosses at all levels in 1937 acquired such a scope and coincided with the adoption of the Stalinist Constitution in December 1936 and preparations for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1937. This then made it possible not only for the ruling party elite to talk about democratization socio-political life in the country, but also to historians who believe what is written in the official documents of the Stalin era. In his speeches at the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin formulated not only

accusations against his appointees, but also a whole program for their replacement. Let's pay close attention to Stalin. On March 3, 1937, as in the initial period of collectivization, he also spoke of dizziness from success. "Successes and achievements are, of course, a great thing. Our successes in the field of socialist construction are indeed enormous. But success, like everything in the world, has its shadow sides. In people,

few experienced in politics, great successes and great achievements often give rise to carelessness, complacency, complacency, excessive self-confidence, arrogance, boasting ...

It is not surprising that in this stupefying atmosphere of arrogance and complacency, the atmosphere of ceremonial demonstrations and noisy self-praise, people forget about some essential facts that are of paramount importance for the fate of our country, people begin to ignore such unpleasant facts as the capitalist encirclement, new forms of sabotage, dangers, related to our successes, etc. ... All this is nothing! We are overfulfilling our plans, our party is not bad, the Central Committee of the party is also not bad, what the hell else do we need? Strange people sit there in Moscow, in the Central Committee of the party: they invent some questions, talk about some kind of sabotage, they themselves don't sleep, they don't let others sleep ... "[980]97.

For all the secrecy and deceitful demagoguery of Stalin's speeches, he still left a lot of verbal evidence of his real politics. First, with the last maxim, he pointed to the initiator of the Great Terror. Secondly, he explained why the possibility of such a turn is being realized right now. The key phrase here is that "saboteurs usually time their main wrecking work not to the period of peacetime, but to the period on the eve of the war or the war itself. Let us suppose that we should begin to lull ourselves with the rotten theory of the "systematic fulfillment of economic plans" and would not touch pests. Do the authors of this rotten theory have any idea what colossal harm would be inflicted on our state by wreckers in the event of war if they were allowed to remain in the depths of our national economy under the shadow of the rotten "systematic implementation of the economic theory of plans"?..."[981]98. These arguments once again confirm that the Great Terror for Stalin was a way of preparing for war: he simultaneously destroyed the remnants of the revolutionaries from the "Leninist Guard" in his party, and handed over the "scapegoats" of the construction of socialism, and "cleansed" the only a O population of the country. At the same time, the Great Terror was not multifunctional action,

but also a super-emergency mechanism of Stalinist rule. As for him

appointees, they, in his opinion, did not notice the sabotage

because they dealt with economic issues too much. The accusation was made in a purely Stalinist manner: to blame precisely what he forced them to do all these years. However, how to combine housekeeping, which Stalin's appointees actually did with such zeal, fulfilling his directives, and politics - Stalin did not give an answer to this question. Demagoguery remained demagoguery: "... It is impossible," Stalin resonated, "to separate politics from economics. We cannot get away from the economy just as we cannot and should not get away from politics." [982]99 At the end of his speech

at the plenum on March 3, 1937, he named the main directions of the proposed personnel reform, without saying, however, that the former leaders would be physically destroyed. It is difficult now to restore how the participants in the plenum perceived Stalin's words, because few of them survived this "personnel reform", but many should have felt the ominous meaning of Stalin's words. Presenting the leadership of the party (from generals to party non-commissioned officers), Stalin stated that "first of all, it is necessary to invite our party leaders, from secretaries of cells to secretaries of regional and republican party organizations, to select for themselves, within a certain period, two people, two party workers capable of being their actual deputies. They can say: where can I get them, two deputies for each, we don't have such people, we don't have the appropriate workers. This is not true, comrades. We have tens of thousands of capable people, talented people. It is only necessary to know them and put them forward in time so that they do not stop in the old place and do not begin to rot. Seek and find." Further, he determined for party secretaries training and retraining of cell

secretaries four-month "Party courses" in each regional center, secretaries of district committees - eight-month "Lenin courses" in 10 most important centers of the USSR, for secretaries of city committees six-month "Courses on the history and politics of the party" at The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and for the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics - a six-month "Conference on domestic and international policy" under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

Soon all the named categories of party workers felt the burden of Stalin's retraining when they ended up in the cellars of the NKVD. B.I. Nikolaevsky was one of the first to give, in my opinion, a correct assessment of the Stalinist personnel reform (although he did not write about personnel reform, but about "Yezhovism"), calling it "a barbaric form of change in the ruling stratum"[984]101 . It was the mass physical destruction of the Stalinist party-state bureaucracy, and not just an "anti-bureaucratic populist campaign", which "caught up a lot of fear in the party, Soviet and military cadres, tightened discipline and responsibility, but, of course, not enough to put an end to mismanagement and slovenliness ", as the modern historian N.S. [Simonov\[985\]102](#). It is difficult to agree with the assessment of S. Fitzpatrick, who considers the terror of 1937-1938. not only as an anti-bureaucratic revolution, but also as a continuation of the cultural one, meaning the mass promotion and training of new personnel

proletarian origin of the period of the first [five-year plan\[986\]103](#).—

There are no exact data on the number of Stalin's appointees killed in the research literature. According to R.A. Medvedev, in the RSFSR, up to 90% of all regional party committees and regional executive committees, as well as most of the city, district and district party and Soviet organizations, were defeated[987]104. Other (economic, sectoral) executives ~~were~~ subjected to repressions to the same extent. By September 1938, the apparatus of Glavenergoprom had been replaced by 85%, starting from the head of the central office and ending with the heads of [departments\[988\]105](#). Information is known about the ~~delegates~~ of the 17th Congress, who represented just the leadership of the country - out of 139 members and candidate members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, 98 were arrested and almost all were shot. Of the 1,966 delegates to the 17th Congress, 1,108 did not live to see the next Congress. Of the 154 delegates from Leningrad to the 17th Congress, only two people took part in the work of the 18th Congress, and they were not working in Leningrad at that time. In Ukraine, where in January 1938 N.S. Khrushchev, only three of the 86 members of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U survived the time between the beginning of 1937 and the end of 1938. In Kazakhstan, the Bureau of the Central ~~tra~~ Committee was arrested

The repression also seized members and candidates for membership in the Stalinist Politburo of the 1930s, which once again testifies to

status of this body in the system of Stalinist power. The surviving members of Stalin's circle also suffered from the Great Terror. Let me remind you that brother L.M. committed suicide while awaiting arrest. Kaganovich M.M. Kaganovich, M.I. Kalinin and V.M. Molotov, their wives E.I. Kalinin and P.S. Pearl. Even his faithful servant, head of the Special Sector of the Central Committee A.N. Poskrebyshev, Stalin did not regret - his wife was arrested and then shot.

The total number of repressed leaders was named by Stalin himself in a report at the 18th Congress of the CPSU (b), when he said that "there are data in the Central Committee of the Party, from which it is clear that during the reporting period the Party was able to nominate leading positions in the state and party line of more than 500 thousand young Bolsheviks, party and affiliated to the party, of which more than 20% are [women](#)"[990]107. This means that about 500 thousand former workers were repressed and mostly shot in 1937-1938. After the 18th Congress, on the direct ~~orders~~ of Stalin, personnel records became even more centralized - a Personnel Department appeared in the Central Committee, and personnel

departments appeared in the republican, regional and regional party committees. G.M. became the head of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee. Malenkov, who previously headed the previous structure - the Department of Leading Party Organs of the Central Committee, the head of which he was approved by the decision of the Politburo of February 4, 1936 [\[991\] 108](#) the same as in the decision of the Politburo, which reflects its priorities): the personnel department of party organizations, the People's Commissariat of Defense, the Navy, the aviation industry, the People's Commissariat of Armaments, the People's Commissariat of Ammunition, the shipbuilding industry, the NKVD, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, foreign trade, fuel electric power industry, black metallurgy, non-ferrous metallurgy, chemical industry, building materials industry, heavy engineering, medium engineering, general engineering, railway transport, water transport, textile industry, light industry,

industry,

And

forestry, meat and dairy, fish, food, local industry, public utilities, communications, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat of State Farms, the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, the People's Commissariat of Finance and the State Bank, trade and cooperation, health care, Soviet authorities, planning authorities, judicial and prosecutorial authorities, the press and publishing houses, education, arts, scientific institutions, Komsomol and trade union organizations; inspection group under the head of the personnel department, archive of personal files[992]109. Random people in the nomenklatura could not be. "We now have cadres who will fulfill any task of the Party, the Central Committee, the Soviet government, any task of Comrade Stalin," said L. Kaganovich[993]110 at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of

The population census of 1939 contains a detailed description of the nomenklatura workers of the new conscription - they were then 1 million 960 thousand. V.B. Zhyromskaya gave a detailed statistical portrait of this stratum of Soviet society. Young people aged 20-29 years old accounted for 25%, people aged 30-39 years old - 44.8%, over 50 - only 6.5%. The general literacy of executives was now 99.7%, but at the same time, less than 1/3 of all managers had completed secondary education, and 6.7% had higher education.

Approximately 56% of the management staff did not even have a completed secondary education and at the same time did not study anywhere. Among the leaders of all-Union, republican and regional institutions and organizations, persons aged 30-39 now predominated; their education indicators were somewhat higher than those of the general management, but here, too, 20.7% did not have a complete secondary education and did not study anywhere. Persons with higher education made up only 1/5 of the highest echelon of power, but the quality of this education was not taken into account and could not be taken into account. V.B. Zhyromskaya also cites data from the census form filled in by V.M. Molotov and his wife P.S. Pearl. Occupying the highest command posts in the state - the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the head of the Glavparfumer of the NKpishcheprom - both had a secondary education[994]111. As for membership in the party, if in 1930 among the secretaries of

regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics there were 69% of communists with pre-revolutionary party experience, then in 1939 among 333 people who held these posts, only 10 people had party experience up to 1917, more than 83% joined the party in 1924-1935, i.e.

after Lenin's death. Among the secretaries of district committees and city committees there were 93.5% of communists with party experience after 1924 [995]112

But many young nominees at that time made a dizzying career. V.A. Malyshev graduated from the Bauman Institute in Moscow in 1932 at the age of thirty and began working as a designer at the Kolomna Locomotive Plant, of which he became director in 1937; two years later, in 1939, he was appointed people's commissar of heavy engineering. He was then thirty-seven years old. A.N. Kosygin graduated from the Leningrad Textile Institute in 1935 at the age of thirty-one and two years later was appointed director of a textile factory, and in 1939 became People's Commissar of the textile industry. D.F. Ustinov graduated in 1934 from the Leningrad Military Mechanical Institute; in 1940 he became the director of the Bolshevik military plant in Leningrad, and in 1941, at the age of thirty-three, he was appointed to the most important post of people's commissar of the military industry. Such examples are typical of the late 1930s. [996]113 The main quality necessary for Stalin's appointees, who began their careers in the wake of the Great Terror, was to "master Bolshevism." When asked what this means, L. Kaganovich answered: "To master Bolshevism is not just to be a politically literate person. Sometimes the enemy is a literate

person. Consequently, here it is a question of a deep understanding of political processes, the ability to discern underlying moods, an understanding of the laws of the class struggle, an understanding of our tasks that require the ability to overcome the difficulties that stand in our way, to always be a firm, confident, joyfully, energetically working Bolshevik. [997]114. If we translate the words of L. Kaganovich from the Stalinist language into normal, it will look like this: "... In the thirties, a new, post-October generation of Bolsheviks, apparatchiks of the Central Committee (Malenkov, Khrushchev, Shcherbakov, Mikhailov, Suslov, Ponomarenko, Patolichev, Kozlov), "red directors" of enterprises (Bulganin, Pervukhin, Malyshev, Tevosyan, Saburov, Efremov), security officers (Beria, Bagirov, Kruglov, Abakumov, Merkulov, Serov), "academicians" and "red professors" (Mekhlis, Yudin, Mitin, Pankratova), Stalin's "diplomats" (Gromyko, Malik, Smirnov, Zorin,

Semenov)... This new generation, free from past "mistakes" and deviations, without ambition and without self-will, diligent and devoted, acting and not reasoning, and most importantly - growing up right there in front of Stalin himself with a "collective biography" - was capable of everything except one thing – independent thinking" (highlighted by me. – I.P.)[998]115 It was precisely such cadres – absolutely loyal subjects – that Stalin

needed to solve the following tasks. Summing up the consideration of the mechanism of Stalinist power, it should be emphasized once again that Stalin was not the inventor of this system and its sole author. In the Russian historical traditions of governance and in the characteristics of the Bolshevik party, there were already almost all the elements of this mechanism: both appointment, and secrecy, and props of power (since the time of the "Grand Duke of All Rus" Simeon Bekbulatovich), and even conspiracy, which was practiced in gangs, in terrorist and "expropriator" groups of Bolsheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. Stalin was not the only initiator of the creation of such a mechanism - the implementation of the policy of "party dictatorship" in 1922-1923. all the then leaders of the party and employees of the Secretariat

of the Central Committee were involved. Stalin could only contribute to the creation of this mechanism and skillfully manage it. However, in addition to subjective abilities, there were objective conditions for the emergence of such a mechanism of power. First of all, these are: 1) the Russian traditions of the relationship between power and society, 2) the Leninist party as the basis of the Stalinist one, 3) the "socialist", and in fact the statist revolution, as a result of which the party-state seized all the means of production of society, 4) the technology of the beginning 20th century - electricity, telegraph, telephone. Another objective, albeit intangible, factor in the formation of the Stalinist mechanism of power was the demoralization of Russian society as a result of the First World War, revolution and civil war. Stalin's skill in shaping this mechanism ultimately consisted in the fact that he nurtured it, since it was precisely such a mechanism of power that best suited both his nat

Chapter V

REPRESSION AS A WAY ACTIONS OF THE STALIN POWER

The millstones of our revolution are working well{5}

Stalin

1. GROWING THE SYSTEM OF MASS VIOLENCE

To date, a large amount of various literature on repressions has been published: memoirs, documentary publications, research papers. However, after there was a certain saturation of facts in this area, the lack of conceptual explanation became especially felt. Even documentary publications, for all their indisputable importance, do not clarify the meaning of the repressions that took place in the 1930s. It is impossible to find an answer in the official documents of the authorities, because not only did they not reveal the motives for making decisions, but, on the contrary, they carefully masked the true background of their actions. In the "traditional-unchanging", according to M.K. Mamardashvili, in Russian society, the authorities solved their own tasks - "power for the sake of power, serving and reproducing itself, and not "civil service" (public service)"[999]1. The secret mechanism of operation of Stalin's power contributed to the development of a gigantic alienation of this power from the people. However, this alienation in Russian society had the opposite effect - despite the enormous hardships and deaths of millions of people, the sacralization of power was clearly observed in society. Exactly as the historian V.P. Buldakov, "the inviolability of the imperious principle is being asserted at the psychological level", and "every person in power, on whose conscience thousands of victims (in the case of Stalin, millions - I.P.), automatically moves from the criminal world to the sphere of

historical greatness"[1000]2. Back in the days of Stalin, the idea was born that he did not know about the lawlessness that was happening, that all this was the work of local chiefs and, above all, the NKVD organs, which allegedly got out of control of the party organs. Stalin not only deliberately supported this idea, but also contributed to its strengthening. The literature has repeatedly spoken about the demonstrative exaltation of the personality of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs N.I. Yezhov and his

ranks, occupied several key posts at once (Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the CPC, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, since October 1937 a candidate member of the Politburo). Cities, enterprises, collective farms were named after Yezhov [1001]3. Such purposeful manipulations around the figure of Yezhov in the minds of the people strengthened confidence in his personal responsibility for everything that happened in the country.

It was no accident, again on the direct orders of Stalin, that the January 1938 plenum of the Central Committee was held, which adopted a resolution "On the mistakes of party organizations in the expulsion of communists from the party, on the formal bureaucratic attitude to appeals expelled from the CPSU (b) and on measures to elimination of these shortcomings"[1002]4. The decision of this plenum was widely publicized, while the proposal of the NKVD on additional orders for repression, approved by the Politburo ten days after the plenum, on January 31, 1938, was known only to those to whom it was addressed for execution[1003]5. Stalin not only deliberately misled his contemporaries, but also confused future historians in his own way when he was defiantly absent in December 1937 at a solemn meeting dedicated to the 20th anniversary of the organs of the Cheka - OGPU - NKVD, at which Yezhov was the "hero of the day." The decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks "On arrests, prosecutorial supervision and investigation", approved by the Politburo on November 17, 1938, was also deliberately initiated, when the main goal of mass repressions was achieved. Following this decision, in the Stalinist tradition, Yezhov's resignation followed - first he was transferred to the secondary position of People's Commissar for Water Transport, and then arrested and shot on February 4, 1940. As a result of Stalinist propaganda, the concept of "Yezhovism" was fixed in the minds of the people for a long time, with which the explanation of the repressions of 1937-1938 was associated. However, a person living at the beginning of the 21st century is unlikely to be satisfied

with more modern explanations: that the repressions were the implementation of the evil will of Stalin, who destroyed his political opponents in order to strengthen the regime of personal power, or the result of his pathological suspicion, or that repressions are an integral part of the cruel political regime. It is also insufficient to conclude that "in order to maintain any

an authoritarian political system, as well as any system of administrative-directive management, needs ... a kind of "subsystem of fear" [1004]6. Statements about the psychosocial inevitability of strengthening the repressiveness of the regime, about terror as "a kind of mirror of the socio-historical subconscious" also focus attention on only one side of the problem, leaving the question of the actions of the authorities in the shade. One can, of course, argue that "terror was prepared by the de-peasant youth who found themselves at the conveyor of industrialization", and Stalin can only be assigned the role of "a tipsy rural priest who imagined himself to be the Lord God"[1005]7, but what to do with the context of the era, through which all the time, as it were, the face of the chief director peeps through, satisfied that he managed to deceive even such a professional

historian as V.P. Buldakov?! In the case of Stalin, we are not just dealing with a cruel ruler. "After all, no matter how cruel the traditional despot may be," as the philosopher Yu.P. Senokosov, - his cruelty did not go beyond his personal arbitrariness and did not undermine the foundations of the existing way of life. He could be insidious towards his subjects and neighbors, he could rob and kill, but he did not dare to destroy the age-old skills of peasant labor (as happened in Soviet Russia), did not encroach on the existing system of life ideas of the people, because he knew that this would inevitably threaten the very foundations of his power and state. In other words, no matter how cruel his actions may be, they can always be somehow explained within the framework of the rational way in which a person, as a finite and evil being, is able to settle down and live in general. But how to explain or, more precisely, to understand, at least from the idea of state expediency, the scale and nature of the repressions that were committed in the USSR during Stalin's time? To justify the endless number of victims (which already sounds wild in itself) that were allegedly brought in the name of the future? Is

any normal mind capable of this ?"[1006]8. The fact of the matter is to explain the repressions, as well as the Stalinist period of Russian history in general, from the standpoint of the general laws of world development in those years, as a special case of the general pro

historical development, although characterized by the alternation of the onset and retreat of the "emergency", is impossible. Stalin's transformations, like the events of 1917, not only were not the result of the progressive historical development of Russia, even if it was "catching up", but had a fundamentally different character. The primitive notions of socialism that had formed in the minds of a few Bolshevik leaders were forced on millions of people. The word "impose" in Russian means "force, force to accept", which just implies violence.

Understanding the Stalinist repressions is further complicated by the most important circumstance that in the 1930s. the actions of the authorities coincided with the archaic ideas of the majority of the Russian population. "The Russian people, bound for centuries by a system of serfdom, really believed that evil forces ruled the earth, while good forces awaited the city of the future, the kingdom of justice. And it was precisely these expectations of theirs, not rooted in the spirit of the Gospel and devoid of a rational beginning, that, 60 years after the abolition of serfdom, found their natural resolution in the idea of building a communist society. It only remained to direct these expectations in the appropriate direction, which the Bolsheviks did on the basis of the ideology they developed and repressive state institutions.

However, as mentioned above, towards the end of his life, Lenin came to the conclusion that it was impossible to "drive the population into a new system by force." Stalin, on the other hand, after putting into practice his ideas of "dictatorship of the party" and "autonomization" - the creation of a unitary state called the "USSR" - strengthened his confidence in the possibility of "planting" socialism. Stalin's ideas about the construction of socialism through a "revolution from above", which assumed violence as the main mode of action of power, began to be put into practice. The

solution of the task of building socialism in one country taken separately was carried out on the basis that had already been prepared by the previous events before and especially after 1917, when not only the idea, but also the practice of revolutionary violence in the name of establishing social justice was first supported in every possible way and kindled by the Bolshevik power, and then

used by her to strengthen herself. Stalin's repressions were a continuation of those political repressions that began immediately after the October Revolution with the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of November 28, 1917, declaring the party of the Cadets the party of enemies of the people. The peak of these repressions falls on the period after the adoption on September 5, 1918 of the decree "On the Red Terror". The goal of terror, as you know, was not only the destruction of political opponents and anti-Soviet intelligentsia, but also the "cleansing" of Russian land from the so-called exploiting classes - the bourgeoisie and landowners. Russian historiography has not yet given a definite answer to the question of the size of these strata of the population that were to be eliminated. An approximate

figure is given of 4–5 million people (excluding the rural bourgeoisie)[1008]10. With all the moral rejection of terror in both the Lenin and Stalin periods of Russian history, it is necessary to see a difference between them. The Red Terror was a consequence of the revolution and was carried out in the conditions of a civil war, when there was a mutual destruction of various social forces. "I had to see a lot before," said Bukharin, "in 1919, when I advocated limiting the rights of the Cheka to executions, Ilyich made a decision to send me as a representative of the Politburo to the collegium of the Cheka with the right of veto. "Let him see for himself," he said, "and introduce terror into the framework, if possible ... We will all be only too happy if he succeeds!" And I really have seen enough of this - I don't wish it on anyone ... But the year 1919 in no way compares with what happened in 1930-1932. Then there was a struggle. We shot and they shot us, and even worse ... And now there was a mass extermination of completely defenseless and unresisting people - with their wives; with young children..."[1009]11. Undoubtedly, the civil war was the apogee of unbridled revolutionary violence[1010]12. There is no doubt that it had an irreversible demoralizing effect both on the psychology of the members of the ruling party and on the consciousness of the people. However, the Stalinist terror cannot be explained, let alone justified, by the pragmatics of the revolution - it was carried out in peacetime and was not cause

The offensive against the kulak in January 1928, which gave the signal for a new round of violence, was a way of solving the tasks set by the authorities. It is no coincidence that, according to one of the secretaries of the Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, R.Ya. Kisis, "at the beginning of the campaign, a significant part of the village cells were simply confused, found themselves at a crossroads, did not immediately understand what was the matter: either war communism was being introduced, the times of apportionment were returning, or we were going to expand the NEP in the countryside." Further words of Kisis testified to the extent of his understanding of what was happening: "It turned out that this is the strengthening of our regulation and planning, our economic impact on the countryside, to the extent of the growth of our socialist commanding heights as the main levers of this ~~s-plan~~ planning"[1011]13. The naive "turned out" rests here on two essential words "amplification" and "command". These words from orders "from above" at their primitive level, the functionaries of the Stalinist government - from local secretaries to members of the Politburo - understood quite adequately. Subsequent

steps in this direction are known - the November 1929 plenum of the Central Committee decided to deploy complete collectivization and, on its basis, eliminate the kulaks as a class; On December 27, 1929, at a conference of Marxist agrarians, Stalin publicly proclaimed the slogan of a transition from a policy of limiting the exploitative tendencies of the kulaks to a policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class; On January 5, 1930, a resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks appeared on the pace of collectivization; January 30 - Politburo resolution "On measures to eliminate kulak farms in areas of complete collectivization" and a call to pursue a policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class "with all the perseverance and consistency that the Bolsheviks are capable of"[1012]14. The tragedy of the peasantry, which fell victim to violence by the has been described in sufficient detail in the only authorities, literature to date. In the

struggle against the peasantry, the Stalinist practice of allocating "categories" and "quotas" for repressions was honed. All farms that were defined as kulak farms were divided into three categories: kulaks of the 1st category, the so-called counter-revolutionary asset, were sent mainly to prisons and camps, and family members were evicted to remote areas. Even before this

By decree, many kulaks were sent to camps by decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR of November 19, 1929. According to the 1st category, a quota of 5–6 thousand people was established for Siberia, 15 thousand for Ukraine, 5–6 thousand for Kazakhstan, and the North Caucasus and Dagestan - 6-8 thousand, the Central Black Earth region - 3-5 thousand, the Middle Volga - 3-4 thousand, the Lower Volga - 4-6 thousand, Belarus - 4-5 thousand, the Urals - 4- 5 thousand, i.e. 50-60 thousand people. Kulaks of the 2nd category - large kulaks and former semi-landowners were evicted with their families to remote areas of the country, making up a layer of so-called special settlers. The initial order for Siberia was defined as 25 thousand families, Ukraine - 30-35 thousand, North Caucasus and Dagestan - 20 thousand, Kazakhstan - 10-15 thousand, Central Black Earth Region - 10-15 thousand, Far Eastern Territory - 4 thousand. Fists of the 3rd category, also after dispossession, were expelled from their native village and settled within the region on uninhabited lands. In the future, these "quotas" were repeatedly revised upward[1013]1

Repressions against the kulaks made it possible in a short time to create, or rather, as Stalin said, "plant" collective farms. The repressions not only solved the problem of creating indivisible funds of collective farms - they were based on real estate confiscated from the kulaks, but also accelerated the entry of the rest of the peasants into the collective farms. "... Why bother with a peasant for a long time? - spoke on February 20, 1930 at a meeting of the party cell of the Institute of Red Professors S.I. Syrtsov (at that time already chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR). – Hint him about the Solovki, about the fact that he will be removed from the supply, or force him to vote according to the principle "who is for collectivization, that is for Soviet power, who is against collectivization, that is against Soviet power" [1014]16 . Collective farms were now completely subordinate to the state and, despite the chaos, staff turnover, mismanagement, etc., unquestioningly handed over grain to the state at symbolic prices, 10–12 times lower than market prices. Bread was exported from the country abroad even in the famine years of 1932-1933. The money received from the sale of bread was used not only to buy machine tools, but also the latest types of weapons. In 1933, in Italy alone, the USSR

purchased weapons worth one billion lire[1015]17. However, the violence of the authorities in relation to the peasantry in the early 30s. expressed no

resolutions on the pace of collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks as a class. All actions of the authorities of that time were extraordinary, based not just on coercion, but on direct violence. T.P. Korzhikhina put the resolutions of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of 1930-1932 in this row. on the fight against speculation, on the taxation of kulaks, on liability for damage to agricultural machinery, on poor-quality repairs of rolling stock and violation of traffic rules, on the theft of postal items, and many others. This is the famous law of August 7, 1932 "on five spikelets" (on the theft of state, collective farm and cooperative property), according to which 54,646 people were convicted in the country during the first five months of its application, of which 2,110 were sentenced to capital punishment. All of these resolutions ended, as a rule, with the words that the Central Executive Committees of the republics were invited to supplement their criminal codes with new articles that provided for fines or imprisonment for a term of 3 to 10 years or the highest measure of social protection (execution) with confiscation of property as a punishment . In the same row is the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of December 27, 1932 on the introduction of the passport system, the obligatory registration of passports and the formation of the Main Directorate of Workers 'and Peasants' Militia under the OGPU, which was obliged to establish a passport regime for cleaning cities "from hiding kulak, criminal and other anti-social elements"[1016]18. I must say that the Stalinist government acted on a grand scale. Only during the winter - summer of 1933 in the northern regions of Western Siberia it was supposed to resettle a new contingent of migrants numbering one million people. True, in this case she came across a protest from local authorities, who were ready to accept only about 300 thousand [people](#)[1017]19.

In the previous chapter it was already said that every grain procurement campaign in the 1930s. turned into a military operation. The grain procurements of 1932/33 stood out in particular. Stalin's telegram of series "G" dated November 9, 1932, which outlined the decision of the North Caucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, adopted on the directive of the Central Committee on grain procurement and sowing in the Kuban, and the decision of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the purge of rural party organizations in the Northern caucasus,

received, among others, the first secretary of the West Siberian regional committee of the CPSU (b) R.I. Eikhe and chairman of the regional executive committee F.P. Gryadinsky. The telegram proposed to blacklist the villages "for a clear disruption of the plan for sowing and grain procurement, and in relation to these villages to apply such measures as a) the immediate cessation of the supply of goods and the complete cessation of cooperative and state trade on the spot and removal from cooperative shops all available goods; b) complete prohibition of collective-farm trade both for collective farms, collective farmers and individual farmers; c) termination of any kind of lending and early recovery of loans and other financial obligations; d) checking and cleaning the collective-farm, cooperative and state apparatuses by the organs of the RKI from all kinds of alien and hostile elements; e) seizure by the OGPU of sabotage by the organizers

counterrevolutionary elements,
grain procurement and sowing, etc. etc ."[1018]20.

These measures did not remain only on paper - in the North Caucasus alone, more than 400 collective farms in 68 districts (out of 83) were blacklisted, 6208 people were convicted, 175 of them were shot. In Ukraine, only in November and the first five days of December 1932, 340 collective farm chairmen, 750 board members, 140 accountants, 265 supply and storekeepers, 140 foremen, 327 party workers and 195 collective farmers were arrested[1019]21. Although the authorities in every possible way concealed and denied the fact of mass famine in the USSR in the early 1930s, they still had to draw some

conclusions from the current situation. On January 19, 1933, a special law on grain deliveries was adopted, the real essence of which was set out in the decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 20, 1933, sent to the localities, signed by Molotov and Stalin. On the one hand, the resolution condemned the practice of "catching up with the use of repression", on the other hand, it formulated measures aimed at the final collective farms. From that time on, the enslavement of peasants was no longer envisaged "not by grain procurements of the old type, carried out on the basis of not quite definite contractual agreements with the peasantry, but by grain deliveries based on a firm, indisputable law, mandatory for all collective farms and of obligations individual farmers. This means that no evasion

delivery of grain on time should not be allowed under any circumstances. This decree contained regional norms and deadlines (month and date) for the delivery of grain, the procedure for replacing (or prohibiting replacing) one crop with another, etc. It was envisaged that "collective farms that have not fulfilled their obligations to deliver grain to the state within the calendar terms established by this resolution are subjected through the village councils to a fine in the amount of the market value of the unfulfilled part of the obligation, and in addition to this, these collective farms are required to fulfill the entire annual obligation ahead of schedule, subject to collection in an indisputable manner" (individual farmers in a similar case were brought to justice). Personal responsibility for the successful course of grain supplies was assigned to the direct executors of the Center's directives, i.e. "secretaries of krai and regional committees and chairmen of the executive committees of krajs and regions and chairmen of district executive committees, and in the village - chairmen of village councils, chairmen of collective farm boards, secretaries of collective farm cells, heads of political

departments of the MTS "[1020]22. Nevertheless, in the following year, 1934, difficulties arose again with grain procurements. A crop failure in the steppe regions of Ukraine made it necessary to reduce the plan launched by it and to stake on the Volga region and Western Siberia. The situation, as always, was so serious that, in addition to various kinds of representatives, Molotov and Kaganovich went to Siberia. By Molotov's telegram from Novosibirsk on September 19, 1934, the Politburo granted Eikhe "the right to sanction capital punishment in Western Siberia—during the months of September and October"[1021]23. By a decree of November 2, 1934, these powers of Eikhe were extended until November 15, 1934, about which Stalin personally—

informed him in a cipher telegram signed by him [1022]24. Following Molotov, Kaganovich went beyond the Urals, who, speaking on October 7, 1934 at a meeting of the Chelyabinsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, said literally the following: "Repressive measures must be given a certain direction. If you want to stir people up, you must create tension, you must publish one sentence with execution, explain it, and then people will understand

keep alive... The power of power is a combined blow: judicial repression, political, organizational, economic and technical – that's what it means to go on the attack for real" [1023]25. Speaking on October 11 in Novosibirsk at an instructive meeting of a brigade sent by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Western Siberia to participate in grain procurements, Kaganovich continued the topic: "... People have some depression from the fact that we beat them. Now we should not disappoint them that we will not beat them: we will beat them if they do not work well. But the

best thing is to raise people up so that they [work better](#)"[1024]26. However, it was impossible to force serf collective farmers to work on the land in any other way than repressions. In combat operations called "grain harvesting", "hay harvesting", "grain delivery", etc. involved not only direct representatives of local and central authorities, but also the organs of the court, the prosecutor's office, and the OGPU. The bodies of the court and the prosecutor's office pursued a judicial punitive policy in cases related to grain harvesting and grain delivery, regularly providing reports to the party bodies under the characteristic title "On the work of the prosecutor's office ... in harvesting and supplying grain to the state." For their part, regular reports were also submitted by local organs of the OGPU. Here are the titles of some special reports of the Plenipotentiary Representation of the OGPU in Western Siberia: "On the course of hay harvesting and laying silage in the West Siberian Territory", "On collective farm construction in the Western Siberian Territory", "On the mood of the delegates of the first regional congress of collective farmers shock women", "~~Summary~~ of negative facts moods in connection with the forthcoming grain delivery", [etc.](#)[1025]27. In each plenipotentiary representation of the OGPU (since 1934, the department of the NKVD), an economic department was actively operating, supervising the state of affairs in industry and agriculture and "disclosing" one "counter-revolutionary wrecking organization" after another[1026]28. What was the price, for example, of one grain procurement campaign in 1934 in the West Siberian Territory can be judged by the following data: only for the period from October 5 to November 4, 1934, 180 cases were considered, of which 158 were under Article 58-14 of the Criminal Code "for sabotage in grain delivery" and 22 cases

processes in rural areas, 46 processes - in district centers and 26 - in cities, and 72 districts were simultaneously covered by visiting sessions. These processes were considered by the authorities as a means of intimidation and a kind of means of mobilizing the population for an active grain procurement campaign. During this period, 779 people were repressed under Article 58-14, of which 194 were shot with the approval of Eikhe, 225 received 10 years in the camps, 113 - from 10 to 5 years in the camps, 170 - a term of 5 to 1 year, the rest were sentenced to corrective labor without imprisonment in a camp. Of the 194 shot, 78 were called kulaks, 36 were called social aliens, and 30 of them were officials, 37 were individual farmers and 13 were collective farmers. According to the law of August 7, 1932, 140 people were repressed, 46 of them were shot[1027]29. According to available data, in the autumn of 1934, in the West Siberian Territory, 7962 people were brought to trial in cases related to grain

procurements [1028]30. The grounds for conviction were accusations not only of sabotage or theft of state property, but also of poor-quality repair of agricultural machines or their breakdown, poor quality of harvesting, damage to grain, etc.

1934 was not something special in this respect. The authorities acted with such methods both in previous and subsequent years. For comparison: in the same West Siberian Territory in 1933, 15,694 people were convicted, in 1935 - 2829, in 1936 - 1371 people[1029]31. The decrease in the number of convicts only indicates that the collective farmers have learned to adapt to a new life.

The Stalinist authorities were aware of the unwillingness of the collective farmers to work for the state. "... Keep in mind," Kaganovich instructed on October 11, 1934, authorized representatives of the Central Committee, who were sent to conduct a grain procurement campaign in Western Siberia, "that mowing, threshing, and all the work now in the countryside does not at all bear the character of a harvest (Eikhe's remark : the peasants have forgotten how to suffer). I saw this in the Chelyabinsk region, and the same is probably true for you. References to the fact that there is no workforce, no horses, whether it is possible to reschedule the harvest. If the question was that everything was used to the bone, then it would be necessary to discuss how to divide the available funds. But the trouble is that the collective farmer works for 40% of w

can give. Indeed, even honest collective farmers have forgotten how to suffer. I shamed two: - Shame on

you, how do you work? - No, we're working. Tell me

honestly, is this how you worked on your piece of land? His eyes lit up: of course, he says, it's not like that. However, further Kaganovich draws a conclusion that only a representative of the Stalinist government could make: "The question must be raised politically. It must be said: we know that there are saboteurs ... our positions are strong, politically strong, but the collective farmers break the law, work poorly when the state gives them cars and that's all. But they do not want to hand over their grain to the state..."[1030]32. This meant again ~~action~~ through repression. The circle was closing - there were no positive economic incentives in the arsenal of Stalin's power.

Only with the constant intervention of the party state in economic life, which was in the nature of improvisations and political campaigns, could the economic system exist in the time of Stalin. This system had its "merits", which even today attract the attention of some political forces. She could mobilize resources by robbery in a separate sector or direction and make a breakthrough, which, as a rule, was paid not only by a decrease in the standard of living of the population, but also by direct human casualties. Therefore, the Soviet economic system, as the American economist K. Hoover rightly noted back in 1930, "is impossible to analyze and evaluate without [emotions](#)"[1031]33.

However, for the Stalinist authorities, these "mistakes and shortcomings" had practically no meaning. The main question in the process of stateization of agriculture was the question of what quantity of agricultural products, automatically considered already in monetary terms, would be at the disposal of the state.

In Stalin's language, it was "the question of the marketability of collective-farm state-farm grain production." In his report at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin calculated the marketability of agriculture for 1938, taking as a basis the numerical calculations of the well-known statistician and economist VS Nemchinov. Recalling that before the First World War, the countryside provided about 1.3 billion poods of marketable grain at the rate of 26% of the marketable production, Stal

indicator of the marketability of collective-farm and state-farm production in 1938 at 40%, received 2.3 billion poods of marketable grain, i.e. 1 billion more than before the war. He was completely satisfied with the result, as evidenced by his words at the congress: "Consequently, the marketability of production is its most important feature, which is of the greatest importance ^{state-farm-collective-farm} for the supply of the country.

This particular feature of collective farms and state farms is the secret of the fact that our country was able to solve the grain problem so easily and quickly, the problem of a sufficient supply of marketable [grain to a huge country](#).

This passage from Stalin's report has been analyzed in the literature. N.S. Simony noticed that Stalin "cheated" here. When he spoke of pre-war marketable grain, he only took into account non-village sales (which he did not mention this time). The evaluation of marketable grain in 1938, in addition to state procurement and state purchases, also included intra-village trade in the amount of up to several hundred pounds (only now not individual farms, but collective farmers participated in it). Therefore, the actual gap in the levels of marketability of grain before the First World War and in 1938, even based on the data of Stalin himself, should be approximately 400 million poods less. But the main thing is something else. From a political and economic point of view, Stalin compared things that were not entirely comparable. Annual state grain procurements of 1.6–1.8 billion poods in the second half of the 1930s. could not be qualified as marketable products, since its withdrawal from the peasants was carried out by non-economic methods, which gave the whole thing that ease and speed that Stalin spoke of, obviously not counting either for labor or for time undertaken by his apparatus for 11 years, the ruin of about 19 million peasant farms, the deportation and physical extermination (by starvation or execution) of many millions of people, etc. N.S. Simony drew attention to one more passage in Stalin's report. According to the data given in it, the gross grain production in the country from 1913 to 1938 increased by only 18.6%. According to statistics for the same time, the population of the country (within the borders of the USSR up to 17

September 1939) increased by 22.4%. It turns out that per capita gross grain production even decreased (from about 5.75 to 5.56 centners). But if this indicator decreased, and the output of grain from the countryside increased (albeit not by 1 billion, as Stalin claimed, but by only 600 million poods), then what did this mean for the peasantry? Nothing more than a robbery. N.S. Simony draws a correct, though incomplete conclusion: when speaking about providing the country with grain, Stalin had in mind only its urban part, i.e. less than one third of its population. The remaining two-thirds were simply not [taken into account](#)[1033]35. The incompleteness of this ~~conclusion~~ lies in the fact that it did not take into account the export of a significant part of the grain abroad to serve the political goals of the regime. Then it is problematic to provide one third of the country's population with grain. There are also statements in the

literature about the neo-NEP in 1932, which are based largely on the gullibility of historians to official documents[1034]36. ~~Among~~ among them are speeches by party leaders at the XVII Party Conference on January 30 - February 4, 1932, specific resolutions of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of May 6 and 10, 1932 on the development of collective farm trade in bread and meat products, a decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR "On revolutionary legality" dated June 25, 1932. However, all these decrees were of a propaganda nature, since in reality they were not and could not be implemented. Thus, from January 15, 1933, trade in bread was allowed for collective farms, collective farmers and individual farmers only after the implementation of the state plan for grain procurement on the scale of regions, territories and autonomous republics, and meat - subject to the fulfillment of the centralized plan for livestock procurement, as well as after the formation of seed and other funds. And since the grain buyers in the main grain regions raked out the entire crop to the last grain, including food and seed funds, from the barns of collective farms and collective farmers, the latter had practically no chance to ~~expand~~ the grain trade [1035]37. As one of the collective farmers stated: "What is the use of a resolution

when there is [nothing to trade](#)"[1036]38. In addition, the May trade were actually a resolution of the Central ~~resolutions on the deployment of the collectiv~~ Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of August 7, 1932 on the protection

of socialist property and the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On the fight against speculation" adopted at the same time, about which Stalin himself said that it "does not suffer from special softness" and that "such a law did not exist and could not exist in the conditions of the first stage of the NEP"[1037]39. As for the results of the implementation of the resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars "On revolutionary legality" of June 25, 1932, this can be found in the text "Instructions to all party and Soviet workers and all bodies of the OGPU, the Court and the Prosecutor's Office" dated May 8, 1933 .: "Chairmen of collective farms and members of the boards of collective farms, chairmen of village councils and secretaries of cells, district and regional commissioners are arrested ... - everyone who is not too lazy and who has no right to arrest." The situation became so aggravated that it required a special resolution of the Politburo of March 8, 1933 "On unloading places of deprivation of liberty" and a formidable shout in the form of "Instructions ..." of May 8, 1933, signed, as usual, by Molotov and Stalin, which provided for a certain streamlining of arrests and a decrease in the number

of prisoners from 800 to 400 thousand people[1038]40. Reasoning about neo-nep seems even more inadequate if we take into account the entire context of the events in the country that unfolded in connection with the massive famine in the main grain-producing regions in 1932-1933. In subsequent years, the authorities repeatedly retreated and attacked again, but in all cases these were actions due to the goals of survival and strengthening of the government itself, and not concern for the situation of the working

In addition to the direct robbery of the village, Stalin's collectivization led to the deepest negative economic and social consequences, expressed in the depeasation and alienation of the peasant from the results of his labor. However, this did not particularly worry the authorities. Moreover, even from this situation, she tried to extract political benefits. "... Where will you get workers in the cities? - Stalin said at a meeting of agricultural workers in 1934 - There is no other source here to take workers to the city. Where will you get them if things go better. But they will do better, and you won't pull him out of the collective farm with a stick. You know that? After all, we have a country where there is no unemployment, no surplus workers. We have a collective farm country. If the collective farmer is given quite sufficient

security, then he won't go anywhere to the factory, but you won't drag them to land work even on the lasso. And you are talking about [opening factories on the collective farm](#)"[1039]41. —

The nationalization of the peasantry not only solved the problem of workers - the number of workers in a short period from 1928 to 1940 increased from 9 to 23 million people, but also insured the government against any opposition speeches for many years. Young workers, torn out of their rural environment or fleeing hunger, illegally leaving special settlements, agreed to the worst living conditions in order to survive. The American worker J. Scott, who worked on the construction of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, for many years retained the impression of how the whole winter of 1932-1933. in 40-degree frost, tens of thousands of kulaks and special settlers, together with their families, were held in tents, every tenth died from cold and malnutrition, not a single child under 10 years old survived[1040]42. Those who managed to find themselves in more or less tolerable conditions became a strong support of Stalin's power, ~~not to~~ mention the promoted workers who were lucky enough to break into command positions.

Repressions were the main source of cheap labor for numerous construction projects, which could easily be transferred from one hard-to-reach area to another. The creation of a system of camps with the beginning of industrialization was also due to purely pragmatic tasks of the authorities, which G. Yagoda formulated on May 15, 1929 at a meeting of a special commission of the Politburo chaired by N. Yanson: "... We have enormous difficulties in sending workers to the North. The concentration of many thousands of prisoners there will help us advance the cause of the economic exploitation of the natural resources [of the North](#)"[1041]43. The system of camps was headed by the OGPU Camp Administration (ULAG), organized ~~on~~ April

25, 1930 by order of the OGPU, which was based on the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 7, 1930. The administration received the status of the head office in late 1930 - early 1931 and became known as the GULAG. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of July 1, 1931, the entire leadership of the special settlers was transferred to the jurisdiction of the GULAG OGPU. After the formation of the NKVD, by the decision of the Central Executive Committee of July 10, 1934 and the order of the NKVD of July 11, 1934, the GULAG was transferred to the jurisdiction of this people's com

all correctional labor institutions of the People's Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR and other union republics were subordinated. To manage production activities from the moment the Gulag was formed, the Production and Economic Department was organized in its composition, which included production groups and departments responsible for certain areas of work. On the basis of these departments, production departments of the Gulag were created: the forest industry, mining and smelting, fuel, pulp and paper, hydraulic and marine construction, agriculture, etc. [1042]44 —

By the end of the 1930s. The Gulag empire had grown so much that it needed to be reorganized. On February 26, 1941, a new structure of the NKVD was announced, which included, in addition to the GULAG, nine specialized production headquarters and departments - the Main Directorates of the camps for hydraulic engineering construction (Glavgidrostroy), mining and metallurgical enterprises (GULGMP), railway construction (GULZhDS), industrial construction (GULPS), Main Directorate for Construction of the Far North (Dalstroy) and Main Directorate for Highways (GUSHOSDOR); Directorates of the camps of the timber industry (ULLP), the fuel industry (UTP) and the Directorate of Special Construction of the NKVD (Osobstroy) to manage the construction of aircraft and engine-building plants in the area of Kuibyshev. Soon they were joined by the Main Directorate of Aerodrome Construction (GUAC) and the Directorate of Camps for the Construction of Ferrous Metallurgy Enterprises and Special Construction for the Oil Industry. In the GULAG itself, there were camps that specialized in agriculture ("GULAG state farms of the NKVD"), fishing and the production of consumer goods, as well as all territorial departments and administrations of corrective labor colonies and camps (OITK-UITLK). In addition, the main functions of the Gulag included the development of regulatory —

documents[1043]45. Permanent repressions against "saboteurs", "saboteurs", etc. became not only a source of replenishment of the camps, but also a real "engine" of Stalin's industrialization. It is characteristic that its beginning was also marked by the

specialists in industry, who allegedly prevented the development of industrialization. The initiative role of the Politburo of the Central Committee in the organization of the Shakhty process after the declassification of the materials of the "special folder" of the Politburo can be considered proven. On the direct proposal of Stalin and Molotov, on March 2, 1928, the Politburo decided to create a commission on the Shakhty case consisting of Rykov, Ordzhonikidze, Stalin, Molotov and Kuibyshev, which determined not only the time for hearing the case, but also the composition of the court, the scope of the trial and the fate participants[1044]46.

On May 18 - July 5, 1928, the Shakhty trial took place, which Molotov called "the first major exposure of sabotage." Of the 53 people who went through this process, five were shot. Immediately after the trial, at least two thousand specialists were arrested[1045]47. "The Shakhty case," said Molotov at the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, "played an exceptionally positive role when the party undertook to correct the shortcomings revealed by the Shakhty case and launched a broader struggle for the further success of our construction"[1046]48. In connection with these events, the order of the OGPU to encourage working miners who "helped" to open the "Shakhty case" received wide publicity and had far-reaching consequences. By this order, several workers were awarded Mauser revolvers with the inscription "For pest control from the OGPU collegium" [1047]49. In 1928–1929 a shake-up was made in the military industry and in the gold-platinum industry in the Urals. In both cases, it was said about the disclosure of a large counter-revolutionary organization[1048]50. The continuation of the repressions that had begun against

the "bourgeois" specialists in 1930 was the process of the "Industrial Party", when representatives of the old technical intelligentsia were declared enemies of the people. In the same year, prominent economists A.V. Chayanov, N.D. Kondratiev and others, who were a non-existent counter-revolutionary Labor Peasant Party. Branches of this party were "discovered" by the OGPU in the field. All the disastrous consequences of Stalinist collectivization were attributed to their vigorous activity. In the same row - the trial of the "Union Bureau

accused

v

creation

Central Committee of the RSDLP Mensheviks", the case "on the White Guard conspiracy", "on wrecking in the Traktorcenter system", "on a conspiracy in agriculture", "on wrecking at power plants in the USSR", which went one after another until the murder of Kirov, when a new stage of terror unfolded in terms of its goals [1049]51.

Repressions against "bourgeois" specialists and "saboteurs" made dangerous warnings about the unfoundedness of industrialization in engineering and technology, and thus made it possible to speed up its pace under pain of being accused of sabotage or sabotage. Chaotic, bacchanal industrialization was accompanied by a huge number of accidents, accidents, loss of life, explained by the "intrigues of the What enemies of construction." Under the socialist

threat of repressions, breakthroughs that constantly arose in one or another area of economic development were liquidated. In the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a standard form was prepared signed by the First Secretary of the Regional Committee R.I. Eikhe and chairman of the regional executive committee F.P. Gryadinsky, which was sent to the district secretaries and chairmen of the district executive committees. On February 17, 1937, for example, the following order was sent to the regions of the re

"Despite [the] stern warning given to you by the regional committee and the regional executive committee, [in] your area the failure of logging continues. Is it really necessary to take [on] the path of applying the most severe repressions in order to force you [in] a Bolshevik way to take up [the] business of logging. We propose to organize Stakhanov Month [for] logging [and] timber hauling on February 25-March 25. Prepare it carefully, send the best forces of the district activists personally [with] a foreman to the timber industry enterprises. Ensure the full access of all collective farmers [to] seasonal work [in] the forest, without stopping [before] the need to bring to justice individual collective farm leaders who maliciously sabotage the fulfillment of contracts [on] logging, do not comply with the decision of the government ... "[1050]52.

Repressions provided the possibility of a rapid rotation of personnel. The place of the repressed "bourgeois" specialists was occupied by young nominees, the so-called young people, who did not reason and did not doubt the performers. "They say that it is impossible for communists, especially working communists-economic managers," Stalin reasoned at the April 1928 plenum of the Central Committee, "to master chemical formulas and technical knowledge in general. This is not true, comrades. There are no fortresses in the world that the working people, the Bolsheviks, could not take. We did not take such fortresses in our struggle against the bourgeoisie. The whole point is to have the desire to master technical knowledge and to arm yourself with perseverance and Bolshevik patience. In a word, "the working class for its own production and technical intelligentsia." The key word in this Stalinist phrase is "one's own". To solve the tasks set, it was really necessary to "forge new cadres of Bolsheviks - specialists in all branches of knowledge"[1052]54. And these were already their own specialists, pleasing to the

However, the authorities forced the so-called bourgeois specialists and wreckers to work for themselves on its own terms, in strict isolation. The circular of the Supreme Economic Council of National Economy and the OGPU "On the use of specialists convicted of sabotage in production" dated May 15, 1930 was signed by the chairman of the Supreme Economic Council of National Economy Kuibyshev and the deputy chairman of the OGPU Yagoda. The preamble to this document stated: "Over the past two or three years, the organs of the OGPU have uncovered counter-revolutionary wrecking organizations in a number of branches of our economy. Wreckers managed to penetrate even into Council of National Economy, the shock the Supreme State Planning

Commission, plant management and workshops ... Elimination of the consequences should be the task of our sabotage should become industry In this matter, wreckers condemned by the OGPU should be used ... The use of wreckers

should be organized in such a way that their work took place mainly in the premises of the OGPU bodies ... To do this, select trustworthy specialists. Assist them in setting up experimental work..."[1053]55. This order marked the emergence of "special places of detention" for convicted specialists

one of these sharashkas "Marfino" near Moscow in the post-war years is described in the famous novel by A.I. Solzhenitsyn "In the [First Circle](#)"[1054]56.

The repression channeled the discontent of the masses, directing it against the "kulaks", "saboteurs", "enemies of the people", on whom all responsibility for failures and disruptions on the path of building socialism was shifted. As a result, the repressions contributed to the strengthening of Stalin's power, its even greater alienation and sacralization. All achievements in the USSR were associated with the name of Stalin, and failures with the intrigues of the enemies of socialist construction.

The repressions eliminated the remnants of the opposition and contributed to the strengthening of Stalin's sole power. As Molotov said, "after the war there are no opposition groups, this is such a relief that helped to give a lot the right, good direction, and if most of these people had remained alive, I don't know if we would have stood firmly on our feet" [1055]57 .

Repression leveled society through fear, which entered the subconscious of every Soviet person to such an extent that it became part of his genetic nature. This was facilitated by the wave-like nature of the repressions - offensive - retreat - and again offensive, which did not allow people to relax and kept them in constant expectation and fear.

The Stalinist authorities not only did not know, but also did not know how to solve social and economic problems in other ways, except by violence against individual social groups or society as a whole. In response to the growth of juvenile delinquency in the 1930s, which was a direct consequence of the transformative actions of the authorities that provoked the mass appearance of street children, a resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of April 7, 1935 "On measures to combat juvenile delinquency" was adopted, according to to which "minors, starting from the age of 12, convicted of committing theft, causing violence, bodily harm, mutilation, murder or attempted murder, shall be brought to criminal court with the application of all measures of criminal punishment." On April 20, 1935, the Politburo approved a secret instruction to the court and prosecutor's offices, which explained that "among the measures of criminal punishment provided for in Art. 1 specified

The decision also applies to the highest measure of criminal punishment (execution)", which until then was applied only to persons who have reached the age of 18. And although the prosecution and judicial authorities had to inform the Prosecutor of the Union and the Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR about sentences of this kind, these cases were considered in the regional (regional)

courts in a general manner [1056]58. The actions of the authorities had the same character even in such a delicate area of human life as family planning. In the 1930s, in an effort to increase the birth rate in the country, the authorities did not find anything better than to adopt a special resolution of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 27, 1936 "On the prohibition of abortion, increasing material assistance to women in childbirth, establishing state assistance to large families, expanding the network maternity hospitals, nurseries and kindergartens, increased criminal penalties for non-payment of alimony and some changes in divorce laws. It has already been noted in the literature that the second part of the resolution was actually a declaration, since benefits in the amount of two thousand rubles. per year (the monthly salary of the first secretary of the Moscow and Leningrad regional committees of the party - I.P.) were assigned to those women who already had six children, at the birth of the seventh child [1057]59. In this case, the woman acquired the status of mother-heroine. However, in order to receive state benefits, it was required to make no less heroic efforts to collect the necessary protocols and certificates in accordance with the relevant instructions. In addition, upon receipt of a personal book, the mother was obliged "to give a signature that all her children, taken into account when assigning benefits, to at the time of receipt of this book are alive and that she was warned about the responsibility for giving incorrect information ... When receiving state benefits for the second and subsequent years, a mother of many children must again submit to the city or district financial department a certificate from the district or city registry office stating that all her children, taken into account when assigning the

However, the 1930s entrenched in the minds of the majority of the people as the years of enthusiasm, striving for the future. As the playwright V.V. Vishnevsky, it was "a decade of frenzied pressure, labor, fights, torments and victories ..." [1059]61. Many still cannot

combine in their minds the dark and bright sides of the Stalinist period and preach the approach "on the one hand ... on the other hand." The reason for this is that it began at the same time, in the late 1920s. a sharp break in the consciousness of the people, which took place under the constant ideological accompaniment of lies about the construction of a new, most just society on earth - you just need to be patient a little. Unified education, unified and strictly limited knowledge about the situation in the country and the world, which was offered by all the media, the complete closeness of Soviet society made Stalin's lies effective. Only a few surviving representatives of the old intellectual elite perceived the information imposed "from above" in the way that, for example, the writer M.M. Prishvin, who wrote in his diary on November 1, 1937: "... most of all I hate the newspaper Pravda as the personification of the most blatant lie that has ever been on earth "[1060]62.

However, one indoctrination of the population would not be enough. The transformation of society in the Stalinist way became possible because Stalin managed to draw the broad masses of the people into his actions. Noisy populist measures, which were quite masterfully used by the authorities, played a huge role here. Among such measures are the slogans of self-criticism and criticism of bosses at all levels, which were periodically launched, the exposure of "saboteurs" and their punishment, the glorification of shock work and the Stakhanov movement, the purposeful creation of symbols, heroes and myths of

the Stalin era. Mass awards for distinguished workers were widely practiced. So, on December 25, 1935, the Politburo approved a resolution of the Central Executive Committee on awarding the advanced collective farmers and collective farmers of the Uzbek, Turkmen, Tajik SSR, Kazakh and Kara-Kalpak ASSR for labor heroism and exceeding the established cotton yield by 100 - 400% - the Order of Lenin was awarded to 96 people, the Order of the Red Banner of Labor - 34, the Order of the Badge of Honor - 78[1061]63. On May 8, 1940, Pravda published a decree approved by the Politburo of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On awarding orders and medals of the USSR

numbering 1746 people[1062]64. The facts of wage increases during the Great Terror, on which all Soviet newspapers focused their attention, had the same effect. The decision of the Council of People's Commissars, approved by the Politburo on November 1, 1937, increased the wages of low-paid workers and employees of the factory industry and transport [1063]65. By the decision of the Politburo of December 9, 1937, the wages of nurses, orderlies and nurses were raised[1064]66. As a rule, by such events, the Stalinist government gained numerous supporters among the low-paid strata.

population.

An important role was also played by the very tactics of carrying out repressions - an offensive was necessarily followed by a retreat, which, as a rule, was accompanied by the punishment of the most zealous executors of Stalin's directives. In this peculiar way, the sense of justice was satisfied among the broad masses of the working people.

As a result, a rather significant support was formed in power, which Stalin himself told about in his report to the 17th Party Congress. In addition to appointees at all levels, there were more than 2 million members and candidate members of the party, more than 4 million Komsomol members, more than 12 million members of Osoaviakhim, more than 17 million members of trade unions, more than 3 million workers and peasant correspondents, etc. [1065]67 This should also include shock workers, Stakhanovites, whom the

Stalinist authorities purposefully singled out as a special group. X. Arendt gave an assessment of this policy back in 1951 in her book *The Origin of Totalitarianism*: "The Stakhanov system, approved in the early 1930s, destroyed the remnants of solidarity and class consciousness among the workers, secondly, the temporary formation of the Stakhanovite aristocracy, whose social distance was perceived more acutely than the distance between workers and managers. This process culminated in the introduction in 1938 of labor books, which officially turned the entire Russian working class into one gigantic labor force for forced labor.[1066]68 Following X. Arendt and some modern Western historians note the special role of the Stakhanov movement in the Stalinization of Soviet society [1067]69.

At the same time, the actual manifestations of the enthusiasm of the masses, as already noted in the literature, were extremely exaggerated in the minds of the people due to the massive impact of the fine arts on them [1068]70. Stalin himself assessed the situation with the funds propaganda ^{And} Stakhanov movement more realistically. In a speech at the ~~first~~ All-Union Conference of Stakhanovites in November 1935, he expressed himself as follows: "Stakhanov's fate was not the best, because he had to defend himself in his advance not only from some members of the administration, but also from some workers who ridiculed and poisoned him for "innovations". As for Busygin, he almost paid for his "innovations" by losing his job at the plant, and only the intervention of the head of the shop, comrade. Sokolinsky helped him stay at ~~the~~ factory"[1069]71. The lines from the diary of A.G. Mankova: "A new canteen for drummers has been opened at our plant. Its purpose, so to speak, is to "stimulate" labor productivity. Its meaning and end result is to strengthen the differentiation of people into right and wrong, to increase strife and civil strife, already huge. They cut off half the area from the common dining room,

fenced it off with a glass partition, painted everything inside with oil paint, hung curtains on the windows, set up small tables, covered them with white napkins ... In a word, "restaurant". From the fact that the area was cut from the common dining room, it became dirtier, much cramped. While workers swarm through it like bees in a hive, either quickly devouring food or standing in line waiting for a seat to open at a long, narrow, food-stained table, next to it, behind an oil-painted partition and curtains behind several dozen people are sitting at separate tables, selected by God knows what criteria. And while in the common dining room they eat soup with pasta or naked sour cabbage soup, and for the second - pasta with sugar (less often with margarine), in the "restaurant" - a meat dinner, and if pasta, then with cow's butter ... »[1070]72. Such a policy, on the one hand, not only prevented the emergence of elementary proletarian solidarity and fostered hatred for the shock workers, which often expressed itself in their murder, but on the other hand,

contributed to the growth of mass careerism, which was consciously encouraged "from

above". Shock workers, most often young ones, were given special opportunities for promotion. The same A.G. Mankov left another remarkable entry dated December 5, 1933 in his diary: "... the Party trade union office ... There is always a group of young party people gathered there. These are all propagandists-agitators of our plant, leaders of circles on the history of the party, Leninism, etc. All of them are full-time, and all of them are paid good ~~money~~ [1071]73. Quite it is natural that in response the young nominees tried in every way to serve the authorities. They were distinguished above all by their uncompromising approach to carrying out the party's general line. All of them well mastered the Leninist principle: "Morality is what serves to destroy the old exploiting society and unite all working people around the proletariat, which is creating a new communist society"[1072]74. The regime ~~not~~

only managed to captivate huge masses of the population with the idea of a "great leap forward", but also made them active accomplices of repressions. All actions that were carried out "from above", at the initiative of the authorities - collectivization, the fight against the kulaks, the fight against pests, anti-religious propaganda, etc., Stalin declared at the 16th Congress of the CPSU (b) the inalienable right of the workers and peasants of the USSR, enshrined in the Constitution[1073]75. Just as Lenin in 1917 carried away the masses with the slogan "Rob the loot!", Stalin in the 1930s. gave carte blanche to the initiative "from below" to expose and eliminate the "enemies of the people", linking these actions in the minds of the people with the construction of socialism. The unleashing of such an initiative inevitably entailed an expansion of the already wide range of candidates for repression, which could include almost any person, which was inevitably given by the vagueness of the very term "enemy of the people." Stalin's slogans "they cut down the forest - the chips fly", "if criticism contains at least 5-10 percent of the truth, then such criticism should be welcomed ...", etc., allowed at all levels to settle personal scores with their opponents and simply objectionable people. One of the most difficult problems of Russian history is the use by the authorities of the sentiments of a person of a traditional society, prone

made it possible to set one part of the people against another. A general statement of the existence of the phenomenon of a split in Russian society between the people and the cultural layer, to which the ruling classes mainly belonged, is clearly not enough. Solving this problem requires additional efforts by scientists of various specialties and, above all, ethnopsychologists. The difficulty lies in not only identifying the main elements of the people's traditional political culture, but also revealing the mechanism of its influence on political processes. And this is not only traditional Russian paternalism and centuries-old traditions of subordination to power, which has been most often discussed in recent literature. Here, the deeper foundations of Russian life are involved, life is largely patriarchal, with a leveling principle prevailing in it. Such a deep foundation was the consciousness of private property, unrooted even by 1917 in Russian society, and the sense of justice inextricably linked with it. The special status of power in Russia has led to a fundamentally different than in the West, the nature of society and a different nature

of its relationship with power. There has never been a civil society in Russia. Some of its beginnings were only beginning to take shape at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, but this process was interrupted as a result of the October Revolution and the subsequent change in the direction of the historical development of Russia.

Civil society presupposes the existence of horizontal structures, i.e. such associations that are created not by the authorities, but by society itself, and therefore have independent mechanisms of influence on the authorities. It was in the West that the masses could "put pressure" on the state, influence the formation of its policy. Such mechanisms did not exist in Russian society. The letters and complaints that Western historians write about have never played such a role. The authorities either ignored them, as was the case during collectivization, when about 100 thousand letters from peasants about arbitrariness in the field were received only to the chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Kalinin, or defiantly used this or that letter to justify their decision.

Russian society has represented and still represents an education in which changes can begin even from a small external push - the actions of the authorities. The literature has not yet developed a single scientific concept to characterize this type of society. There are definitions made only on an intuitive level. This is a well-known characteristic of society as a "bag of potatoes", which is found in K. Marx. Or a similar definition of society by M.K. Mamardashvili is a "jelly-type society". There are definitions of society as "heaps of sand" or the definition of the Russian environment by V.O. Klyuchevsky as "sluggish, spiritually crumbling and socially fragmented, accustomed to marking time in one place without moving forward"[1074]76. In all cases, the authors who tried to define a society of this type assumed the presence of an external factor, an external force that stood above the society and held it together. That force was power. Therefore, "such a society deprived of power, like a sand castle without moisture, instantly crumbles," as V. Lipnevich, the author of one of the reviews in the journal *Novy Mir*, aptly noted[1075]77. This is exactly what happened when the Russian autocracy fell. "Rus' faded in two days," wrote V.V. Rozanov. - At the most - in three ... It is amazing that it crumbled all at once, to the details, to particulars. And in fact, such a shock has never happened, not excluding the "Great Migration of Nations" [1076]78.

That is why the majority of the illiterate and semi-literate population of Russia, with its characteristic stereotyped consciousness and simplified perception of the world, was a fertile object for manipulation by the authorities. It was on these features of traditional Russian political culture that Lenin staked, pushing and inflaming the mood of the anarchist masses in 1917. Throughout the entire period from February to October, there was a process of not strengthening, but destroying the weak structures of the emerging civil society and creating new asocial structures, whose activity was directed to the destruction of public order and robbery.

The unleashing of a dark, irrational beginning in Russian political life was greatly facilitated by the factor of the civil war and even before the First World War, when

a monstrous decline in the value of human life. A poor and brutalized society, inflamed by class hatred, emerged from the civil war. At the same time, this society was overwhelmed by a thirst for social justice and equality. The authorities used these opposite feelings that lived among the people, combining the idea of building socialism and repression against its alleged enemies, making the first the goal, and the second the way to achieve the goal. Already from the end of 1925, as noted in a special chapter, a new round of purposeful policy began to incite social struggle in the countryside, a policy of inciting the village lower classes against wealthy peasants. At the same time, the cities were kindled

hatred for "nepmen" and for people with an "unclean" social origin. In this case, the hatred of capitalism by the communist authorities and the hostility of the broad working masses to private property, to the rich, coincided. Therefore, for many segments of the population, especially those "humiliated and insulted" in the past, the communist government really became their own, people's power.

The collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks as a class could not be carried out only by the appointees of all levels and the 25,000 workers. What was needed was the initiative of the peasant masses themselves. The main support of the ruling party elite in carrying out these actions was, first of all, the peasant poor. There are plenty of facts about the active, and most importantly, initiative participation of the poorest strata of the countryside in carrying out the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class. This initiative surprised even the authorities. "It is typical," Kalinin said in March 1930, "that when you go around and look at this mighty anti-kulak movement, you involuntarily state that the authorities in 95 cases out of 100 have to play a restraining role in the field of dispossession"[1077] 79 .

The information reports of the OGPU and the materials of the information and statistical sectors of the regional and regional party bodies contain numerous information about how the expropriation of kulak farms turned into auctions, in which the middle peasants, poor peasants, local employees, party and Komsomol activists participated, about how "they pulled off the coat from daughter met on the street

kulak", "they carried an old, still burning iron stove around the village", "they took away the last pantaloons", "they took away the food cooked in the oven"^[1078]⁸⁰, etc.

and so on. The policy of the authorities contributed to the emergence of various forms of complicity of the peasants in dispossession and grain procurement. This topic deserves special consideration. In the context of this presentation, it will be necessary to confine ourselves to a few typical examples. So, under the Verkhne-Nazarovsky district executive committee of the West Siberian Territory, a regional "five" specially created from local peasants for the eviction of kulaks operated, which, at its discretion, determined both candidates for kulaks and their subsequent fate. At a single meeting on May 11, 1931, the decision to "recognize as clearly kulak" was made in relation to 67 people, on May 12 - on 4, on May 13 - another 10 people; and on October 24, 1931, the "troika" for grain procurements in the same area adopted a resolution on decisive repressive measures to influence prosperous kulak farms through multiple taxation and bringing to criminal responsibility^[1079]⁸¹. —

Popular was such a form of complicity of collective farmers in the actions of the authorities, as an asset of the justice bodies, organized into groups to assist the prosecutor's office and industrial and comradesly courts at enterprises, state farms, MTS and collective farms, which were considered by the authorities as "one of the important driving belts of the party"^[1080] ⁸². In a certificate on the judicial and punitive policy in cases related to grain harvesting and grain delivery in 1934, prepared by the regional prosecutor of Western Siberia I.I. Barkov, following the results of the grain procurement campaign, specifically noted the role of the groups assisting the prosecutor's office, thanks to which about 400 people were convicted for sheltering livestock^[1081]⁸³.

How illiterate the ideas about the legality of ordinary Soviet people were is evidenced by their additions proposed for inclusion in the draft Stalinist Constitution during the campaign for its discussion in the fall of 1936 - "to give the local authorities the right to arrest criminals at the scene of the crime, to take them into custody without the sanction of the prosecutor and the organs of justice of the NKVD"; "provide the opportunity to arrest criminals to the head of the NKVD RO and the chairman of the village

Council"; "permit workers to detain criminals at the scene of a crime without the sanction of judicial and investigative authorities"; "village councils of working people's deputies have the right to arrest criminals with the subsequent transfer of the detainees to supervisory and

investigative bodies"[1082]84. It was in this legal field that the daily intensification of hatred "from above" that encouraged "the ability to recognize the enemy of the party, no matter how well he was disguised" bore fruit. Newspapers in the 1930s were full of calls to "Shoot mad dogs!", "We will not leave a single enemy of the people on Soviet soil!", "Death to traitors and traitors to the Motherland!", "Learn to recognize enemies the way our Chekists recognize

them!" Show trials of their former bosses evoked a particularly wide response among the working masses. Such trials were carried out everywhere in 1937, and almost all of them were covered by central and local newspapers. In the Novosibirsk region alone, and only in the fourth quarter of 1937, 21 show trials were held against "pests and saboteurs in agriculture and elevators." 131 people were convicted, 32 of them were shot[1083]85. Lines from a letter from the First Secretary of the West Siberian Territorial Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to Eikhe Stalin reflected the general situation of that time: "Judicial verdicts against the enemies of the people - pests of agriculture were met with the unanimous approval of the broadest masses of workers, collective farmers and employees. At numerous meetings and rallies, the working people unanimously demand that the Trotskyist-Bukharin—

bandits, spies, wreckers and saboteurs be rooted out to the end. Using this kind of facts, many modern historians, political scientists, and literary critics, who base their works on the concept of historical determinism, explain everything that happened in the country not so much by undisguised violence from the authorities, but by the "intentions of the masses" who demanded increased repression. In their opinion, the masses not only unconditionally approved and welcomed the repressions, but it turns out that the authorities also periodically "lag behind", "did not keep pace" with all the same

spin the flywheel of repression. It turns out that the party was "forced", almost against its will, to meet the "interests and wishes of the people." From reasoning of this kind, the conclusion logically follows that the people themselves, voluntarily, to use the well-known metaphor of Ch. a victim of historical memory, turning it into a mankurt - an ideal and obedient object of manipulation[1085]87.

However, the fault of the people here is still secondary, although, in the words of K. Marx, "a nation, like a woman, is not forgiven for a moment of oversight when the first adventurer she meets can commit violence against her"[1086]88. The main thing is the crime of the Stalinist government, which fully managed to use the worst moods and traits of the people to solve their own problems. The

initiative unleashed "from above" by the employees of the punitive bodies deserves a special discussion. It is known that during the years of the Great Terror the number of the repressed was several times higher than the so-called limits on repressions lowered from the Center. Sophisticated torture during interrogations, mass executions, humiliation in the camps were not the work of the occupiers, who committed violence on a land alien to them, but of their own compatriots.

The authorities so skillfully manipulated these moods and actions that they framed their decisions as the demands of the people. Only one characteristic fact: on the day of the trial of the military, a telegram was sent to the republics, territories and regions of the USSR: "To the National Central Committee, regional committees, regional committees. In connection with the ongoing trial of spies and pests, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and others, the Central Committee proposes that you organize meetings of workers, and where possible, peasants, as well as meetings of Red Army units and pass a resolution on the need to apply the highest measure of repression. The trial must be over tonight. The announcement of the verdict will be published tomorrow, i.ö. twelfth June. 06/11/1937 Secretary of the Central Committee ~~Stalin~~ "[1087]89. At 11:35 p.m. on June 11, the chairman of the court, V.V. Ulrich announced the verdict of the execution of all eight convicts. The sentence was carried out on June 12, 1937.

Having made the people an accomplice in the massacres, the Stalinist authorities did not change their policy towards them. It was only in words that Stalin urged "to listen to the voice of small [people](#)"[1088]90. In reality, however, as convincingly proved by recent studies, in the pre-war period, the situation of the people, due to the increased burden of military spending, seriously deteriorated. The government kept its priorities here too. By a decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated May 29, 1939, a closed system of military stores was created to supply the command staff of the Red Army and Navy, as well as workers and employees of military construction projects. Closed trade was also introduced in those industries that were associated with the extraction of strategic raw materials - in coal mines, peat extraction, oil fields, copper mines and copper smelters. In the spring and summer, this provision was extended to employees of the NKVD and the command staff of the internal [troops](#)[1089]91. All other segments of the population had to fight for survival in conditions of acute [shortages](#) and inflation. And although the government defiantly did not raise prices for the goods of greatest demand (bread, flour, cereals, pasta) from October 1935 to September 1946 (and in 1947 there was even a price reduction that was imprinted in social memory for a long time), but what was to get these items! Huge queues for groceries in the cities became a sign of the pre-war period. However, even here the authorities preferred to solve the problem

not on the merits, but to act by repressive methods. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of April 10, 1940 "On the norms for the sale of food products in one hand" actually meant a return to the rationing system for supplying the population. Nevertheless, it was not formally introduced, but first appeared the decision of the Council of People's Commissars of January 17 "On the fight against queues for food products in the cities of Moscow and Leningrad", which, by decision of the Politburo of May 4, 1940, was extended to another 41 cities of the country. The Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of October 16, 1940 further reduced the rate of sale of food and some industrial

goods in one [hand](#)[1090]92. At

the same time, by the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of June 26, 1940, approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee, 8-

an hourly working day with a seven-day working week, unauthorized leaving from enterprises was prohibited, which was punishable by imprisonment for a term of 2 to 4 months. Absenteeism without a valid reason was punishable by a sentence to corrective labor for up to 6 months with deduction of up to 25% of the salary^[1091]93.

In the countryside, on the basis of the decisions of the May 1939 plenum of the Central Committee and the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of May 27, 1939 "On measures to protect the public lands of collective farms from squandering" adopted on its basis, the surplus was seized (in relation to the norms, fixed in the Charter of the agricultural artel, amounting to 1/4–1/2 ha, in some areas up to 1 ha of land in household plots. from the collective farm" and lost the rights of a collective farmer ^{farms} ^[1092]94. Another consequence of this decision was the mass resettlement of peasants in the eastern regions of the country in 1940, primarily from the 800-meter border strip of the western regions of Ukraine^[1093]95.

2. THE MEANING OF THE GREAT TERROR

The logical conclusion of the operation to build socialism in the USSR was the Great Terror, or the so-called Great Purge of the party, army, intelligentsia and people. In this operation, repression became not the way the authorities acted, but the essence of the whole event. The "cleansing" of the country's population from all potentially active people who could pose a danger to the ruling regime was not an impromptu, but a planned action. The signal for the preparation of a new, large-scale stage of repression against all so-called anti-Soviet elements in the country was Stalin's speech at the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on January 7, 1933, and on January 12, by a special resolution, the plenum confirmed the decision of the Politburo of December 10, 1932 on purge of the party in order to "ensure iron proletarian discipline in the party and purify the party ranks of all unreliable, unstable and entrenched elements"[1094]1. By a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of April 28, 1933, the following categories were established to be purged: "double-dealers who live by deceiving the Party, hiding their real aspirations from it and under cover of a false oath of "loyalty" to the Party, trying in practice to frustrate the policy of the Party; open and hidden violators of the iron discipline of the party and the state, who do not comply with the decisions of the party and government, questioning and discrediting the decisions and plans established by the party by chattering about their "unreality" and "impracticability"; degenerates, fused with the bourgeois elements, who do not want to fight in practice against the kulak elements, the social grabbers, the loafers of property"[1095]2. At the same time, secret orders were issued for a general check through the organs of the OGPU. Not later than September 5, 1933, department of the _____ And robbers the special Plenipotentiary _____

Representation of the OGPU in the West Siberian Territory, guided by the orders of higher authorities, requested various organizations to provide

lists: "1) former officers and 2) former people (nobles, landlords) who are in the service in the apparatus and subordinate [points](#)"[1096]3.

Under the definitions of "double-dealer" and "reborn" one could bring any objectionable person or who doubted the policy of the party. However, the 1933 purge was not a one-time campaign. In the Party Charter, adopted at the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b), appeared notable addition:

"By periodic decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, purges to systematically purify the party of: - class-alien and hostile elements; - double-dealers who deceive the party and hide their real views from it and frustrate the policy of the party; – open and hidden violators of the iron

the disciplines of the party and the state;

- degenerates merging with the bourgeois elements;

- careerists, self-seekers and bureaucrats elements;

- morally corrupted, dropping the dignity of the party with their unseemly behavior, soiling the banner of the party;

- passive members of the party who do not fulfill their duties and who have not mastered the program, the charter and the most important decisions [of the party](#)"[1097]4.

These decisions prepared the broad masses of party members for the onset of a new stage in the struggle to complete the construction of "socialism". The resolution of the congress on organizational issues expressed confidence that the members of the party "will rise to the height of their tasks, help the party and the government through their activity to cleanse the apparatus of the proletarian dictatorship of bureaucratic shortcomings, strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat, raise the leading role of the party even more and ensure the country's complete victory. second five-year plan"[1098]5. The words "party" and "government" in the context of this

resolutions meant not just "Politburo" and "Sovnarkom", but "Stalin" and "Molotov". This centralization of power was consolidated by the formal reorganization of the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate into the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Commission of Soviet Control of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The head of the Party Control Commission was one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, who had his own apparatus in the center and permanent representatives in the republics, territories, regions, appointed and recalled by the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The head of the Commission of Soviet Control of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was appointed one of the deputy chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, who also had his own apparatus in the center and permanent representatives in the field, appointed and recalled by the Commission of Soviet Control [1099]6

This reorganization, along with the purge of the party carried out in 1933, not only put up a powerful barrier to opposition sentiments in the party, but also meant the actual confirmation of the unlimited powers of Stalin's power. There is evidence that since 1933, especially important meetings of senior officials of the OGPU (since 1934 - the NKVD) began to be practiced in the Kremlin under the personal leadership of Stalin [1100]7.

Direct preparations for the Great Terror began with the assassination of Kirov on December 1, 1934. The adoption on the same day of the decision of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of preparation of acts, which prescribed the conduct of an investigation within 10 days, the consideration of the case in court without any accusation and defense, and the immediate execution of sentences of execution, became the next envisaged consequence of the murder. This was followed by an order to "cleanse Leningrad of Zinoviev's rabble" [1101]8. In the two and a half months after December 1, 1934, in Leningrad, according to available information, 843 people were arrested by the NKVD. On January 9, 1935, after the trial on December 28, 1934 in the case of the so-called Leningrad center, the materials regarding a number of those arrested were separated into a separate proceeding under the name "The case of the Leningrad counter-revolutionary Zinoviev group of Safarov, Zalutsky and others." Among them were party, Soviet and

trade union workers, economic managers, representatives of educational bodies, the press, technical intelligentsia, workers, housewives. Of the 77 people repressed in the case, 76 people were imprisoned in concentration camps or exiled for periods of 4 to 5 years, and one was G.I. Safarov was sent into exile for a period of 2 years. Most of them were subsequently shot or died in the camps. On January 16, 1935, in the Moscow Center case, 19 people were sentenced to imprisonment for terms of 5 to 10 years, among them Zinoviev and [Kamenev\[1102\]](#)⁹. On January 18, 1935, a closed letter from the Central Committee of the All-Union—

Communist Party of Bolsheviks “Lessons from the events associated with the villainous murder of S.M. Kirov” called on the Communists to “genuine Bolshevik revolutionary vigilance”, as well as to identify double-dealers and emphasized that “with respect to a double-dealer, one cannot limit oneself to expulsion from the party - one must still arrest and isolate him in order to prevent him from undermining the power of the state of the proletarian dictatorship”^[1103] ¹⁰. In March-April 1935, in Moscow, a Special Conference under the NKVD considered the case of the so-called Moscow counter-revolutionary organization - a group of "workers' opposition", in which 18 people were involved, headed by A.G. Shlyapnikov^[1104]¹¹.

Despite the fact that the direct preparation of a new round of repression was carried out in secret from the people, he was drawn into it as a result of purposeful actions of the authorities. On the one hand, 1935 and 1936 in the memory of contemporaries remained as the years of some weakening of the regime. There were even peculiar manifestations of glasnost, expressed in the criticism allowed "from above" of the chiefs of all levels, some consolidation of the intelligentsia. Everyone remembers the adoption of the “most democratic” Constitution and preparations for the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1937, which gives some historians reason to seriously talk about the democratization campaign today. On the other hand, not a single repressive action of the authorities took place without the participation of the broad masses of the working people. Here are the lines from the letters of R. Eikhe to Stalin and Kaganovich: “The news of the death of (S.M. Kirov - I.P.) was brought by us on December 2 within a few hours from the moment we received the message from the Central Committee and the government ... Notice of the murder of Comrade . Kirov quickly penetrated with the help of live communications and press into the most remote places of the region, u

collective farms, state farms, forest plots, gold mines, etc., cut off hundreds of kilometers from the railway... At the rallies, the workers put forward additional obligations for each workshop and unit. Additional obligations were also assumed by the workers of state farms and MTS, engaged in the repair of cars and tractors. The message of the counter-revolutionary fleet ... in the terrorist group of former Zinovievites caused a new upsurge production activity, an even closer approach of the best part of the non-party workers to the party "[1105]12.

At the same time, the development of a master plan for the elimination of the remnants of the exploiting classes continued, the material for which was prepared in the course of previous party purges and the daily activities of the NKVD. A new campaign to purge the party in the form of a check of records began in May 1935 at Stalin's urging. In a circular letter dated May 13, 1935, he demanded that local party organizations within three months streamline the registration of party members, verify the correctness of information about the communists entered in party documents, and "clear the ranks of the CPSU (b) from crooks, crooks and adhering elements ". Soon, under this pretext, a massive campaign of spy mania, denunciations and arrests unfolded. In fact, there was a new purge of the party ranks. In December 1935, its results were considered by the plenum of the Central Committee, at which Yezhov was the main speaker. He informed that in the course of the re-registration, 18% of its members were expelled from the party. The plenum decided to continue the purge until February next year, after carefully checking political emigrants, foreigners, among whom, as the organizers of the purge suggested, "alien elements, agents of the class enemy" were especially active. In their opinion, Soviet

[Germans](#)[1106]13. As for the Soviet Germans, who were specially noted in the resolution of the plenum, this was a signal to intensify the repressions unleashed against them according to the instructions contained in the encrypted telegram on behalf of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to all the Central Committees of the national communist parties, regional and regional committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the secretary West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks R.I. Eikhe of [November 5, 1934](#) [1107]14

However, in the tradition of the Stalinist government, only the decision on a public check of party documents was published. A.G. Avtorkhanov managed to establish that at the same time, on May 13, 1935,

four more decisions appeared: 1. Create a "Defense Commission" of the Politburo to guide the preparation of the country for a possible war with powers hostile to the USSR (meaning Germany and Japan in the first place; France and England in the second). It included Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Ordzhonikidze.

2. Create a Special Security Commission of the Politburo to lead the liquidation of the enemies of the people. It included Stalin, Zhdanov, Yezhov, Shkiryatov, Malenkov and Vyshinsky. 3.

Conduct two checks throughout the party: a) a public check of the party documents of all party members through party committees, b) a covert check of the political face of each party member through the NKVD.

4. Appeal to all members and candidates of the party with a closed letter on the need to "increase Bolshevik vigilance", "mercilessly expose the enemies of the people and eliminate them."

"Stalin's entire political laboratory," as Avtorkhanov rightly noted, "plunged into the greatest conspiracy against his own party and state"[1108]15. As a result of the activities

of the Politburo Security Commission, a plan for the final operation to clean up the population of the USSR appeared. The essence of this plan was as follows: 1. The entire adult

population was subjected to covert political verification through the NKVD and its agent network by groups: a) intelligentsia, b) workers, c) peasants. 2. For each of these social groups, it was established in

percentage of the number subject to liquidation. 3.

A detailed table of features was developed, according to which people are to be eliminated.

4. A calendar plan was developed that provided for the exact timing of the liquidation of these groups by districts, regions, territories and national republics. The plan divided the people to be liquidated into categories: a) the remnants of the former and destroyed

hostile classes (former nobles, landowners, bourgeoisie, tsarist officials, officers and their children);

b) former members of hostile parties, members of former anti-Soviet groups and organizations of the White movement and their children; c) ministers of a religious cult;

d) former kulaks and sub-kulakists; e) former participants in all anti-Soviet uprisings, starting from 1918, although they were previously amnestied by the Soviet government;

f) former members of all anti-party opposition movements within the party, regardless of their position and belonging to the CPSU (b) in the present; g) former members of all national democratic

parties in the national republics [of the USSR\[1109\]16](#). All these categories of people, designated in the plan and ~~subject~~

to liquidation as anti-Soviet elements, for the most part were not. To one degree or another, they adapted to the conditions of life in the USSR. The fault of these people was their potential to be in the ranks of opponents of the regime, because, as a rule, they retained the ability to think independently. All these people have long been under the tacit control of the OGPU-NKVD, which became all-encompassing after the passportization of the country's population carried out from the end of 1932. Passport departments were created in the regional police departments, and passport offices were created in the city and district departments (departments). Address bureaus were created in settlements where more than 100 thousand "passportized people" lived. In addition to them, in order to "improve the search for hiding and fleeing criminals", by order of the NKVD of the USSR of September 10, 1936, cluster address bureaus were organized in all major cities of the country, to which all other cities and districts were attached. The Central Address Bureau operated in Moscow [\[1110\]17](#). Hiding from the pervasive control of power was almost impossible.

The Jesuit character of Stalin's power consisted in the fact that simultaneously with underground decisions to intensify repressions, as a rule, populist decisions were made to strengthen socialist legality, on the procedure for making arrests, on

sanctions of the prosecutor's office, etc., which, on the one hand, legitimized the underground actions of the authorities, and on the other hand, made it possible to qualify arbitrariness as a violation of socialist legality and shift the responsibility for it to specific "scapegoats". That is why, some time after the decisions of May 13, 1935, on June 17, a resolution of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee "On the procedure for making arrests" was adopted, signed by Molotov and Stalin. Its content is extremely revealing, especially in the light of the unfolding bacchanalia of the Great Terror:

"1. In a change to the instructions of May 8, 1933, arrests in all cases without exception can henceforth be carried out by the NKVD bodies only with the consent of the relevant prosecutor.

2. If it is necessary to make an arrest at the scene of a crime, authorized by law officials from the NKVD are obliged to immediately report the arrest to the relevant prosecutor for confirmation.

3. Permission to arrest members of the Central Executive Committee of the Union SSR and the Central Executive Committee of the Union Republics is given only upon receipt by the organs of the Prosecutor's Office and the NKVD of the consent of the

Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR or the Chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the Union Republics, according to their affiliation. Permits for the arrest of senior officials of the people's commissariats of the Union and Union republics and equivalent central institutions (heads of departments and heads of departments, managers of trusts and their deputies, directors and deputy directors of industrial enterprises, state farms, etc.), as well as those in the service of various institutions of engineers, agronomists, professors, doctors, scientists, heads of educational and research institutions - are given in agreement with the relevant people's commissars.

4. Permissions for the arrest of members and candidates of the CPSU(b) are given in agreement with the secretaries of the district, regional, regional committees of the CPSU(b), the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, according to

affiliation, and in relation to communists holding leading positions in the people's commissariats of the Union and equivalent central institutions - upon receipt of the consent of the chairman of the Party Control Commission. 5. Permissions for the arrest of military

personnel of the highest and middle command staff of the Red Army are given in agreement with the People's Commissar of

Defense. 6. Permits for arrests are given in a district by a district prosecutor, in autonomous republics by the prosecutors of these republics, in krais (oblasts) by kray (oblast) prosecutors.

In cases of crimes in railway and water transport, permits for arrests are given by district prosecutors, traffic prosecutors of basins according to their affiliation; on cases under the jurisdiction of military tribunals, prosecutors of military districts.

Permissions for arrests carried out directly by the people's commissariats of internal affairs of the union republics are issued by the prosecutors of these republics.

Permissions for arrests carried out directly by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR are given by the Prosecutor [of the Union](#)"[444]18.

Very soon, the unfolding events showed who actually gave the so-called permits for arrests. However, in this resolution, the names of the main directors of terror, as well as their executor - the NKVD - were not named. Such a decision was taken for cover, and not for execution. That is why "Vyshinsky's demand, addressed in his directive of June 19, 1935, to all prosecutors, "not to allow any deviation from the rules set forth in the decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of June 17, 1935," hung in the [air](#) —

»[1112]19. On July 29, 1936, local party committees received another closed letter entitled "On the terrorist activities of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev counter-revolutionary [bloc](#)"[1113]20, which became the — ideological justification for the preparation and conduct of

open trials 1936–1938 In August 1936, a trial was held in the case of the so-called Anti-Soviet United Trotskyist-Zinoviev Center, in November 1936, the Kemerovo Trial with the exposure of the "sabotage and sabotage activities of the Trotskyists", in January 1937, in the case of the so-called Parallel Anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center, and in March 1938 in the case of the so-called Anti-Soviet Right-Trotsky Bloc [\[1114\]21](#).

The well-known plenum of the Central Committee, held on February 23-March 5, 1937, became a milestone on the path to unleashing mass terror. The commission created at the plenum adopted a unanimous, I emphasize unanimous decision to exclude Bukharin and Rykov from the list of candidates for members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and members of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and transfer their case to the NKVD. Even before the end of the plenum, on February 27, they were arrested. It is also important to emphasize the unanimity and elation that permeated the atmosphere of the plenum during the discussion of the reports of Molotov, Stalin, Zhdanov and Yezhov. No one expressed any doubts, let alone protests. The key words in Stalin's report "On the Shortcomings of Party Work and Measures to Eliminate Trotskyist and Other Double Dealers" and his closing speech at the plenum were "saboteurs", "saboteurs", "agents of the Trotskyist and non-Trotskyist type of foreign states", "remnants of the exploiting classes", "capitalist environment results arising from this fact", etc. etc. [\[1115\]22](#). All Stalin's appeals at this plenum had very quick consequences.

In May, the main arrests took place among the military, future victims of the trial of the so-called Anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization in the Red Army, which took place on June 11, 1937 [\[1116\]23](#). On July 2, 1937, by the decision

of the Politburo "On anti-Soviet elements", a plan was launched to clean up the country's population, which had been purposefully developed in the bowels of the NKVD for more than two years. This is currently documented [\[1117\]24](#). The adoption of this resolution was preceded by a special plenum of the Central Committee, which was held from June 23 to 29, 1937. The agenda of the plenum, approved at a meeting of the Politburo on June 19, included five issues: 1. Yezhov's message. 2. Project new

electoral law (reported by Comrade Yakovlev). 3. On the improvement of seeds of grain crops (reported by Comrade Yakovlev). 4. On the introduction of correct crop rotations (reported by Comrade Chernov). 5. On measures to improve the work of the MTS (reported by Comrade Chernov)[1118]25. In the information report about the plenum, published in the newspapers, there was no first point, although the plenum discussed it for four days. The local secretaries who were present at the plenums - members or candidate members of the Central Committee usually spoke on the ground with an explanation of the results of the next plenum. Thus, among the materials of the West Siberian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, a summary of the speech of the first secretary of the Regional Committee R. Eikhe on the results of the December 1936 plenum of the Central Committee has been preserved. There are reports by Eikhe about the results of the discussion in the region of the decisions of the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee. But no traces of the June plenum could be found here either, although it is known for sure that Eikhe himself and the chairman of the Zapsibkrai Executive Committee Gryadinsky were present at this plenum. It can be assumed that either Eikhe did not speak at all, violating the established

tradition on instructions from above, or the recording of the speech was destroyed after his arrest, as was usually done with the materials of "enemies of the people." Some traces have been preserved among the documents of the district party level. So, on July 11, 1937, a meeting of the party activists of the Northern region of the West Siberian Territory was held. The results of the June plenum of the Central Committee were reported by the secretary of the district committee M.I. Sailors. There is no record of his speech, but a resolution has been preserved, which stated the need to implement "the decisions of the plenum on measures to improve agriculture, to strengthen the collective farms and cleanse them of anti-Soviet and class hostile elements" and further that "the meeting of the asset demands from all communists of a

merciless struggle against enemies and the adoption of vigorous measures to eliminate the consequences of sabotage in agriculture ...

"[1119]26. As for the memoirs of this plenum, there are few of them, and all of them, firstly, are reminiscences, as they say, "second-hand", and secondly, they concern only two subjects - speeches at the plenum by G.N. Kaminsky and I.A. Pyatr

Substantial memories of the plenum could have been left by the members and candidate members of the Central Committee who were present at it, but who could have done this? According to V.Z. Rogovin, by the beginning of the plenum, 46 people had already been arrested[1120]27. In total, as is known, out of 139 members and candidate members of the Central Committee elected at the XVII Congress of the CPSU (b), 98 people, i.e. 70% were arrested and shot - the majority in 1937/38. Speakers who spoke on the agenda at the June plenum were also destroyed. Those who were fortunate enough to avoid such an end were forever frightened and never voluntarily mentioned

this plenum. Of course, it is impossible to establish exactly what happened during the four days while Yezhov's message was being discussed. But it is also impossible to delete this event from history, which Stalin counted on. It should be inscribed in the historical context of the Stalin era, the context of the Great Terror, since one thing is certainly clear - that this plenum played a decisive role in unleashing mass repressions.

It is likely that Yezhov began his report at the plenum by summing up the results of the trial of the military. Further, he reported on the state of the investigation in the case of Bukharin and Rykov and demanded their physical destruction. But the main content of his speech was the demand to grant emergency powers to the NKVD in order to "finish once and for all" all anti-Soviet elements according to a prepared plan. It is also likely that the plenum raised the question of the permissible methods of investigation in relation to "enemies of the people." There are two pieces of evidence that confirm that there was a sanction from higher authorities for the use of torture. Firstly, this is Stalin's ciphered telegram dated January 10, 1939, sent to the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees, the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties, the people's commissars of internal affairs, and the heads of the NKVD departments. It said: "The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks explains that the use of physical force in the practice of the NKVD was allowed from 1937 with the permission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ..."[1121]28. The second evidence is a passage from the transcript of the June 1957 plenum of the Central Committee, at which the question of the anti-Party actions of Molotov and Kaganovich was considered and

Kaganovich acknowledged the existence of such a document and that it was drawn up by hand and signed by all members of the Politburo. Kaganovich said that the text was written by [Stalin's hand](#)[1122]29. In 1983, in a conversation with F. Chuev, Molotov retracted his words: "Torture?"
- It was so?

"No, no, that didn't [happen](#)." [1123]30

V.Z. Rogovin slightly corrected the text of this telegram: "Stalin explained that the use of this "method" "in the practice of the NKVD was allowed since 1937 with the permission of the plenum (emphasis mine - I.P.) of the Central Committee of the All-Union

Communist Party of Bolsheviks" "[1124]31 . I must say that in the text of the telegram published in different sources, there are slight discrepancies, but in none of the known publications the word "plenum" is used. Apparently, Rogovin really wanted it to be there, but it is not there, and we used one source. But this does not mean that the question of the methods of investigation was not considered at the plenum. As for the documents themselves, they were prepared not at a plenum, but in Stalin's office and then formalized as decisions of the Politburo and on behalf of the Central Committee of the

Were there protests at the plenum? This is another vague question. The primary source, which spoke about the speech at the plenum of the People's Commissar of Health of the USSR G.N. Kaminsky, is the speech of N.S. Khrushchev at the July 1953 plenum of the Central Committee, which considered the case of Beria. Moreover, Khrushchev did not say that this speech took place precisely at the June 1937 plenum of the Central Committee. Kaminsky, according to Khrushchev, spoke out against Beria, accusing him of working in counterintelligence in Baku (for Musavat intelligence, which in turn was connected with British intelligence, and Kaminsky in 1920-1921 was the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) Azerbaijan and the chairman of the Baku Council). Kaminsky was arrested during the plenum on June 25th. The next day, a resolution of the plenum appeared on the exclusion of Kaminsky as not trustworthy from the list of candidates for members of the Central Committee and from the party. The authors of the notes to the transcript of the July 1953 plenum of the Central Committee, published in the journal Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU, indicate that, according to indirect data (memoirs, testimonies, etc.), this speech could have been at the evening meeting of the plenum on June 24[1125]32. Khrushchev's message had a clearly opportu

in order to finally "sink" Beria, who threatened to become the first person in the system of communist power after Stalin's death. In addition, in 1937, at the June plenum, Beria was not yet a significant figure and did not occupy the place in the supreme Areopagus, which he occupied in November 1938. Only in the summer of this year was he transferred from Tbilisi to Moscow. So why did Kaminsky direct his protest against Beria, if this fact actually took place? All subsequent publications retell the story of Kaminsky precisely from the words of Khrushchev, without practically adding to them

nothing new.

The second name with which the protest at the June plenum of the Central Committee of 1937 is associated is I.A. Pyatnitsky. In this case, the primary source is L. Kaganovich's short story about the plenum, written down by his secretary V. Guberman in 1967. From his words, the content of the story was then written down by Pyatnitsky's son Vladimir. On June 24, at the evening session of the plenum, Pyatnitsky "spoke out against the physical destruction of Bukharin and members of his group; declared that for the factional activities of representatives of the right bloc, it is enough to expel Bukharin and his associates from the party and thereby remove them from political activity ... Pyatnitsky opposed Stalin's proposal to grant emergency powers to Yezhov and suggested, on the contrary, to strengthen control over the activities of the NKVD and, in particular, behind the activities of [Yezhov](#)"[1126]33. There are also questions about this passage: why Pyatnitsky, speaking about Bukharin, showed obvious incompetence, since Bukharin and Rykov had already been expelled from the party and arrested during the February-March plenum of the Central Committee and no one then opposed. As for Yezhov's powers, why not only did no one object to them, but, on the contrary, showed complete unanimity in assessing the activities of the NKVD at the February-March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937. The next day, according to the same source, Yezhov charged Pyatnitsky as former agent of the tsarist secret police, but he was

arrested only on [July 7](#)[1127]34. In another source that has come down to us, the diary of his wife Yulia, there is the following entry, which seems more plausible: "I arrived in the evening. Pyatnitsky found in the bathroom. I learned that at the Plenum he had

distrust was expressed and suspicion was expressed of his communion with Trotskyism. The message was made by Yezhov. Pyatnitsky did not agree to the withdrawal from the Central Committee, asked for an investigation and rejected the accusation brought against him. June 28 did not go to

work. Difficult days have come..."[1128]35. From the memoirs of A. Temkin about his meeting with Pyatnitsky in Lefortovo prison, which he dictated to Igor Pyatnitsky on April 13, 1963, the following is known: "Pyatnitsky, speaking of Stalin, said that there were moods in the party to remove Stalin from the leadership of the party. Before the June Plenum of 1937, a meeting was held where this was discussed - "a cup of tea", as he called me - with the participation of him, Kaminsky and Filatov ... Stalin

learned about this "cup of tea" ... "[1129]36. It is no coincidence that this plot has been given such attention, because it vividly demonstrates the difficulties that arise when trying to restore the real context of the events of that time, and even more so to understand the motives for the actions of the "architects" of terror. In fact, it is only indisputable that it was after the June 1937 plenum of the Central Committee that a whole series of Politburo resolutions were adopted, giving the NKVD bodies carte blanche to carry out mass repressions. The first in this series is the resolution of the Politburo "On anti-Soviet elements", adopted on July 2, 1937, two days after the end of the plenum. This decree was first published in the Trud newspaper on June 4, 1992, but Khrushchev spoke about it for the first time at the June 1957 plenum of the Central Committee, reading the text of this decree and accusing Kaganovich of authorship, to which he replied: "Often at closed meetings which took place without the presence of the secretary, I wrote down

Based on the resolution of the Politburo of July 2, 1937, the text of a cipher telegram was prepared and sent to the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics. "It has been noticed," the cipher telegram said, "that most of the former kulaks and criminals who were deported at one time from different regions to the northern and Siberian regions, and then, after the expulsion period, returned to their regions, are the main instigators of all kinds of anti-Soviet and sabotage

crimes, both in collective farms and state farms, and in transport and in some branches of industry. The Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks invites all secretaries of regional and regional organizations and all regional, regional and republican representatives of the NKVD to register all kulaks and criminals who have returned to their homeland so that the most hostile of them are immediately arrested and shot in the order of administrative conduct of their cases through troikas, and the rest, less active, but still hostile elements would be rewritten and sent to the areas at the direction of the NKVD. The Central

Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposes to submit to the Central Committee within five days the composition of the troikas, as well as the number of those to

be shot, as well as the number of those to be evicted"[1131]38. The text of this telegram was encrypted not only in form, but also in substance. It spoke only about kulaks and criminals, although the resolution itself was called "On Anti-Soviet Elements." However, the plan for the final cleansing of society was so grandiose that the authors of the telegram sent to the localities were afraid, even in encrypted form, of the possibility of its wide publicity. The very decision of the Politburo of July 2, 1937 immediately received the stamp "special folder".

This decision was followed by the order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs "On the operation to repress former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements", approved by the Politburo on July 31. It is characteristic that in the text of this order, which marked the beginning of mass arrests, "and other anti-Soviet elements" were named. The order prescribed to start the operation, depending on the region, from 5 to 15 August and finish within four months. All those arrested were divided into two categories: subject to immediate execution or imprisonment for a term of 8 to 10 years. All regions, territories, republics were given limits for each of the two categories. Initially, it was ordered to arrest 259,450 people, of which 72,950 were to be shot. The order gave the right to local leaders to request additional limits on [repressions from the Center](#)[1132]39.

The processes in the center complemented the processes and group affairs in the field. Falsified accusations, protocols of interrogations were fabricated by means of physical torture of those under investigation.

were prepared by investigators in advance according to the same type of standards. Survivors of the 1939 campaign, employees of the NKVD, during interrogations conducted in the 1950s, admitted that in 1937-1938. there was an order of the NKVD to draw up the original protocols only on a typewriter. "In fulfillment of this requirement," admitted the former acting head of the 4th department of the NKVD Directorate for the West Siberian Territory, K.K. Pastanogov during interrogation on August 24, 1955, - draft protocols of interrogation by investigators interrogating the arrested were carried out carelessly, often in pencil, then transferred to the machine bureau and, after printing, lost the significance of the originals and, apparently, were destroyed. The printed copies were given to the detainees for signature, were considered authentic and were attached to the investigation files. There were cases when arrested persons made amendments to the printed text. The testimonies of individual arrested persons were stenographed and the transcribed transcripts in printed form were given for the signature of the arrested person and attached to his investigative file. When the investigator wrote the protocol of interrogation in ink and in the prescribed form, they were attached to the investigative files, but this, as a rule, was not required of the investigator. K.K. Pastanogov was supplemented by A.F. Grigoriev, an employee of the 4th department of the 3rd department of the NKVD Directorate for the West Siberian Territory, during interrogation on December 24, 1955: "... What we wrote in the interrogation protocols, what facts were entered into the protocol, no one checked and did not demand this check. True, there were cases when the protocols were corrected by Edenberg (head of the department - I.P.), but only with the aim of making the facts of the "criminal" activities of one or another accused more sharp, we did not receive any other comments. ... The whole point of investigative work at that time was in obtaining the signatures of the accused on the protocols drawn up, and all attention was paid to this, all the requirements of the department and department leadership were reduced to this. Therefore, in my opinion, all employees, including me, were allowed to draw up protocols without the accused, with the introduction of non-existent data into them, since no one ever made comments on the incorrectness and bias of the testimony we recorded"[1133]40.

Those arrested were artificially linked with each other, as group cases of 30-40 people or more were processed, which were considered in an expedited manner by special "troikas". As a rule, "troikas" were made up of the first secretary of the regional committee, the regional committee of the CPSU (b) or the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the national republic, the head of the relevant department of the NKVD and the prosecutor of the region, territory, republic and were

approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee. Simultaneously with the elimination of anti-Soviet elements, a number of operations were carried out in order to protect themselves from the "fifth column" in case of war. The resolution of the Politburo of July 20, 1937 ordered to continue the repressions against the Soviet Germans and to arrest all the Germans who worked at the defense factories, some of them to be sent abroad. On August 9, the Politburo approved the order of the NKVD "On the liquidation of Polish sabotage and espionage groups and organizations of the POV (Polish Military Organization). September 19 - Order of the NKVD "On measures in connection with the terrorist, sabotage and espionage activities of Japanese agents from the so-called Harbin" (former workers of the Chinese Eastern Railway who returned to the USSR after the sale of the CER in 1935). There was also a mass expulsion of "unreliable elements" from the border regions. The largest action of this kind was the deportation of the entire Korean population from the Far East to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, carried out on the basis of a decree of the Central Committee of the

All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated August 21, 1937 [1134]⁴¹ The operation to eliminate anti-Soviet elements was not completed on [schedule](#) . four months. On January 31, 1938, the Politburo approved the proposal of the NKVD for additional repressions. By March 15 (by April 1 in the Far East), another 57,200 people were ordered to be repressed, of which 48,000 were to be shot. On the same day, the Politburo extended until April 15 the operation to defeat the so-called counter-revolutionary national contingents - "from Poles, Letts, Germans, Estonians, Finns, Greeks, Iranians, Harbins, Chinese and Romanians." Moreover, the Politburo instructed the NKVD "to carry out a similar operation before April and smash the cadres of Bulgarians and Macedonians, both foreign nationals and

On August 1938, the Politburo approved additional limits for repressions of another 89,750 people^{[1135]42}, in addition to the

January limits. Three ciphered telegrams contributed to the strengthening of repressions: the first, dated August 3, 1937, signed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin, obliged the secretaries of the regional committees, regional committees of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics to organize "in each region, 2-3 open demonstration trials over the enemies of the people - pests of agriculture, who made their way into the district party, Soviet and land bodies "and cover the trial of them in the local press in order to mobilize collective farmers" to fight against sabotage and its carriers. The second cipher telegram, signed by Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR Molotov and Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin, dated September 10, demanded that 2 to 3 demonstration trials be held on pests for grain storage, "sentencing the perpetrators to death, shooting them and publishing about it in the local press." The third cipher telegram dated October 2, 1937, with the same signatures, ordered to conduct "from 3 to 6 open show trials in each republic, territory and region with the involvement of the peasant masses and wide coverage of the process in the press", sentencing the convicts to capital punishment in connection with "with sabotage and bacteriological sabotage" in animal husbandry, which led to a massive loss of

By the decree of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of October 2, 1937, approved at the same time by the Politburo of the Central Committee, in order to combat espionage, sabotage and other acts of sabotage, the court was given the opportunity not only to sentence to capital punishment - execution, but also to increase the term of imprisonment from "no more than 10 years "

to "not more than 25"^{[1137]44}. The orgy of repressions began to wane only after the command "from above" - "retreat". The Politburo approved the Decree "On Arrests, Prosecutorial Supervision and Investigation", which is known as the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of November 17, 1938. This is a classic example of a Stalin-era document. Firstly, it highly appreciated the role of the NKVD bodies, which did "a lot of work to defeat the enemies of the people and clean up the USSR ...". Secondly, "violations" were noted that took place in this work, especially during the investigation. Due to

the most odious structures of the NKVD were cut off: the decree ordered "to liquidate the judicial troikas at the regional, regional and republican departments of the RK police"[1138]45.

The traditional Stalinist policy of retreat was continued by such demonstrative actions of the authorities as the removal of Yezhov from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs and the appointment on November 25, 1938 of a new People's Commissar - Beria. At the same time, the most presumptuous NKVD workers were punished and approximately 327,400 people were released [1139]46. However, neither

the decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of November 17, 1938, nor the announcement of the construction of socialism at the XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks meant the end of the repressions. The paragraph of the decree dated November 17 that "from now on, in strict accordance with the existing laws on jurisdiction, to refer all cases to the courts or to the Special Conference under the NKVD of the USSR has not changed and could not change the established practice of actions of the authorities" [1140]47 .

By order of the NKVD of December 27, 1939, in pursuance of the secret decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR on the transformation of the territory "near the railways" into a sensitive area, all the heads of the road transport departments of the NKVD were ordered to "immediately begin preparations for the removal of anti-Soviet and criminal elements living in temporary residential buildings near the railways ". Of all these buildings (dugouts, "Shanghai", "Chinese", as they were designated in the order) in a strip of two kilometers from the railways, people were evicted, and the buildings themselves were demolished. Such a "cleansing" was carried out on 38 railways of the USSR (excluding the roads of Western Ukraine and Belarus), including 64 railway and 111 defense and economic hubs. This operation was the actual continuation of the action of 1937, since lists were compiled "for the entire identified anti-Soviet and criminal element" (using investigative and archival materials and covert interrogations), and people who had previously been expelled from their homes, but survived during the previous operation , according to the decisions of the Special Conferences, were forcibly sent to "remote areas" and

forced labor camps[1141]48. Repressions-

continued throughout all subsequent years and were considered by the authorities as the main way to force the masses to

labor and the main means of strengthening discipline, as well as the main way of consolidating society during the war and in the post-war period. Only after Stalin's death did the untwisted flywheel of repression begin to slow down.

Neither Russian nor Western historiography has yet developed a concept that would adequately express this Stalinist practice of forcibly reshaping society, a concept that would include not only the ideas of people of that time about socialism - both the leaders of the party and those who supported them broad masses of working people, but also the blood of the millions who were destroyed and died in the course of this construction. As such a concept, the concept of "ideological criminality", which A.S. used to characterize communism, could be used. Kazantsev (1908–1963), emigrant, author of the book *The Third Force*, written in 1952 [1142]49. This concept "captures" not only the method of transforming society in the Stalinist way and its consequences - direct and long-term, but also the direction of such a transformation - the construction

of socialism, which is inherent in the word "ideological". The direct result of Stalin's building of socialism was the death of millions of people. In the literature, the question of the number of victims of the communist regime cannot be considered closed in connection with the publication of KGB data. The former chairman of the KGB of the USSR V. Kryuchkov in February 1990 named the total number of those repressed for the period from 1930 to 1953 - 3,778,254, of which 786,000 people were shot. These data echo those that were officially published in 1954: from 1921 to 1953, 3,800,000 people were repressed, of which 634,000 were shot. In 1991, Major General of the Ministry of Security of Russia A. Krayushkin named another official figure: for 1917–1990. 3,853,900 people were repressed, 827,955 of them were shot.

The largest number of repressed, according to these data, falls on 1937–1938, when 1,344,923 people were arrested, of which 681,692 were shot[1143]50. Even according to official data, the total number of those repressed exceeded the originally planned figures by five, and those executed by nine times. Moreover, the data of the KGB-MVD include only those convicted under

political motives, i.e. under Article 58 of the Criminal Code. The press has repeatedly expressed doubts about the reliability of these data. Even among the historians themselves, who worked with the same materials, there are disagreements - for example, V.N. Zemskov considers the figure of 3.8 million repressed to be correct, while V.P. Popov, the total figure was 4.1 million, i.e. 300 thousand more, although the references used by these historians as a source were compiled with an interval of only two months[1144]51. Indeed, to prove the indisputable authenticity of the statistical data of the OGPU-NKVD-MGB-MVD, as Zemskov does, and many other historians after him, means not to understand the mechanism of operation of Stalin's power. Otherwise, why such confidence that these data were not falsified, while the "sly figure" of Soviet statistics is now recognized by almost everyone. Why, in a system where lies were elevated to the principle of state policy, was one of the regime's most guarded secrets an exception?! Discrepancies in the

publications of Zemskov himself are quite typical. Some include the figure of 1,344,923 repressed in 1937-1938. on charges of counter-revolutionary speeches, in others - 1,575,259. In addition, to the latter, he added another 918,747 "doubtful" criminals, whom, according to his methodology, he singled out from the total number of those arrested in these years on charges of criminal offenses - 1,566,185. As a result, he came up with a total number of victims of the Great Terror - about 2.5 million people, "the maximum allowable, according to Zemskov's firm conviction, the amount of political repression in 1937-1938 "[1145]52. This figure, as well as a number of others, with reference to the NKVD documents stored in the State Archives of the Russian Federation, were published in the West in a joint article by V.N. Zemskov, J. Arch Getty, and Gabor T. Ritteshporn[1146]53.

Meanwhile, one cannot ignore the fact that there are other data on the number of repressed. Already during the period of perestroika, O.G. spoke about them more than once. Shatunovskaya, a member of the so-called Shvernik commission, which, on the instructions of Khrushchev, was investigating the case of the murder of Kirov.

While preparing the text of his report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, Khrush

The Chairman of the Committee, Shelepin, handed over the relevant certificate personally to Khrushchev, and he familiarized Shatunovskaya with it, together with Kuznetsov, an employee of the Central Committee apparatus. According to this certificate, from January 1935 to June 1941, 19,840,000 people were repressed in the country, of which 7,000,000 were tortured and shot in the first year after their arrest[1147]54. These data are also known in [the West](#)[1148]55. However, today they prefer not to remember them. After the removal of Khrushchev, Shatunovskaya was repeatedly accused of having a bad memory and confusing everything, since 17 years of camps did not pass without a trace ... The fact that modern KGB data on the number of repressed people for the period from 1921 to 1953 is not final, confirms the figure of 4.8 million, named by A.N. Yakovlev in 1997 [\[449\]56](#). On November 16, 1999, in his report to the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, he already published the figure of 8 million 96 thousand 665, adding that—

"these figures, of course, are not [complete](#)"[1150]57. The given data do not include the victims of collectivization - dispossessed and starved to death in the early 1930s. The number of dispossessed in the literature is determined in the range from 4 to 10 million people, and among this number there are millions who died as a result of dispossession. R. Conquest determines the total number of deaths as a result of collectivization at 14.5 million people, of which about 7 [million died of starvation](#)[1151]58. Most likely, this figure is correct, and Russian historians - the authors of a collective letter about the famine of the 1930s. in the journal "Otechestvennaya istoriya" (I.E. Zelenin, N.A. Ivnitsky, V.V. Kondrashin, E.N. Oskolkov) today they name the same figure - at least 7 million, and not 2-3 million. , on which the historian V.P. Danilov at the beginning of ~~perestroika~~, criticizing R. Conquest and other Western [aut](#)

Thus, the total number of victims of the decade of building Stalinist socialism far exceeds 7.9 million people - this figure was named in 1989 by the director of the Central State Archive of the National Economy of the USSR V.V. [Tsaplin](#)[1153]60. Determine the exact number of deaths in 1928–1938—hardly possible, but it is obvious that, according to the most conservative estimates, it is more than 10 million [people](#)[1154]61. If we take as a basis the data that O.G. Shatunovskaya, then—this

the figure will be twice as large. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that the literature practically does not consider the issue of the number of those repressed under special decrees, as a result of which the most diverse groups of the population ended up in the camps - workers, peasants, employees. What was the value of the decree of August 7, 1932 "On the protection of state enterprises, collective farms and cooperation and the strengthening of public (socialist) property", which provided for execution with confiscation of property as a punishment, and under extenuating circumstances - imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years!

The historian V.P. Popov. According to him, for 1923-1953. the total number of those convicted by the judiciary in the RSFSR alone amounted to 39.1 million people. Moreover, this number did not include those convicted by the judicial panels for criminal cases of the Supreme, regional and regional courts (a separate record was kept for them) and permanent sessions that operated at the camps, as well as those convicted (not military personnel) by the military tribunals of the Red Army and Navy, railway and water transport, NKVD troops. The total number of convicts during this period exceeds 40 million people. According to Popov, this figure is "very approximate and greatly underestimated"[1155]62. It turns out that only in the Russian Federation during the period of Stalin's rule every third capable member of society was convicted. The percentage of recidivist criminals, as Popov notes, was relatively low; the vast majority of those 40 million were convicted for the first time. These people ended up in the camps as having violated numerous decrees aimed at maintaining order in the country. This is not only the decree of August 7, 1932, but also many other decrees of the pre-war and post-war period.

The so-called Stalinist reforging in the camps had an irreversible impact on human psychology. At the same time, let us recall V.T. Shalamov, who considered "the camp as a negative experience for a person – from the first to the last hour. One should not know, should not even hear about it. No person gets better or stronger after camp. The camp is a negative experience, a negative school, corruption for everyone - for bosses and prisoners, escorts and spectators, passers-by and readers of fiction"[1156]63.

Thus, the result of Stalin's transformations is not only millions of exterminated, starved to death and died in camps and in places of special settlements. This is every third capable member of Soviet society who survived the experience of Stalin's camps or places of special settlements. And that part of society that did not sit, but planted, tortured, shot, supervised in camps and special commandant's offices! We should not forget that these people could and did educate their own kind. The violent criminalization of Soviet society is one of the most terrible results of the construction of Stalinist socialism.

For comparison: according to available data, in Russia during the period from 1826 to 1906, 984 people were executed - 11 executions per year. The surge of state violence dates back to the time of Stolypin, when from 1905 to March 1909 4,797 people were sentenced to death, 2,353 of them were hanged and shot, i.e. about 995 [executions were carried out annually](#)[1157]64. Impressed by this policy, L.N. Tolstoy in 1908 wrote his famous article "I cannot be silent." Most of all, besides the direct harm that was inflicted on the victims of violence and their families, he was worried about the corrupting influence of this violence on the masses of the people. "This corruption is spreading especially rapidly among the simple, working people because all these crimes, exceeding hundreds of times everything that was done and is being done by simple thieves and robbers and all revolutionaries together, are committed under the guise of something necessary, good, necessary, not only justified, but supported by various institutions, inseparable in the concepts of the people with justice and even holiness: the senate, the synod, the thought, the church, [king](#)"[1158]65.

State violence against its own people, which was carried out in the interests of building socialism, turned out to be incommensurable in scale with state violence in Russia at the beginning of the century. Even if we agree with the official data on repressions in 1937-1938, it turns out that 340,846 people were shot per year - 934 per day, almost the same as during the time of Stolypin in a year. If we take as a basis the data that O.G. Shatunovskaya, 2950 people come out a day! However, in the 1930s in the USSR, not only was there no L.N. Tolstoy, but

and the people by that time had been corrupted by violence to a degree that our brilliant writer could not even imagine. The word "shoot" became commonplace and no longer plunged anyone into despair. Stalin's reasoning about the future fate of the remaining oppositionists, which he shared with the participants of the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, was perceived as quite commonplace: and that the Trotskyists are using the last footage in order to mischief, whom we will soon shoot down, do not console yourself "(emphasis mine. - I.P.)[1159]66. In this regard, it must be emphasized once again that the Stalinist repressions were not an act of spontaneous violence, and certainly ~~not~~ a reaction of the state to the increased disorder in society. It was violence aimed at reshaping society. "... All our work in building socialism," Zhdanov emphasized in his report at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), "all our educational work is aimed at remaking people's consciousness. That is why our party exists, that is why we have achieved the victories of socialism, that is why we set the tasks of communist

construction in order to remake people, their [consciousness](#)"[1460]67.

According to the deep consequences that Stalin's repressions had, it is quite legitimate to call them an ethno-cultural revolution, as suggested by the historian V.L. Doroshenko: "In the war with the people, a twofold task was solved: the implementation of communism and thereby the preservation of power by completely subordinating the people to this power and transforming the people in accordance with the ideology and interests of this power. The main method of this war was to oppose and incite one part of the people against another. As a result of this struggle, the authorities eradicated the not very rooted foundations of Christian morality among the people, deprived people of economic independence, i.e. social and economic autonomy, which is associated with a wide range of stereotypes of consciousness and behavior, a vision of one's interests... Consciousness manifests itself primarily in the language, and this is a mixture of the official Soviet newspeak with the language of prisons and camps through which a significant part of the population passed"[1161] 68. As a result, a new lumpenized society appeared to the world, which

for the most part did not know what a normal, civilized society was.

attitude to work, a society in which people lived for decades in an atmosphere of lies and got used to treat both the state and each other in a lumpen way, a society that did not imagine what law and legal consciousness are. A remarkable characteristic of such social formations (of the "jelly" type) was given by the philosopher M.K. Mamardashvili in one of his lectures on social philosophy back in 1981: "There is, as it were, such a law of history: people living in this "jelly" consider themselves carriers of a special mission, special spirituality (supposedly only they have a soul). In fact, they are usually immoral, because the "jelly" lends itself to any arbitrary action. It will pass through it without bumping into any structures, including personal ones. If anything, there is no word of honor here. In another, formalized system, a situation is possible when the action will be based on an honest word, because the personal structure in this case is not identical to the social status, social role. There is both at the same time. In this case, if they want to force a person to do meanness, then the influence from the outside will come across the "crystal" lattice of the personality itself - the personal structure. When there are such grids, mass hysteria, mass denunciation and so on are impossible. In the case of jelly, there are none, and it is filled with morality... Life is complicated precisely because it is in fact as simple as possible, like soft [jelly](#)"[1162]69.

The creation of civil society structures is a necessary stage on the path of Russia's democratization. Democracy presupposes the complication of forms of social life and, above all, imposes a heavy burden of freedom and responsibility on each member of society. The events of recent years have revealed with merciless clarity the insurmountable obstacles on this path. It turned out that the point is not only in the sins and vices of modern Russian statehood and its lack of democratic traditions, but also in the society itself, in which the "Soviet paradigm" is not only not destroyed, but also cannot be ousted from the mass consciousness and which is becoming more and more obvious. demonstrates his desire to go [back](#)[1163]70. —

Chapter VI

STALIN'S PLANS TO EXPAND THE "FRONT OF SOCIALISM"

You can't trust anyone's word, comrades...{6}

Stalin

In Soviet historiography for many decades there were provisions that the October Revolution was “the great beginning of the world proletarian revolution; it showed all the peoples of the world the path to socialism. However, as the authors of the six-volume “History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union” convinced readers, the party “saw its mission not in “pushing”, not in “exporting the revolution”, but in convincing the peoples of the advantages of the socialist system by practical example”[1164] [1](#).

In reality, everything was done exactly the opposite. True, in the first months and even years after the October Revolution, the leaders of the Bolshevik Party did not hide not only their faith in the world revolution, but also their actions aimed at "pushing" it. Not one V.I. Lenin lived in the hope that "as soon as we are strong enough to defeat all of capitalism, we will immediately grab it by the collar." Researcher L.A. Kogan summarized the statements and proposals of other well-known party figures of that time on this subject: L.D. Trotsky in 1919 proposed to form a powerful cavalry corps for a throw to India, since, in his opinion, the path to the West ran through Afghanistan, Bengal and Punjab. N.I. Podvoisky owns the statement that "one must be transformed into another so that it is impossible to say where the war ends and the revolution begins." Proposing to create

General Staff of the III International, M.N. Tukhachevsky wrote in July 1920: "The war can be ended only with the conquest of the world dictatorship of the proletariat." Other maxims are also known: - K.B. Radek: "We have always been for a revolutionary war ... a bayonet is a very essential thing necessary for the introduction of communism." - F.E. Dzerzhinsky: "We are going to conquer the whole world, despite all the sacrifices that we still have to make." - N.I. Bukharin: "The workers' state, waging war, seeks to expand and strengthen the economic basis on which it arose, that is, socialist relations of production (hence, by the way, the fundamental admissibility of even an offensive revolutionary socialist war is clear)"; "The civil war is a minus, but it makes it possible to rebuild on new principles." In 1919, a book by G. Borisov (a pseudonym for the economist and philosopher I.A. Davydov) was published in Petrograd under the title "The Dictatorship of the Proletariat", in which there was a frank confession: "No, not the world, but the sword is carried into the world by the dictatorship of the

proletariat"[1165]2. After the defeat at Warsaw in 1920, Lenin became more cautious about his plans for the future Sovietization of the West. At present, a previously unknown fragment of his speech at the IX Party Conference on September 22, 1920 has been published, where he, in particular, said: "I ask you to write down less: this should not get into print ..."[1166]3. This speech, as already noted in the literature, reflected Lenin's plans for the Bolshevik expansion to the West, including the deployment of the Red Army along the German and Czechoslovak borders, as well as his

obsession with secrecy[1167]4. Speaking about the plans for the Sovietization of Poland, Lenin lifted the veil on how the decision to "use military forces" was made: "We did not formulate this in an official resolution recorded in the minutes of the Central Committee and representing the law for the party until the new congress. But among ourselves we said that we should feel with our bayonets whether the social revolution of the proletariat in Poland is ripe? (highlighted by me. - I.P.). This was done in secret both from their own party and from the Comintern. "When the Congress of the Comintern was in Moscow in July," Lenin continued, "it was at the time when we

we could not ask this question, because this congress had to take place [openly](#)”[1168]5. After the—

defeat near Warsaw, the intentions of the party leadership remained the same. Chairman of Sibrevkom I.N. Smirnov, at the III Siberian Conference of the RCP (b) in February 1921, spoke about his conversation with Lenin, which he had after it turned out that 40 thousand volunteers who had gathered in Siberia for a trip to the Polish front turned out to be unclaimed: “. ..Tell the villagers that we still have to break capitalist Europe, and that these 40,000 must play a decisive role. And the Russian Soviet rifle will appear in Germany”[1169]6. As for the principles of conspiracy in foreign policy, they ~~were~~

not only fixed, but also brought to their logical conclusion by Stalin. After the first unsuccessful experiments, the hopes for a world revolution did not disappear and the actions to "push" it did not stop, but were deeply conspiratorial. As a result, the truth about them was literally bricked up. Who could really dare to doubt Stalin's assertion when, in 1936, when he was asked by the American journalist Roy Howard "Has the Soviet Union abandoned its plans and intentions to make a world revolution?" answered: "We never [had such plans and intentions](#)”[1170]7 (emphasis mine. - I.P.). This answer is extremely characteristic of Stalin's personality. For those who did not know that such plans existed, the— Stalinist answer meant "did not leave", while those who asked at random received the corresponding answer. There is not even a double, but an excessive negation, equal to self-exposure and worthy of a common anecdote! At the same time, this response can be viewed as a subtle disorientation of the enemy for internal use and an expression of non-participation in the policy in which the West suspected the Soviet Union - for external use. In fact, it contained a gross mockery of everyone to whom this answer was intended.

Only with the beginning of radical political changes in the Soviet Union since the late 80s. the truth began to gradually come out, but this process turned out to be much more complicated than it seemed then.

The "key" that opens the way to the truth about Stalin's plans to expand the "front of socialism" is the truth about the eve of the war.

1. SEARCHING FOR THE TRUTH ABOUT THE EVE OF THE GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

Immediately after the war, at the direction of Stalin, a special body was created, which was called differently in different documents: “government commission for the Nuremberg trials”, “government commission for the organization of the Nuremberg Court”, “commission for the leadership of the Nuremberg trials”. Stalin placed Vyshinsky at the head of this top-secret commission with special functions. The USSR Prosecutor Gorshenin, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the USSR Golyakov, People's Commissar of Justice of the USSR Rychkov and three closest associates of Beria, his deputies Abakumov, Kobulov, Merkulov were appointed members of the commission. The main goal of the commission was to under no circumstances allow public discussion of any aspects of Soviet-German relations in 1939-1941, primarily the very fact of existence, and even more so the content of the so-called secret protocols supplementing the non-aggression pact (23 August 1939) and the Treaty of Friendship (September 28, 1939). In order to ensure the effectiveness of the instructions of the secret commission during the investigation, a special-purpose investigative team was sent to Nuremberg, headed by one of the most ferocious executioners of Beria, Colonel M.T. Likhachev[1171]8. Stalin was afraid in the public opinion of Europe and America to be in Nuremberg on the same bench with Nazi war criminals. And he had good reason for such fears. Therefore, Stalin did everything to prevent the Nuremberg trials from discussing the role of the USSR in unleashing World War II. He succeeded - the position of the winner allowed him to dictate conditions. On November 26, 1945, the

Vyshinsky commission decided to “approve ... a list of questions that are unacceptable

for discussion at [the trial](#)”[1172]9. Separate attempts by the defendants to point out the real role of the USSR in the preparations for the Second World War did not change the general situation.

Thus, Ribbentrop stated in his last speech: “When I arrived in Moscow in 1939 to

Marshal Stalin, he discussed with me not the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the German-Polish conflict within the framework of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, but made it clear that if he did not receive half of Poland and the Baltic countries without Lithuania, with the port of Libava, then I could immediately fly back. Waging war, apparently, was not considered there in 1939 a

crime against peace..." This paragraph was not included in the Russian edition of the materials of the Nuremberg Trials [1173]10. The truth about the eve of the war was ordered to be forgotten. Forget in the truest sense of the word - Stalin forbade writing diaries and memoirs about the war. Violation of the ban could cost lives. As for the direct accomplices of Stalin, oblivion was in their own interests. The clearest evidence of this is the conversation between F. Chuev and Molotov: "The West persistently writes that in 1939 a secret agreement was signed along with the treaty..."

- None. -

Did not

have? - Did not have.

No, it's absurd. "Now we can probably talk about it. Of course, there are no secrets here. In my opinion, they deliberately spread rumors in order to somehow, so to speak, wet. No, no, in my opinion, it is still very clean here and there could be nothing resembling such an agreement. I was very close to this, in fact I was engaged in this matter, I can firmly say that this is, of course, [an invention](#)"[1174]11.

Of course, Molotov "was very close to this", which is undeniably confirmed by his signature under the secret protocols and the photograph that depicted him next to Stalin and Ribbentrop during the signing of these documents. It is significant that even decades later, Molotov turned out to be incapable of historical self-assessment, otherwise his deliberate lie would have been verbalized without the intriguing words "spread rumors", "wet" and the assertion that "it's still very clean here", while there it was very dirty, extremely dirty. All this once again convincingly testifies to the moral characterization of Molotov as a political figure who occupied the position of "second person" in the country at a crucial moment in its history.

The lack of necessary documents (those that remained were deeply hidden in secret archives), the general worldview of military historians, most of whom lived under Stalin and went through the war, brought up by official propaganda, naturally led to the fact that they saw the war at the suggestion of Stalin.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that even during the period of the Khrushchev "thaw", historians did not even allow the thought of the existence of the secret of the eve of the war, which was hidden by Stalin. AM Nekrich, the author of the well-known book "1941. 22nd of June". He spoke sharply negatively about the "legend of preventive war", which is "artificially supported by West German neo-Nazis and some reactionary West German publicists and [historians](#)"[1175]12.—

Any criticism of Stalin's actions, which went beyond the limits then allowed, caused an immediate disciplinary reaction. The dialogue that took place during the discussion of the book by A.M. Nekrich in the Department of the History of the Great Patriotic War of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the Central Committee of the CPSU on February 16, 1966 between the presiding Major General E.A. Boltin and teacher of the Moscow Historical and Archival Institute L.P. Petrovsky, who called Stalin a criminal: "Comrade Petrovsky, in this hall, from this rostrum, expressions must be chosen. Are you a communist? - Yes. "I have not heard

that

somewhere in the directive decisions of our party, binding on both of us, it was said that Stalin is a criminal."[1176]13 After the displacement of N.S. Khrushchev,

from the post of First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, criticism of Stalin's "personality cult" gradually faded away. Over the next twenty years, the historiography of the Great Patriotic War lost even what it had achieved after the 20th Congress of the CPSU. It is enough to compare at least the 6-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945." (M., 1960-1965) with the 12-volume "History of the Second World War 1939-1945" (M., 1973-1982). This was acknowledged by military historians themselves. "It remains only to regret that," wrote N.G. Pavlenko, - that time is lost, many participants and witnesses have left us, and the most significant

the problems of the initial period of the war have to be studied, in fact, anew"[1177]14.

Mountains of books about the war, accumulated by the beginning of perestroika, were united by the general pro-Stalinist concept of the eve of the war, which consisted of a set of unshakable schemes and stereotypes. Let's open any of these books, for example, "The Great Patriotic War. Questions and Answers (Moscow, 1985): "The situation ... forced the USSR to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939, although this act was not included in the plans of Soviet diplomacy before the breakdown of Moscow negotiations by England and France.

... On September 17, the Red Army began a liberation campaign in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine. ... On

November 30, 1939, through no fault of the USSR, the Soviet-Finnish war broke out

On June 22, 1941, fascist Germany treacherously, violating the non-aggression pact, suddenly, without declaring war, attacked the Soviet Union. Moreover,

even at the beginning of perestroika, new knowledge about the eve of the war made its way with difficulty. The elders of Soviet military historiography F. Kovalev and O. Rzheshhevsky considered it their duty in 1989 to warn those who expressed "points of view that did not critically reproduce the long-known theses of anti-socialist propaganda, such as stereotypes about the "direct responsibility" of the USSR for unleashing the war ... »[1178]15.

Perestroika in the historiography on the eve of the war began only with the creation of the commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on international politics, headed by A.N. Yakovlev. Here are some of the statements made at the meeting of this commission on March 28, 1989, statements that are militant and helpless at the same time.

Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU V.M. Falin: "... In the near future we will face a whole avalanche of versions that are completely divorced from real facts, imposing - especially on ignorant people, young people the conclusion that the Soviet Union was an accomplice to the outbreak of the Second World War or at least contributed to the fact that it accepted such tragic turn, which we know from history and from our own experience.

... Therefore, it is impossible to be detached from what is happening - and something similar is observed in our country - too. Truth is our ally in the current heated debate. But this truth must be complete. Without fakes and overlaps. Head of the

Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense D.A. Volkogonov: "... All decisions that were made in 1939, including the August and September treaties, were determined by the defensive strategy of the Soviet Union.

History will eventually justify the fact that the pact was signed on August 23, justify it as a forced, albeit extremely dull step in the moral sense. While politically

supporting the need to sign the treaty of August 23, we must at the same time condemn the conspiracy, which was contrary to the Leninist principles of renunciation of secret agreements.

Director of the Institute of World History of the USSR Academy of Sciences A.O. Chubaryan: "... We have a common concept related to the responsibility for unleashing the Second World War, which is borne by Hitler's fascism. It does not require —

revision"[1179]16. The results of the work of the Commission A.N. Yakovlev reported to the II Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR. According to his report, the congress adopted a special resolution "On the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939", which became a new guide in covering the eve of the war by Soviet historians: "... The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR agrees with the opinion of the commission that the treaty with Germany on non-aggression was in a critical international situation, in the face of the growing danger of Nazi aggression in Europe and Japanese militarism in Asia, and had one of the goals to avert the threat of an impending war

from the USSR. ...The congress considers that the content of this treaty did not differ from the norms of international law and the contractual practice of states adopted for such settlements. However, both at the conclusion of the treaty and in the process of its ratification, the fact was concealed that simultaneously with the treaty a "secret additional protocol" was signed, which demarcated the "spheres

interests" of the contracting parties from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from Finland to Bessarabia. ...

The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR condemns the signing of the "secret additional protocol" of August 23, 1939 and other secret agreements with Germany. The Congress recognizes the secret protocols as legally untenable and invalid from the moment of their signing..."[1180]17.

Commission A.N. Yakovleva did not go beyond the discussion and evaluation of the treaty as an international legal document. The treaty was not placed in a historical context, and no fundamental conclusions about the consequences of this treaty were made at that time. Yakovlev limited himself to remarking that "Stalin and some people from his entourage could even then have imperial designs alien to the principles of socialism," as well as "illusions that, apparently, Stalin indulged in after the conclusion of the agreements of 1939. Illusions that did not allow proper use of the received peaceful respite..."[1181]18. Moreover, the Yakovlev Commission by this time did

not yet know that the originals of the secret protocols were stored in the archives of the General Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Speaking at the congress, Yakovlev said: "There is an official note in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, fixing the transfer in April 1946 of the original secret protocols by one of Molotov's assistants to another: Smirnov - Podtserob. Thus, we had the originals, and then they disappeared..."[1182]19. Meanwhile, the original secret protocols were not only

found, but also known to the General Secretary of the Central Committee. However, speaking at the Congress of People's Deputies, M.S. Gorbachev assured that "all attempts to find the original of the secret treaty were unsuccessful." Some time after his speech, - as V.I. Boldin, - "M.S. Gorbachev asked me casually whether I had destroyed the protocol..."[1183]20 Fortunately, this did not happen, and the publication of the original secret protocols was another serious step towards comprehending the truth. But how difficult was this path! In the discussions of that time on the question of the political and legal assessment of the

Soviet-German non-aggression pact,

opinion that, having concluded this treaty, both states bear the same responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War. However, Soviet historiography rejected such opinions automatically, in fact, without argumentation. Here is the point of view of M.I. Semiryaga, author of the book "Secrets of Stalinist Diplomacy": "The statement about the equal responsibility of the USSR and Germany for unleashing the Second World War only because they had "the same totalitarian regime" cannot be considered convincing. The main responsibility for this international crime still lies with the ruling elite of Nazi Germany. The Soviet leadership bears its share of responsibility for the fact that, by signing the non-aggression pact with Germany, it created certain conditions that contributed to the outbreak of war [by Hitler.](#)—

The position of M.I. Semiryagi is more radical than the position of historians represented by A.S. Orlov. Despite the obvious facts, he was still convinced that "the treaty allowed the USSR to stay out of the military fire that had engulfed Europe since September 1, and the secret protocol limited German expansion to the East by the line of the northern border of Lithuania and the Narew, Vistula, San rivers, made it possible move the western border of the USSR 250–300 km to the west. The treaty created an opportunity in peace to prepare for the inevitable battle with fascism. Further, the Red Army "entered the borders of Poland ...", and the troops "had the limited task of protecting the lives and property of the—

population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus"[1185]22. Relative peace among Russian military historians was destroyed by the publication in Russian of books by V. Suvorov (V. Rezun), who called into question what had never been questioned in the USSR before. (His book *The Icebreaker* is subtitled *Who Started World War II?*). With his books, he sought to prove that the main culprit and main instigator of World War II was the Soviet Union. Using a metaphorical turn, he called the day the USSR actually entered the war - August 19, 1939. V. Suvorov managed to figure out that on that day a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee took place, which decided to start a secret mobilization. "Many historians," he writes, "think that at first Stalin decided to sign peace with

surprise attack on Germany. But the facts revealed and confirmed to me that there were no two different solutions. Signing peace with Germany and finally deciding on the inevitable invasion of Germany is one decision, these are two parts of a single plan. And further: "Therefore, I consider August 19 the boundary of the war, after which, in any case, the Second World War should have taken place. And if Hitler had not started it on September 1, 1939, Stalin would have to look for another opportunity or even another performer who would push Europe and the whole world into war. This is the essence of my little discovery." [1486]23

V. Suvorov did not focus on one year 1939, but considered all the main events up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War on June 22, 1941, linking them into a single logical whole: "The secret mobilization was to end with an attack on Germany and Romania on July 6, 1941. ... Secret mobilization was aimed at preparing aggression. Nothing was done to defend the country. The secret mobilization was so colossal that it was not possible to hide it. Hitler had only one and last chance - to save himself with a preemptive strike. And on June 22, 1941, Hitler - for two weeks - preempted Stalin.

The publication of Suvorov's books divided historians into two unequal groups. The overwhelming majority are historians with experience and names who, in their writings, "sanctified" the pro-Stalinist concept of the war. Working for many years under the auspices of the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, they could not accept even that half-truth about the war, which became the property of official publicity. This is evidenced by the failed attempt to prepare a new 10-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people." But even those military historians who (for example, A.N. Mertsalov and L.A. Mertsalova) sharply criticize Stalin and Stalinism for the unpreparedness of the Soviet troops for the outbreak of war, for incompetence and arbitrariness, immorality and cruelty [1188]25 turned out to be not ready to calmly discuss the concept of V. Suvorov.

This can only be explained by the fact that the Suvorov concept not only broke the established historiographic tradition, but also dealt a blow to personal feelings and ideas about the war. Tem

moreover, that many military historians, like A.N. Mertsalov, were themselves its participants. This is not just rejection, but also unwillingness to understand. The books of V. Suvorov, in their opinion, do not deserve detailed reviews of military historians, because "with the help of "icebreakers" a conjuncture revision of the most important moments of national and world history is carried out", "a shadow is cast on real historical facts that have long been scientifically irreproachably I.P. ~~instilled~~ historiography"[1189]26.

As the influence of V. Suvorov's books on the public consciousness spread in Russia, their denial also intensified. From silence, these historians moved on to swearing and implausible accusations. They branded him as "not a historian, not a memoirist, a traitor, an agent of foreign intelligence services." It turns out that his books "are written by different people, rather by groups of people", V. Suvorov's participation "is found only in individual literary devices, jargon, ~~interjections~~"[1190]27.

Even such a radical historian as D.A. Volkogonov, who was placed in a privileged position by the post-communist authorities and had access to many secret documents, did not accept this [concept](#)[1191]28. However, the article that outlined his position on this issue is significant in its own way. Firstly, by the fact that he recognized the fact guessed by V. Suvorov: on August 19, 1939, a meeting of the Politburo really took place. But, as Volkogonov emphasized, "the military question was only this: "On the postponement of the conscription of workers for the construction of the Akmolinsk-Kartaly railway (according to Skvortsov's telegram) to the Red Army." And that's all. No mention of the Thunderstorm

plan, etc." Secondly, the article is significant in that it demonstrates a lack of understanding of the mechanism of action of Stalin's power. Volkogonov, who received the right to print out the "special folders" of the Politburo of the pre-war and post-war period, did not understand that the absence in the Politburo protocol of August 19, 1939 and in the "special folders" of any information about Stalin's secret plans for an attack on Germany, and also the absence of signatures of Stalin and Zhukov on such, according to Volkogonov, "striking" document as

"Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet U

with Germany and its allies" as of May 15, 1941 (and not only on this, but also on other important documents) is not yet an argument, much less a decisive one, in a dispute with V. Suvorov.

Unlike his venerable opponents, V. Suvorov understood, although he did not specifically deal with, the mechanism of power of the Stalinist regime, the basic principle of Stalin's activity in politics - if possible, leave no documents, leave no traces, surround the truth with "battalions" of lies. Significant

testimonies of Soviet military leaders about how decisions were made on military matters have already been cited above. If people like the Deputy Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army, Major General A.M., knew so little. Vasilevsky, who was directly involved in the development of operational plans on the eve of the war ("Considerations on the strategic deployment plan ..." were written by him [\[1192\]](#)²⁹, then it is quite natural to assume that subordinates knew even less about Stalin's strategic plans, moreover, sometimes were perplexed about the "illogical" actions of their leadership. Historian V.D. Danilov cited in his article a very characteristic testimony of K.K. Rokossovsky, on the eve of the war, released from prison and appointed commander of the 9th mechanized corps in the Kiev Special Military District: "The orders that followed from the headquarters of the district to the troops to send artillery to the ranges located in the border zone, and other instructions that were ridiculous in that situation, caused complete bewilderment. Judging by the concentration of our aviation on advanced airfields and the location of warehouses of central subordination in the front line, it was like preparing a jump forward, and the disposition of troops and the measures taken by the troops did not correspond to it ... In any case, if some kind of plan and if there was, it clearly did not correspond to the situation that had developed by the beginning of the war"[\[1193\]](#)³⁰.

Thus, to assert that the Soviet Union was not preparing for a war against Germany in 1941 only on the basis of the absence of an official "decision to start a war on the part of the Soviet political leadership and government, according to which the USSR would be the first to start preparing for war, the first would mobilize, concentrate and deploy troops on

the most advantageous frontiers", as Yu.A. Gorkov, at least prematurely. Moreover, in the same article, he reports a very remarkable fact that in the prewar period, the operational plan "was developed in a single copy, and was reported for approval only personally to Stalin and Molotov" [1194]31.

In Soviet times, historians not only did not have access to secret materials of party and state bodies, but were also brought up on strict adherence to the principles of party membership and a class approach. This implied following the interpretation of events that was laid down in the sources themselves. As a result, the ideology and logic of the document were reproduced in the works of historians. The main difficulty in overcoming the Soviet historiographic legacy was to learn how to reveal the true meaning of events that in their own way reflected the remaining documents of the Soviet era - secret and unclassified. We must pay tribute to V. Suvorov, who showed himself in the book "Icebreaker" as an intelligence historian who managed to reveal the main secret of Soviet military policy and history. He did this, relying mainly on published Soviet sources, which he compared, rethought, cleared of ideological masking and marking.

It is noteworthy that the conclusion about the preparation in 1939-1941. active entry of the USSR into the world conflict came and other historians. First of all, the names of J. Zamoyski (Poland) and I. Hoffmann (Germany) should be mentioned. The article by J. Zamoyski "The Black Hole", September 1939 - June 1941 (On the Policy of the USSR in the Initial Period of the Conflict)" was published in 1994, but prepared much earlier, for an international conference of historians in April 1990 in Moscow [1195]32. Convinced that the actions of the Soviet Union during that period "do not fit into some kind of logical whole", not knowing many more documents published in Russia in subsequent years, the author came to the conclusion that the decisions listed below indicate the preparation of the USSR for an offensive.

These are: 1. The appointment of G.K. Zhukov to the post of Chief of the General Staff as the winner at Khalkhin Gol, who showed himself excellently (although not without criticism) during the January staff game. 2. Increasing

replenishment of units in the western districts, but not yet in the mobilization order. 3. A huge program of military production and rearmament of the Red Army, the results of which were implemented only in 1942 (taking into account the achievements of German aviation). 4. The movement of five armies (16th, 19th, 21st, 22nd, 25th) from the interior of the country to the west, but not to the border zones, which is important from an operational point of view. 5. Creation in Ukraine of a strong operational fist of 60 divisions with a tendency to further strengthen it. 6. Reorganization of the four rifle divisions of the Kiev district into mountain divisions (Ukraine is mostly flat, and in front of it is a mountain direction at the junction of Czechoslovakia, Austria with access to the central, vital regions of Germany - a direction known from the First World War). An airborne corps, an instrument of non-defensive use, was also formed in the Kiev district. 7. Disarmament of fortified areas on the old border. 8. The extensive construction of airfields near the western border and the mass delivery of air bombs there, which could mean their preparation for an offensive. 9. The movement of military depots to the west by Stalin's personal decision, which later turned out to be a major mistake, but which is quite understandable and correct given the offensive version of the planned operations. 10. Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies on May 5, 1941 (in the text of the article on January 5, 1941 - I.P.) that the war with Germany is inevitable and we must be ready for it in 1942, and what is possible not only a defensive, but also a warning blow. 11. May 6, Stalin becomes head of government, which could mean many things, including a sharp turn towards concessions to Germany, but above all meant that the

USSR was entering a period of major and dangerous decisions - decisions calculated for success. J. Zamoyski also made an important remark about "silent sources", which do not contain any information about Stalin's strategic plans. In particular, attention is focused on the transparency and significance of the ellipses in the memoirs of G.K. Zhukov – "Hitler... was in a hurry, and not without reason..." As a result, Zamoyski was convinced that "Stalin, back in the Munich period, undertook a huge, dangerous, "with a long-range aim" game, calculated on the fact that USSR, i.e. he will say the decisive

The historian I. Hoffmann, who worked for many years at the Institute of Military History in Freiburg, moved in the same direction in his research, and came to the conclusion that "Stalin concluded a pact on August 23, 1939, in order to unleash a war in Europe, in which since September 17, 1939, he himself took part as an aggressor... The military and political preparations of the Red Army for an attack on Germany reached a climax in the spring of 1941 "[1197]34.

Hoffmann's article, published in the journal *Otechestvennaya Istoriya*, contains additional evidence of the aggressive intentions of the USSR. Firstly, he cites two very important facts: "The conclusion of our agreement with Germany," the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs informed the ambassador in Japan on July 1, 1940, "was dictated by the desire to unleash a war in Europe." And in a telegram to the Soviet ambassadors in Japan and China on June 14, 1940, it said: "We would agree to any agreement to ensure a clash between Japan and the United States." Secondly, in the

interrogations of Soviet officers of war kept in the German archives, he found confirmation of the fact that the actions of the Red Army on the border with Germany before June 22, 1941, were indeed shrouded in mystery, the meaning of which was understood by far not everyone. Third,

there are additional physical evidence of the existence of offensive plans on the Soviet side, captured by the Germans. So, the former head of the Department of Eastern European History at the University of Mainz, Professor Dr. Gotthold Rode, who at one time was a translator and *Sonderführer* at the headquarters of the 3rd German Infantry Division, found on June 23, 1941 in the building of the headquarters of the Soviet 3rd Army in Grodno, - as he noted in his diary, "a pile of maps of East Prussia, excellently printed on a scale of 1:50.000 ... All of East Prussia, at a glance. Why, he wondered, did the Red Army need hundreds of maps? Further, in the building of the headquarters of the Soviet 5th Army in Lutsk, on July 4, 1941, documents were found, among which was the "Plan for the political support of military operations during the offensive." In addition, the Germans were aware of leaflets addressed to German soldiers, found, in particular, by the troops of the 16th German Army on the first day of the war, June 22, 1941, near the town of Shakiai in Lithuania. So

Thus, according to I. Hoffmann, although "Hitler did not have a clear idea of what was really being prepared on the Soviet side, ... with his attack on June 22, 1941, he anticipated [Stalin's attack](#)"[1198]35. It must

be said that in the West, too, the point of view about Germany's "preventive" attack on the USSR in 1941 is rejected without discussion by the overwhelming majority of historians. The weekly "Die Zeit" (June 7, 1991) directly called the supporters of this version "belated victims of Nazi propaganda"[1199]36. One gets the impression that Western historians, especially German ones, are most afraid of accusations of sympathy for fascism, of neo-Nazi aspirations. These fears are so great that they outweigh the desire for truth, which should guide the historian in his work. That is why they are so aggressive in their criticism of the historians of the so-called revisionist school, to which they include above all Suvorov and Hoffmann. Recently, another name has been added to this series - the German historian W. Mather published the book "The Broken Word. Hitler, Stalin and the Second World War" (in another translation "Treachery ..."), which was subjected to crushing criticism from another German historian G.A. Jacobsen to the point of stating that "Mather has shown himself in this book to be untenable as a historian." The arguments in his criticism are the same categorical statements as those of our opponents of this concept: "There are no indications, documents that would indicate that Stalin had political intentions to attack Germany on a certain day", and in general "there is no evidence that Stalin was going to attack Germany in 1941." In addition, according to G.A. Jacobsen, "The Red Army was just about to

modernize its tank troops and [aviation](#)"[1200]37.

Unfortunately, in this matter, not only Russian but also Western historians are guided primarily by ideological motives. Thus, the Israeli historian G. Gorodetsky, the author of books published in 1995 and 1999. in Russian - "The Myth of the Icebreaker" and "Fatal Self-Deception: Stalin and the German Attack on the Soviet Union", proclaiming as its goal "transferring the discus

"a grandiose hoax" that is beneficial "for those who wanted to weaken the warming of the political climate, and in Germany - to rehabilitate the Nazi regime"[1201]38. This statement most frankly reveals the ideologization of the works of G. Gorodetsky himself. It would be more honest to admit that many Western historians are not yet ready for a serious scientific discussion on these issues in the way that, for example, the American historian R.Ch. Raak in a review of I. Hoffmann's book "Stalin's all-destroying war 1941-1945"[1202]39. Attempts to justify Stalin's actions in 1939–

1941 helpless, naive, and most importantly, go against the logic. Perhaps Stalin would not have wished for himself a better defender than, for example, J. Fleischhauer. Having cited the fact of Stalin's more than half a meter (58 cm) signature on the map - an annex to the Soviet-German Treaty of Friendship and Border of September 28, 1939, she seeks to convince the reader that this is not an "imperialist triumph in connection with the signing of a secret protocol to the pact of 23 August, but rather a kind of detente in connection with the fact that the non-aggression pact has borne fruit. Although there would be no triumph, there would also be no psychological relaxation. Moreover, according to I. Fleischhauer, "the map fixes not the division of Poland in half, but rather the Soviet renunciation of most of Eastern Poland as compensation for Lithuania. Stalin then clearly preferred military security to territorial expansion in the West. Subsequently, I. Fleischhauer and G. Gorodetsky even tried to prove that the noun "offensive" in Russian means

... "defense"[1204]41.

It is noteworthy that the publications that appeared in Russia in those years on this topic - documentary materials or articles by historians, guided by the desire to establish the truth, generally confirmed the concept of the "Icebreaker". "Military History Journal" (1991, No. 12; 1992, No. 1, 2) carried out a partial publication of options for plans for the strategic deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces, which were developed before the war by the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR (the 1940 plan is the basis for preparing the plan dated September 18, 1940, the plan dated March 11, 1941 and partially the plan dated May 15, 1941). Anticip

under the title "Did the USSR prepare a preventive strike?", the editors of the magazine formulated their point of view: "In general, they (materials. - I.P.) confirm that the Soviet Union, doing, according to Molotov (highlighted by me. - I.P. .), the choice in favor of an "offensive policy", did not set itself aggressive goals, did not provoke Germany into a "preventive war""[1205]42. However, historians B.N. Petrov[1206]43 and especially V.N. Kiselev, from whom the editors even preferred to dissociate themselves with a note ("We do not consider the author's point of view indisputable"), came to different conclusions. According to Kiselev, "both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were preparing for the offensive. We did not plan a strategic defense, and this is generally recognized. Only covering troops were supposed to defend themselves in order to ensure the deployment of the main forces for the offensive. Judging by the timing of the concentration of reserves of the border military districts, the armies of the reserve of the High Command and the deployment of front-line command posts, the offensive of the Soviet troops to defeat the aggressor.

preparing the invasion could begin no earlier than July 1941 ... "[1207]44. Colonel General Yu.A. Gorkov was one of the first in Russia to publish "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" as of May 15, 1941, which dealt another blow to the previous Soviet historiography of the war, which categorically denied the fact of a possible study The General Staff of the Red Army planned an attack on Germany. But Gorkov himself does not agree with the conclusion that the Red Army is preparing for an offensive. Moreover, in strengthening the South-West direction, he sees not a strategic plan, but a miscalculation. In his opinion, "... the concept of the operational plan of the war did not reflect an offensive, but rather an umbrella doctrine. According to the meaning of the umbrella doctrine, the covering troops should be tasked with covering the deployment of their troops with a solid defense, identifying the composition of the advancing enemy troops, determining

the direction of the main and other strikes in order to clarify the tasks of the main forces of their troops. Meanwhile, it was an unbiased study of the available documents on the eve of the war that led to the appearance of

Danilov, consisted in the recognition: "They were preparing to start the war with a crushing offensive, but they missed many issues of organizing a reliable defense of the country. It is these "mistakes" and "miscalculations" that explain the major failures of our troops at the beginning of the war.

As for Meltyukhov's article, the decision to publish it was made at a special meeting of the editorial board of the journal *Otechestvennaya History*, which also showed a sharp rejection of the concept of preparing the USSR for an attack on Germany on the part of historians Yu.A. Polyakova, V.P. Dmitrenko, V.I. Bovykina, V.A. Fedorova and others[1210]47. Polyakov, despite an avalanche of obvious facts, refused to recognize the actions of the USSR to annex the Baltic States, Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Bessarabia as aggression and accused Meltyukhov of tendentiousness. Dmitrenko was convinced that "it is simply indecent to discuss Suvorov's book in a scientific journal." Nevertheless,

the article was accepted for publication. Deputy editor-in-chief M.A. Rakhmatullin rightly assessed it as one of the first attempts to objectively evaluate the books of V. Suvorov. Meltyukhov not only substantiated the fact that the USSR was preparing an attack on Germany, but also pointed out that the plan for the war with Germany was approved on October 14, 1940 and its further clarification in the documents of March 11 and May 15, 1941 is nothing, in fact, did not change. "The most important thing," he stressed, "both in Germany and in the USSR, these plans did not remain on paper, but began to be implemented. A comparative analysis of the preparation of the parties for the war is another direction for further research on the eve of the war. But even on the basis of the materials known today, it can be argued that this process went on in parallel and from the beginning of 1941 entered the final stage both in Germany and in the USSR, which, by the way, once again confirms the inevitability of the outbreak of war precisely in 1941, who no matter who

initiated it"[1211]48. As for the date of a possible Soviet offensive, then, according to Meltyukhov, "no offensive actions of the Red Army against Germany before July 15, 1941 were impossible"[1212]49.

Danilov, on the contrary, believes that the latest

the completion date was July 2, 1941. [1243]50 Somewhat later, he gave a different date – “after about July 10, 1941.”[1244]51

Then Meltyukhov touched on the version of Germany's "preventive war" against the USSR. He cited the definition of preventive action given by the German historian A. Hilgruber. Preventive war is "military action taken to preempt the actions of the enemy, who is ready to attack or has already begun one, by his own offensive." To do this, you first need to know about the intentions of the enemy. According to Meltyukhov, neither Germany nor the USSR counted on the enemy's offensive, which means that the thesis of preventive actions is not applicable in this case. Moreover, he believes that “the version of a preventive war has nothing to do with historical science at all, but is a purely propaganda thesis to justify one's own actions”[1215]52.

The issue of preventive actions, in my opinion, is more complicated than Meltyukhov interprets it, and is not just propaganda. Hitler really did not have a clear idea of what was being prepared from the Soviet side - let's refer to the authoritative opinion of I. Hoffmann. He had no idea of the scope of this preparation and did not know the date of the alleged attack. The Germans knew practically nothing about the systematic creation of tank formations in the USSR for the purpose of conducting offensive operations, so at the beginning of the war it was a complete surprise for them to encounter numerous tank divisions, which they suddenly entered. But Hitler had a certain understanding of the offensive military doctrine of the USSR and of Stalin's political intentions. From the adviser of the German embassy in Moscow, G. Hilger, he knew about Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 to graduates of the military academies of the Red Army, in which it was directly said about the war with—

Germany in the near future[1216]53. From a legal point of view, the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, of course, is aggression. Hitler's actions could be qualified as preventive if he, having defeated the enemy's army on the border, would not rush further into the interior of the country, capturing more and more territories of the USSR. Since that time, military actions on the part of Germany

aggression, and on the part of the USSR - the liberation war, the Patriotic War. However, objectively, Hitler's attack on the USSR was preemptive, because it prevented a much more massive offensive by the Red Army. At the same time, it was

recognized that official Soviet historians, trying to substantiate the thesis about the military-technical superiority of the Wehrmacht at the time of the attack on the USSR, falsified the available facts. They cited, for example, the number of all German tanks and aircraft available on the Eastern Front, and from the USSR only the number of the latest models. This is not even a falsification, but a direct forgery. As a result, the belief in the absolute superiority of the Wehrmacht troops was firmly established not only in Soviet historiography, but also in everyday consciousness. Now even the former editor-in-chief of the "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people" V.A. Zolotarev admitted that by the beginning of the war, "only in terms of tanks and aircraft, we surpassed the armed forces of Germany, Japan, Italy, Romania and Finland, taken together, almost twice"[1217]54. At the same time, official historiography confirmed that the negotiations with England and France in 1939 ~~reached~~

an impasse not only through the fault of these two countries, but also through the fault of the USSR: without the consent of the Polish government to let the troops of the Red Army pass through the territory of Poland, a military convention with these states was excluded ... although the only way to prevent a war was to conclude a military and political alliance with England and [France as soon as possible](#). At the same time, Russian literature noted that "there is still no comprehensive documentary picture that would reflect with exhaustive reliability the position of the Soviet leadership in relation to the conclusion ~~of~~ a mutual assistance pact with London and Paris, would highlight the underlying, and not external, reasons for the breakdown of these negotiations. and reorientation of Moscow towards an agreement with [Berlin](#)"[1219]56.

And in the December 1994 issue of the Novy Mir magazine, a publication appeared of Stalin's speech, which he delivered on the day

meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939 T.S. Bushuyeva, who found the text of this speech in the secret trophy funds of the former Special Archive of the USSR, rated it as "an undeniably historical document that so openly exposed the aggressiveness of the USSR's policy." In her opinion, it was this speech that "formed the basis of the position of the Soviet side when it signed secret protocols with Nazi Germany on the division

of Europe"[1220]57. A recording of Stalin's speech at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on August 19, 1939 was published earlier in the West. Almost immediately, this speech was presented by the French agency Gavass, whose publication Stalin called "a lie" in an interview with the Pravda newspaper on November 30, 1939. Some Western historians also knew about Stalin's speech. The West German historian E. Jeckel even published the recording of Stalin's speech he found in one of the journals of the FRG in 1958 [1221]58 The reaction of Soviet military historians to this publication can be found in the second volume of the History of the Second World War: "The falsification is very rude. Suffice it to say that Stalin is credited with such turns of speech and addresses that he never used. In addition, on this Saturday, August 19, 1939, there was no meeting of the Politburo at all"[1222]59. Even such a pro-Stalinist Western historian as J. Fleischhauer[1223]60 considers this speech a falsification.

In 1995, the 50th anniversary of the Victory over Nazi Germany and the end of World War II was solemnly celebrated in Russia. This anniversary year has become the year of a huge number of publications on the topic, demonstrating not only the level of freedom that Russian historians have achieved, but also the difficulty with which the truth about the eve of the war breaks out—

[1224]61. Soviet history is replete with secret crimes of the authorities, but of all its secrets, the preparations for a military offensive against Europe in 1941 were especially dark and guarded. This truth has so far been accepted by a small

part of Russian historians. As an example of the clash of directly opposite points of view, the published unplanned discussion "Did Stalin Prepare an Offensive War against Hitler?" (M.: AIRO-XX, 1995). Along with the articles by A.V. Afanasiev, S. Grigorieva, M.G. Nikolaev, S.P. Isaikin, A.N. and L.A. Mertsalov's

The collection presents an alternative view of the events on the eve of the war - B.N. Petrova, V.N. Kiseleva, V.D. Danilova, M.I. Meltyukhov, V.A. Nevezhina. At the same time, faced with a number of obvious facts, supporters of the pro-Stalinist concept were forced to at least admit that "the problem of the relationship between military doctrine and technical policy in the USSR has always been a white spot for society ...", that "compared to the West, we have published a negligible number of books on this subject"[1225]62.

The most radical conclusions were contained in the article by M. Nikitin, who, not by chance, disappeared under a pseudonym (albeit a very transparent one). Based on the ideological documents of May-June 1941, the author came to the conclusion that "the main goal of the USSR was to expand the "front of socialism" to the maximum possible territory, ideally to the whole of Europe. According to Moscow, the situation was conducive to the implementation of this task. The occupation by Germany of most of the continent, the protracted, hopeless growth of the occupied countries, the dispersal of Wehrmacht forces on different fronts, the close Japanese-American conflict - all this gave the Soviet population discontent leadership a unique chance to defeat Germany with a sudden blow and "liberate" Europe from "decaying capitalism". All the activities of the Soviet leadership in 1939-1941 were devoted to this goal.

Thus, the author believes, the intentions of the Soviet leadership in May-June 1941, established on the basis of historical documents, differ significantly from those presented to us by Russian historiography. Consequently, the whole already not very coherent concept of the prehistory of the Great Patriotic War is incorrect, since it does not correspond to known facts and documents. Therefore, already now the main task of domestic science is to create a new concept of the history of the Soviet period in general and the events of 1939–1941. in particular"[1226]63. However, the subsequent development of the historiographical situation showed how far Russian historical science is from recognizing this conclusion. In 1995, conferences were held in Russia, including

including those specially dedicated to the eve of the war. At an international conference in Moscow, organized by the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, together with the Cummings Institute for Russian and Eastern European Studies at Tel Aviv University, “the overwhelming majority – almost all – of the speakers refuted the version of Suvorov and other authors, calling into question their very method of approach to the analysis of events”[1227]64. The participants of the scientific seminar in Novosibirsk, organized by the local society "Memorial", on the contrary, spoke in favor of clearing history of ideological camouflage. One of the seminar participants V.L. Doroshenko made an analysis of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, which convincingly proved that the text of this speech, “with all possible distortions, goes back to Stalin and should be accepted as one of the fundamental documents on the history of the Second World War”[1228] 65 . Of the foreign authors in the anniversary year,

Russian historical journals gave preference to those who spoke with pro-Stalinist concept[1229]66. —

In the context under consideration, two orientation articles deserve special attention - the director of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.O. Chubaryan and Director of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences A.N. Sakharov, who, according to the tradition dating back to Soviet times, determined the possible limits of the historical search, but objectively outlined the difficulties that still need to be overcome on the path to truth. The main conclusion of Chubaryan's article boiled down to the fact that “in those anxious months, Stalin was afraid even to think about the German attack and the beginning of the war”[1230]67. However, the new factual material about the eve of the war, already introduced into scientific circulation, could not but determine the contradictory nature of the article. On the one hand, noting the absence of a discussion of the most important issues of foreign and domestic policy in the Politburo protocols, the author agrees that “many issues were not discussed at the Politburo: decisions on them, apparently, were made at meetings in narrow format or by Stalin alone”, and on the other hand, referring directly to the “Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies” as of May 15, 1941, he again asserts th

evidence that this document was discussed anywhere, just as there is no definite data on Stalin's reaction to it. In addition, one of the main provisions of Soviet historiography, which has been refuted more than once in recent times, is repeated. In his opinion, "the USSR did not have the forces and capabilities to start a war with Germany"[1231]68. However, in the same issue of the journal, G.A. Kumanev admitted that "by the beginning of the war, the defense industry of the USSR as a whole for the first time began to surpass in quantity, and in certain areas of military production and in quality,

the indicators of fascist [Germany](#)"[1232]69. Article by A.N. Sakharov "War and Soviet Diplomacy: 1939-1945" to a greater extent met the requirements of the time and took into account the results of historiography achieved in recent years. Sakharov officially recognized the desire that still exists to this day "to create and strengthen state-ideological myths, to anathematize those who are trying to penetrate or at least approximately find out the true meaning of the events that took place in the late 30s - the first half of the 40s, to keep the veil over them state secret, which is completely unacceptable from the point of view of a [historian](#)"[1233]70. Further, Sakharov acknowledged the fact of Stalin's speech at a meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, quoting an excerpt from it and referring (albeit muffled!) to the December issue of the journal *Novy Mir* for 1994. The most important fact was also confirmed by A.N. Sakharov, in contrast to A.O. Chubaryan, the thesis that "...according to

all objective data, by the middle of 1941, the preponderance of forces in almost all respects was on the side of the Soviet [Union](#)"[1234]71. However, Sakharov's general objectivist approach to assessing Soviet diplomacy in 1939-1941 raises serious objections: "It was pragmatic, globalist diplomacy based on the principles of continuity with the policies of old Russia and accompanied, moreover, by certain revolutionary ideological calculations of the Bolshevik leadership. To defend and justify it, as Soviet historiography has done for many years, or to condemn and denounce it, as, say, V. Suvorov does in his books, is completely pointless

or defeat. Such was the Soviet policy and diplomacy of those

[years](#)”[1235]72. It is impossible to avoid a moral assessment of the actions of the Stalinist authorities, and these attempts always have a real basis and, as a rule, such an objectivist approach leads to justification of the actions of the authorities. For Sakharov, it was determined, firstly, by the fact that Soviet diplomacy in 1939-1941. was considered by him in isolation from the inherently provocative Stalinist diplomacy of the previous period, and secondly, he, like many other modern authors, did not escape the influence of the "charm" of the Stalinist great power. Only taking into account these circumstances, one can perceive the author's final conclusion without internal protest: "... the Soviet leadership acted quite in the spirit of the time, decisively, on a large scale, and proactively. And the main miscalculation of Stalin and his guilt before the Fatherland was at this stage and in those conditions not that the country had not properly prepared for defense (it did not prepare for it), but that the Soviet leadership - both political and military - it was not possible to accurately determine the moment when the desire to delay the war until bringing its offensive forces to full readiness was no longer possible, and it did not take emergency measures to mobilize the country and the army in a state of maximum combat readiness. A preemptive strike would have saved our Fatherland millions of lives and, perhaps, would have led much earlier to the same political results that the country, ruined, hungry, cold, having lost the color of the nation, came in 1945, hoisting the banner of Victory over the Reichstag.

And the fact that such a blow was not delivered, that the offensive doctrine, carefully developed at the General Staff of the Red Army and began to be vigorously implemented in May-June 1941, was not implemented, is perhaps one of Stalin's main miscalculations.[1236]

[73](#) . A certain

result of the historiography of the topic was published in 1996 by the Russian State University for the Humanities, edited by Yu.N. Afanasiev's book "Another War: 1939-1945", which brought together contemporary authors known for their new approaches to the study of not only the eve, but the entire period of the Great Patriotic War. This book is mostly republished

articles by V.D. Danilova, M.I. Meltyukhov, V.A. Nevezhina, Yu.A. Gorkova, A.A. Pechenkin and others.

However, in the same year, against the background of the growing wave of apologetic literature about Stalin, a retreat from what had been achieved in covering the eve of the war became noticeable. The illustration for Yu.A. Gorkov and Yu.N. Semin "The end of the global lie. (The operational plans of the western border military districts of 1941 testify: the USSR was not preparing for an attack on Germany)"[1237]74. This is a poster from the time of the war called "The broom of the Red Army will sweep the evil spirits to the ground!" Among this "evil spirits" is the book by V. Suvorov "Icebreaker". Signs

of digression are actually a negative review by A.F. Vasilyev on the book "Another War: 1939-1945", published in 1997 in the journal "Questions of History" (No. 7), and new publications by G. Gorodetsky. In response to the reprint of Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939 by the German weekly "Die Welt" (July 12, 1996), Gorodetsky once again called this speech a falsification. In complete contradiction to the historical facts known today, he continues to insist that in the days leading up to the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939, Stalin "more than ever adhered to his traditional defensive policy", that he "did not put forward any territorial claims, but only wanted mutual German-Soviet guarantees of the inviolability of the Baltic countries"[1238]75.

The book by V.Ya. Sipols, Diplomatic Secrets. Eve of the Great Patriotic War. 1939–1941" (M., 1997) and reviewed by A.S. Orlov, in which the high assessment of the fact that "the book is permeated by controversy with opportunistic interpretations of the history of 1939-1941, which, in the wake of unbridled criticism of the history of the USSR in the late 80s and early 90s, prevailed in post-Soviet historiography" is very indicative. The logic of the objections of both Sipols and the reviewer supporting him is also indicative. It turns out that the idea of secret protocols and the division of "spheres of influence" first appeared not in the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, but in the course of secret Anglo-German negotiations and in

English proposals of the USSR about the ^{guarantees} ^{countries} Baltics[1239]76.

In the same year, a book by V.A. Nevezhin "Syndrome of offensive war. Soviet propaganda on the eve of "holy battles", 1939-1941 which is a systematic result of his ^{years} ^{is} previous research. Based on a large amount of factual material, Nevezhin came to the conclusion that "Stalin did not separate the national interests of the country from the ultimate strategic goal - the destruction of the "capitalist encirclement". At the end of the 1930s, the Bolshevik leadership no longer considered the "world revolution" in itself as the main instrument for achieving this goal. The mission of crushing the hostile "bourgeois world" was to be taken over, according to Stalin's plan, by the Red Army"[1240]77. Of particular interest

is the special chapter of the book "Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941" This is not only Stalin's speech to the graduates of military academies, but also his remarks and toasts at a banquet arranged for this occasion. The original authentic text of Stalin's speech is unknown. At the disposal of the researchers there is only a record, and not only of speech, but also of Stalin's statements, made by an employee of the People's Commissariat of Defense K. Semenov and identified in the RGASPI. At present, the most complete publication has been prepared by A.A. Pechenkin[1241]78. So the accusation made in 1994 by historians A.N. and L.A. Mertsalovs against the German historian I. Hoffmann in that he operated on "Stalin's alleged intentions, his speech on May 5, 1941, the content of which, unfortunately, is unknown to science", is devoid of any grounds[1242]79 . Nevezhin himself, completing the chapter on Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941, concludes that "for the closest Stalinist entourage, everything said then by the" leader "at the solemn meeting and at the reception (banquet) was not a "hoax" and not "

disinformation," but a direct guide to [action](#)"[1243]80.

However, the significance of Nevezhin's study is reduced by the inconsistency and inconsistency of the author's conclusions. It would not be worth paying special attention to this circumstance if it were not

One gets the impression that Nevezhin is afraid that he will be put on a par with V. Suvorov, to whom he treats with an obvious prejudice, incomprehensible because it was the Icebreaker that prompted Nevezhin himself and other modern researchers of the pre-war period to many conclusions. Without noting the positive aspects of this book, Nevezhin immediately proceeds to criticize it in the worst historiographical traditions: "... Russian historians noticed that V. Suvorov (V. B. Rezun) makes little use of the documentary base, abuses speculation, tendentiously quotes memoirs literature, which in itself requires careful source analysis, distorts facts, and arbitrarily interprets events. Western scientists also made big claims to the author of the book "Icebreaker". Thus, B. Bonvech attributed it to a very specific genre of literature, in which one can see the desire to remove the blame from Germany for the attack on the USSR" [1244]81. In this context, those Western researchers who agreed with V. Suvorov in their conclusions - G. Gilessen, V. Mather, E. Topich, I. Hoffmann, also got it.

With familiar prejudice, Nevezhin also refers to The Other War: 1939-1945. In his opinion, Yu.N. Afanasiev unreasonably tried to put Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 "on a par with Stalin's speeches allegedly delivered at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on August 19, 1939 and at the main military council on May 14, 1941. The source on the basis of which was the publication of Stalin's speech to the Politburo on August 19, 1939 was made, adds Nevezhin further, "requires critical analysis." Having made this addition, he considered it unnecessary to mention, firstly, that V. Suvorov attracted attention to Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939, and secondly, that a recording of the text of this speech was found in the Special Archive (now the Center for the Storage of Historical -documentary collections) T.S. Bushueva and published by her in the journal Novy Mir in 1994 (No. 12), thirdly, that the analysis of this speech has already been made by V.L. Doroshenko and published in the materials of the scientific seminar dedicated to the fiftieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany, held in Novosibirsk on April 16, 1995, and then republished in the book "Another War: 1939-1945". For a

no indications not only in the main text of the book, but also in the attached "List of used sources and literature".

As for the verbal phrase used by Nevezhin, "supposedly spoken," the same can be said about Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941. The original text of the speech was not found in either case. In addition, the whole structure of Nevezhin falls apart if we take as a basis another recording of Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, which was told by N.G., who was present in the Kremlin at that moment. Lyashchenko. Decades later, he was able to read a transcript of the text of Stalin's speech sent from the Institute of Military History. According to Nevezhin, there was not a word about the war in the received record. As an eyewitness, N.G. Lyashchenko concluded that "someone did a fair amount of work on it"[1245]82. All this was quite ~~in the~~ in the spirit of Stalin. It is no coincidence that he forbade the inclusion of a recording of his speech on May 5, 1941, made by K. Semenov, in the 14th volume of his works that was supposed to be

published. Such a position of Nevezhin could not but cause the inconsistency and vagueness of the conclusions of his book. In the chapter devoted to Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941, he joins the conclusion that "Stalin's calls for the need to restructure Soviet propaganda, sounded at a banquet in the Kremlin on the occasion of the graduation of the military academies of the Red Army, did not yet mean that the USSR was preparing in the summer of 1941 to attack Germany" (emphasis mine.— I.P.)[1246]83.

The book ends with an afterword by professor of the Ruhr University (Germany) B. Bonwetsch, in which he "explains" Nevezhin's position to the reader. It turns out that the emphasis on "offensive" does not make "attack" forced. The author of the book, according to Bonwetsch, "is sometimes prone to some dramatization, but on the whole he is positively characterized by the fact that, based on obvious changes in Soviet military propaganda after Stalin's speeches on May 5, 1941, he does not conclude that the Soviet Union definitely intended to attack against Germany..."[1247]84. Bonwetsch, despite the study of Nevezhin and other authors, is still convinced that "Stalin scrupulously and not only for reasons of defense, took into account state interests, taking into account the possibility of war with

Germany. By what time he attributed the beginning of the war, it is impossible to establish, but many data point to 1942 "[1248]85.

A section written by M.I. also testifies to a certain "surrender of positions". Meltyukhov in the book "Soviet society: emergence, development, historical finale. T. 1. From the armed uprising in Petrograd to the second superpower of the world "(Moscow: RGGU, 1997). The section has an eloquent title - "Cries for defense is a veil", which is a phrase of Stalin, said by him on October 1, 1938 at a meeting of propagandists from Moscow and Leningrad, then recorded by the Secretary of the Central Committee A.A. Zhdanov in his notebook. It is characteristic that Zhdanov singled out this phrase as a key one,

revealing the true representation Stalin o foreign policy mission of the Soviet state [1249]86. But, on the other hand, analyzing the articles of the authors, which are collected in the book "The Other War: 1939-1945" and actually represent a discussion on the topic "Did Stalin Prepare an Offensive War?", Meltyukhov incorrectly reduced it to the following conclusion: "the authors dispute not as much the probability (or necessity) of a pre-emptive offensive by the USSR as the possibility of its implementation precisely in 1941 (emphasis mine. - I.P.). In any case, a comparison of the mentioned articles published in the same book and reflecting, at first glance, opposing points of view, is useful. This helps to better understand the causes and nature of the catastrophe that occurred in 1941 and which, in the final analysis, was organically connected with the nature of the Stalinist regime"[1250]87.

The emphasis on the question of the possibility of carrying out an offensive by the USSR in 1941 is nothing more than an attempt to divert the discussion from clarifying the real actions of Stalin in preparation for war. The same trend was clearly manifested at the meeting of the Association of World War II Historians in December 1997, at which a special report by M.I. Meltyukhov [1251]88. On the same flank were the speaker and the historian V.A. Nevezhin, and on the other - the elders of our military historical science V.A. Anfilov, M.A. Gareev, Yu.A. Gorkov, A.S. Orlov, O.A. Rzheshhevsky and others, for whom "history is a political science", and the historian, in their opinion, "should always remember the interests of his state and take care of the sanity of generations entering life"[1252]89 .

The discussion that took place demonstrated that the historians of the democratic trend did not succeed in pushing back or in any noticeable way pushing back the historians of the pro-communist trend. The latter, having retained their positions in the institutional system of post-Soviet science, have moved to revenge, which has no actual scientific significance. However, it has a serious impact on the process of further degradation of historical science in Russia and will affect the training of a new generation of historians. The processes that are taking place in post-Soviet historical science are connected with the general political processes in the country. Democracy has not succeeded even in history, and indeed it could not succeed in the present correlation of forces. If the pro-communist revenge had received at least a rebuff from the world of historical science, a paradoxical situation has developed here too: Western historians not only formally contact pro-communist historians, but also support them conceptually[1253]90. Russian democratic historians will have to show not

only patience, but also courage. The publication in 1998 by the international foundation "Democracy" of the collection of documents "1941: In 2 books" does not put an end to the historiography of this topic, as L.A. Bezymensky, an interview with which under the significant title "The Truth about June 22" appeared on June 18, 1998 in the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda". The collection contains documents that, until very recently, were not available in such archives as the Archive of the President, the Archive of Foreign Policy, the Archive of the Foreign Intelligence Service, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation, etc. For all their undeniable importance, these documents in themselves are not can give direct answers to the questions posed. This was exactly what was in the interests of Stalin, who personally controlled the acquisition of his archive, which today forms the basis of the Presidential Archive. That is why "the documentation contained in the personal archives of Stalin and Molotov is an-exceptionally important, but not exhaustive source" (emphasis mine. - I.P.)

[1254]91. Quite indicative is the fundamental fact that came to light during the

possible political rapprochement, the materials on the resumption of economic ties between the USSR and Germany are very extensive..."[1255]92. It was no coincidence that Stalin left in his archive mainly materials on economic cooperation with Germany, as if he knew the psychology of historians educated in the country he created. Indeed, the conclusion followed: "Our assumption about the initiatory role of the economic factor still requires additional research, but even now it should be taken into account when assessing the argument

about the "forced" nature of the 1939 agreements."[1256] 93 of our time, are precisely that example of sources that make "we get rid of the illusion that the sources are "windows" through which one can look at the historical life of people of other eras in its "primordial" authenticity, one has only to wipe these windows well"[1257]94. Only then will it be — possible to extract a grain of truth from this array of sources left to us when they are compared with others, analyzed, built into the general context of events. Only under this condition will these sources "tell" us what Stalin wanted to hide. Therefore, the conclusion of the compilers of the collection of documents "1941" that "the published documents completely refute the speculation about the supposedly preventive (to repel the impending Soviet aggression) attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union" [1258]95 seems premature . Moreover, the situation in the pre-war period cannot be interpreted so unambiguously in the categories: "preventive" - "non-preventive

(treacherous)" attack. Whatever the digressions in coverage of the eve of the war, the truth about him has already come out. It made more understandable not only the foreign, but also the internal policy of the Stalinist government, aimed at realizing the main goal. This goal is clearly formulated in the article by Z.S. Belousova and D.G. Nadzhafov, which can be regarded as a milestone in the process of modern Russian historians' departure from the lies of Soviet historiography: "The proletarian call for a "last and decisive

communist rulers of the Soviet state, was the basis of their global strategy. Thus, the idea of destroying the "old world" became the end in itself of the newborn socialist system, the meaning and justification of its existence, infecting the millions of masses of the vast Eurasian country with aspiration for the "new world" ... The belief that the dialectics of historical development will lead to the triumph of communism (and in the post-October years, such a course of world events seemed to the creators of the Russian revolution to be the near future), rested on the dogmas of class irreconcilability and the inevitability of wars under capitalism, supposedly leading the proletariat to the social revolution. Elevated to the rank of official policy, the bet on the victory of world communism determined the global framework of Soviet activity in creating conditions for the widespread establishment of a new social order.^[1259]⁹⁶ However, the need for a historical assessment of this "bet on the victory of world communism" marked a new divergence between historians on

the eve of the war, which can be considered significant. On the one hand, this is a democratic position, its essence is stated by D.G. Najafov. "Most likely," he writes, "the Soviet leaders really believed in their revolutionary mission, putting an equal sign between the interests of the socialist Soviet Union and the "radical" (in Marxist terminology) interests of the peoples of other countries, intending at the right time to act as the liberator of these peoples. from the yoke of capitalism. In practice, the so-called proletarian internationalism of the USSR was reduced to outright nationalism (in its Soviet, National Bolshevik version), while the basic component of the Second World War from the very beginning was the defense of freedom and democracy against the onslaught of the forces of totalitarianism"^[1260]⁹⁷.

On the other hand, this is a great-power, anti-Western position, manifested in the book by M.I. Meltyukhov "Stalin's Missed Chance". This position deserves special attention, because its supporter turned out to be the author, who achieved very significant results in the study of existing and in the search for new materials on this topic. Meltyukhov managed to summarize almost all the facts,

become famous in recent years, and create a comprehensive

research, after which a return to the old version of the unpreparedness of the Soviet Union for war is no longer possible. The book convincingly proves that by the summer of 1941 the Red Army was the largest army in the world, armed with a number of unique systems of military equipment, and this army was preparing for the offensive. In 1940–1941 The General Staff of the Red Army developed at least four variants of the operational plan, the content of which indicates the preparation of only offensive actions by the Soviet troops ... This idea is especially clearly expressed in a document dated May 15, 1941 ... In total for the war with Germany from those available in the Red Army 303 divisions were allocated 247, which after mobilization would have totaled over 6 million people, 62 thousand guns and mortars, 14.2 thousand tanks and 9.9 thousand aircraft. Germany and its allies, according to the data given in the book, did not have forces capable of inflicting a guaranteed defeat on the Red Army. The superiority of the latter in the number of divisions was 2.3 times, in personnel 2.1 times, in guns and mortars 2.4 times, in tanks 8.7 times, and in aircraft 4.4 times[1261] 98. After Meltyukhov's

book, it is no longer possible to talk about the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, not only on the eve of the war, but also in the preceding years. The book examines in detail the actions of the USSR in Poland in September 1939, its "struggle for the Scandinavian bridgehead", "the buildup of the Soviet military presence in the Baltics", the struggle for the Balkans, the policy aimed at weakening the positions of England and France in Europe.

At the same time, the discussion about the eve of the war cannot be considered completed. Firstly, as Meltyukhov himself rightly notes, many documents on the state of the Red Army, plans for military operations against Finland, Romania, Turkey, most of the documents on the operational training of troops, in particular, district plans, cover plans for the entire interwar period, are still classified. period etc. . But first of all, there are no documents that allow "to fully reconstruct the process of making key decisions by the Soviet leadership in 1939-1941." The available sources do not yet allow not only to answer the question about the reasons for the refusal of June 12 as the initial date for the attack on Germany, but also to substantiate the thesis that the "Red

The army was supposed to complete preparations for the offensive no earlier

than July 15, 1941 "[1262]99. Secondly, Meltyukhov's general approach to considering the policy of the USSR in 1939-1941 raises a serious objection. Claiming to objectively recreate historical reality, to consider Soviet foreign policy "without any propaganda blinkers, but from the point of view of the real interests, goals and capabilities of the Soviet Union", opposing moralizing traditions in Russian historical literature and declaring that in its The study is not about justifying or accusing the Soviet leadership, Meltyukhov turns out to be the spokesman for the great-power and anti-Western position that is typical today for many representatives of the Russian intelligentsia, including historians. This position determined his research approach - he is completely on the side of Stalin, moreover, he regrets the missed chance "to defeat the most powerful European power and, having entered the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, to eliminate the age-old Western threat to our country." If Stalin had succeeded in realizing the planned plan, then, according to Meltyukhov, "The Red Army could have been in Berlin no later than 1942, which would have made it possible to put under the control of Moscow a much larger territory in Europe than happened in 1945. The defeat of Germany and the Sovietization of Europe allowed Moscow to use its scientific and technical potential, opened the way to a "just social reorganization" of the European——

colonies in Asia and Africa..."[1263]100. No one would dispute the right of M.I. Meltyukhov to talk about the possible prospects for the Sovietization of Europe more than half a century ago, just as the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party V.V. Zhirinovskiy and his follower, State Duma deputy A.V. Mitrofanov about the position of modern Russia in relation to the West, if not for one important circumstance. This approach is in complete contradiction with the author's claim for an objective study of the problem. This contradiction can be shown by the example of his consideration of the most important issue of the role of the USSR in unleashing the Second World War. Meltyukhov actually

on non-aggression of August 23, 1939, incorrectly states the position of the USSR on the eve of Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow, bypasses the question of evaluating Stalin's speech on August 19, frankly hushing up the publications that appeared on this topic. Thanks to the August 23 agreement, Meltyukhov believes, "for the first time in its history, the USSR received recognition of its interests in Eastern Europe from a great European power," therefore, "the Soviet-German non-aggression pact can be regarded as a significant success of Soviet diplomacy, which was able to outplay British diplomacy and achieve its main goal of staying out of the European war, while gaining a significant free hand in Eastern Europe, more room for maneuver between the warring factions in their own interests, and at the same time shift the blame for the breakdown of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations on London and Paris. It was not in the interests of the Soviet leadership to prevent the war in Europe between the Anglo-French bloc and Germany, since only the war gave him a real chance to significantly increase his influence on the continent ... The non-aggression pact, - he concludes, - ensured not only the interests of the Soviet Union, but also the rear of Germany, facilitating her war in Europe"[1264]101. In fact, the key role of the USSR at the beginning of the Second World War lies in the words I have highlighted. However, this role is camouflaged by Meltyukhov's geopolitical reasoning.

Thus, despite the obvious success in the search for the truth about the eve of the Great Patriotic War, the creation of its objective history requires clarification of many more fundamental points. Following the concept of a post-communist great power that defends Stalin's aggressive aspirations not only leads to a distortion of the coverage of the key turns of his policy, but also cannot answer such an important question as to why the Red Army, despite its multiple superiority, suffered such a crushing defeat in 1941. Speculation about the fatal miscalculation of the Soviet leadership and the unpreparedness of the troops to create a continuous front of defense is not enough here. Questions of this kind do not fit into this concept at all, because these are no longer questions about Stalin's geopolitical plans, but about the attitude of millions of Red Army soldiers to the regime he created.

The truth about the eve of the war will have to win its proper place not only in historiography, but also in the public consciousness. The Russian society is not yet ready to accept such truth about the war, as evidenced by its negative reaction to the documentary film by V. Sinelnikov "The Last Myth" about Viktor Suvorov and his book "Icebreaker". And yet, there is still hope that May 9 in Russia will someday become not only the Day of the long-awaited peace that came after a bloody war, the Day of Remembrance of the 27 million who died in this war, but also a reminder of our blindness, of how relations between power and society should not be built.

2. STALIN'S CONSPIRACY OF PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

Perhaps, in no other sphere of Stalinist policy were there so many secrets and outright lies as in his foreign policy. It must be admitted that the Stalinist conspiracy and lies turned out to be quite effective. Stalin's true intentions were not understood at the time not only by his political opponents, but many modern authors refuse to recognize them even after the publication of documents exposing him. One of the participants in the unplanned discussion "Did Stalin prepare an offensive war against Hitler?" M.G. Nikolaev believes that "the main 'defect' of a methodological nature that leads critics of the pro-Stalinist point of view to erroneous conclusions is that they all proceed from a false understanding of the socio-political nature of Stalinism in general and its manifestations in foreign policy in particular. To count Stalin as an adherent of the idea of "world revolution" or, in the words of D. Volkogonov, as a leader guided by "Comintern thinking" is the height of absurdity»[1265]1. M.G. Nikolaev took L. Trotsky as his allies and cited his statements relating to the second half of the 1930s, which just demonstrate a lack of understanding of Stalin's actions.

"International politics," wrote L. Trotsky, "is completely subordinated to Stalin's internal politics. Domestic politics means for him, first of all, the struggle for self-preservation ... Hitler cannot solve his historical mission in other ways. A victorious offensive war must ensure the economic future of German capitalism and at the same time the National Socialist regime. Stalin is another matter. He cannot wage an offensive war with the hope of success. Besides, he doesn't need her. If the USSR is involved in a world war with its innumerable victims and hardships, all insults and violence, all the lies of the official system will

inevitably cause a deep reaction on the part of the people who committed in

three revolutions this century. No one knows this better than Stalin. The main idea of his foreign policy is to avoid a big war"[1266]2.

Meanwhile, Stalin, all the years that he was at the head of the party and the country, did not leave the idea of a big war, during which there would be opportunities for expanding the "front of socialism". In this sense, he was a consistent student of Lenin. He firmly grasped the position that revolutions grow out of war, a vivid confirmation of which was the October Revolution itself. The failures of the proletarian revolution in 1919 in Hungary, in 1920 in Poland, in 1923 in Germany, in 1924 in Bulgaria did not affect Stalin's long-term intentions. He knew how to wait in the wings and was not only abstractly faithful to the idea, but also actively prepared its implementation. Recently, historians have repeatedly cited Stalin's statement about a future war, which he made at the January 1925 plenum of the Central Committee: "If the war starts, then we will not have to sit idly by - we will have to act, but to speak last. And we will come out in order to throw the decisive weight on the scales, the weight that could outweigh it"[1267]3.

In a letter to A.M. On January 17, 1930, Gorky spoke about stories about the war as follows: "We need stories that lead readers from the horrors of the imperialist war to the need to overcome the imperialist governments that organize such wars. Besides, we are not against any war. We are **against** the imperialist war as a counter-revolutionary war. But we are **for** an anti-imperialist, revolutionary war of liberation, despite the fact that such a war, as you know, is not only not free from the "horrors of bloodshed", but even abounds with them.

In the early 30s. there was a final reorientation of Stalin to the militarization of the country. This is confirmed by his letter to K. Voroshilov dated May 7, 1932, in which he agreed with the main proposals of M.N. Tukhachevsky, made in his note dated January 11, 1930. It was supposed to increase the size of the army to 6 million people and, accordingly, saturate it with modern military equipment. If an army of 3-3.5 million is considered as a defense army, then twice as large is already an offensive army[1269]5.

At the same time, Stalin practically did not speak frankly about a future war. On the contrary, in his speeches intended for the public, he spoke about the world, and, touching on the issue of specific actions of the authorities, he simply lied [1270]6. Awareness of this most important characteristic of Stalin's personality is extremely important for understanding his true actions and intentions. One cannot take at face value such, for example, a passage of his speech at the 16th Congress of the CPSU (b), where he spoke about the policy of peace, which "we will continue to pursue with all our strength, by all means. We do not want a single inch of foreign land. But we will not give our own land, not a single inch of our land to anyone" [1271]7.

As a classic example of Stalin's lies, one can cite an excerpt from his speech at the same congress in connection with the events in China. It also contains Stalin's characteristic method of repetition, which he used for greater persuasiveness. "The false version that the employees of the Russian embassies in China are the perpetrators of the violation of "peace and tranquility" in China must be considered completely failed. There have long been no Russian embassies either in southern or central China. But on the other hand, there are British, Japanese, German, American and all sorts of other embassies. There have long been no Russian embassies either in southern or central China. But on the other hand, there are German, British and Japanese military advisers to the warring Chinese generals. Russian embassies are no longer there. But on the other hand, there are British, American, German, Czechoslovak and all sorts of other guns, rifles, airplanes, tanks, poison gases. And what? Instead of "peace and tranquility" we now have in southern and central China the most unbridled and most ruinous war of generals, financed and instructed by the "civilized" states of Europe and America. It turns out "civilizing" work quite a picture of the capitalist states. It is only unknown what the Russian Bolsheviks have to do known from declassified sources, the with it?"[1272]8. As it became communist leadership and Stalin himself contributed to just such a development of events in—

China, but kept their actions in deep secrecy. It is enough to cite as evidence a number of documents stored under the heading "special folder". By a resolution of the Politburo of May 7, 1925, L.M. Karakhan was

it was proposed to "observe great secrecy in correspondence ... Chicherin to take measures to establish such a technique of relations with the embassy in China, which would guarantee their greatest secrecy"[1273]9. By a resolution of the Politburo of March 4, 1926, "in view of the difficult situation of the people's armies, it is possible to transfer 10 million cartridges to Fyn on credit, provided that their transportation is completely secrecy"[1274]10. Stalin himself transmitted his orders to the workers of the Soviet embassy in China in cipher and signed "Koba"[1275]11.

In those matters that Stalin wanted to hide, he made full use of the advantages of the mechanism of power he had created. As a result, only those actions were discovered that had noisy consequences. The very process of developing decisions, their adoption and even implementation in many cases remained secret. I will give one more characteristic example that will make it possible to understand the meaning of Stalin's general actions. At the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, Ya.B. Gamarnik and left the following evidence for History: "... At the end of 1931, I remember, in the Central Committee, Comrade Stalin raised the question that it was urgent to transfer a particle of our aviation to the Far East, and the Central Committee sent a telegram from Comrade Eikhe to the Siberian Territorial Committee, he probably also remembers the Far Eastern Regional Committee, that hangars for receiving aviation were urgently built, and I remember that Comrade Stalin suggested that we write a draft of such a telegram, but at the same time he warned: do not print this telegram on a typewriter, write it by hand and give it to me and Comrade Molotov to sign.

He proceeded from the fact that, after all, the transfer to the Far East was done strictly secret, he proceeded from the fact that the typist, even, apparently, the most trusted, was not informed about this event ... Then the question arose of the transfer of several Siberian divisions to the Far East. Tov. Stalin warned us: do not give an order about this from Moscow, but Gamarnik will go, let him tell the commander there, on the spot, in Novosibirsk, about the transfer of divisions to the Far East. And I must say that only the narrowest circle, even in our People's Commissariat, knew about these events. And so Comrade Eikhe remembers that I arrived with a group of our military workers in

Novosibirsk, and all these measures were carried out there ... then the greatest vigilance and secrecy were shown, which were taken by us, as I said, at the direction of Comrade Stalin. And thanks to this, we managed to make significant transfers to the Far East in the first months. Moreover, according to the testimony of the OGPU, the Japanese at first did not know about our transfers, in any case, they did not know about the size of our ~~transfers~~.

Declaring peaceful intentions in their public speeches, the military and party workers, "embedded" in the system of Stalinist power, consistently prepared themselves for participation in a future war. "We, the Bolsheviks, are in the Red Army," Ya.B. Gamarnik, "we understand the enormous responsibility that lies with us to our party, to the country, in preparing the defense of our country, in preparing our army for a victorious war "[1277]13. Frankly expressed his desire to participate ~~in~~ a future war, the secretary of the Naryn district committee of the CPSU (b) Karl Levitz in one of his letters to the first secretary of the West Siberian regional committee of the CPSU (b) R.I. Eikhe in 1933, in which he asked that the regional committee give him the opportunity to go to stationary studies in the autumn of next year (1934), "if by that time the height of a new world war and proletarian revolutions does not become a fact. In this case, I will gladly replace my studies for direct participation again in the ranks of the Red Army "[1278]14. Thus, only taking into account——

Stalin's conspiracy in the development and implementation of the most important decisions for him and his camouflage, calculated both for internal justification of his policy, and for abroad ("Europe will swallow everything"[1279]15), it is possible to recreate a—— genuine the meaning of his actions in the 1930s. In this regard, it becomes clear his negative attitude towards social democracy and the actual support of Hitler and the militarization of Germany. Stalin considered the strengthening of fascism a positive factor in the development of international relations, which, in his opinion, led to an aggravation of contradictions between the main capitalist powers and was directed primarily against Great Britain and France.

Only then does the subversive activity of the Comintern and its policy of splitting the anti-fascist front, which contributed directly to Hitler's rise to power, become understandable. According to M.N. Ryutin, the Comintern turned "after the defeat of all oppositions and associates of Lenin, after the establishment of Stalin's personal dictatorship in the CPSU (b) and the Comintern, simply into Stalin's office for communist parties"[1280]16. Today, even modern authors agree that "the leadership of the Communist International was an obedient tool of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and personally I. Stalin ("shop", as Stalin himself put it) ... All the most important decisions were agreed with V.M. Molotov and A.A. Zhdanov, approved by I. Stalin"[1281]17. At the same time, it is clear that Stalin was not guided by "Comintern thinking", but utilitarianly used the Comintern for his own purposes. "World revolution" as a concept was reduced to "expansion of the front of socialism" - to this tautological cover for the impending

Stalinist aggression. Only then does the lie of Stalin's statement, which was supported by Soviet and Russian historians for many decades, become apparent, that if there had been no Munich agreement, there would have been no Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939. Historians Z.S. Belousov and D.G. Najafov noted that even in the "Short Course on the History of the CPSU(b)", which, as is known, was being prepared with the direct participation and control of Stalin, it is said that "the second imperialist war has actually already begun"[1282]18. The statement was made before the Munich Agreement, since the book was published in September 1938. This, firstly, and secondly, "if the proclaimed goal of the Munich Agreement was to prevent war in Europe, then the goal of the conclusion of the pact by Germany and the Soviet Union in a week before the armed conflict, on the contrary, it was to make such a war inevitable. Both in Munich and in Moscow, the agreements concluded led to war, but in the first case, historians, as a rule, speak of a disastrous mistake by the governments of England and France, and in the second, of the obvious intent of Hitler and Stalin, who actually agreed to start a war, in particular, through the j

After the Munich agreement, Stalin felt the increased chances for the implementation of the idea of a world revolution. M. Buromensky, even before the publication of V. Suvorov's "Icebreaker" in Russia, drew attention to the "revolutionary intentions" of Stalin, to the fact that by the end of 1938, Soviet foreign policy was oriented by Stalin to the war in Europe as a *fait accompli*, from which he was waiting for quite definite political dividends, while pinning special hopes on Germany, capable of accelerating the realization of the idea of a world [revolution](#)[1284]20.

Stalin let slip about his intentions on October 1, 1938, speaking to the propagandists of Moscow and Leningrad - the participants in the meeting convened in connection with the release of the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks". Unexpectedly, he spoke very frankly: "The Bolsheviks are not just pacifists who sigh for peace and then begin to take up arms only if they are attacked. This is not true. There are cases when the Bolsheviks themselves will attack, if the war is just, if the situation is suitable, if the conditions are favorable, they themselves will begin to attack. They are not at all against an offensive, not against any war. The fact that we are now shouting about defense is a veil, a veil. All states disguise themselves: "you live with wolves, you have to howl like a wolf." It would be foolish to twist your gut and put it on the table. They would say that [they are](#) —

[fools](#)"[1285]21. Only taking into account Stalin's true intentions does it become clear the meaning of Stalin's forced industrialization, to which all funds were directed from the population robbed by the authorities, as well as the meaning that Stalin put in response to the question: "What is needed to really win? To do this, three things are needed: the first thing we need is weapons, the second is weapons, the third is arms again and again"[1286]22.

Stalin opened his cards regarding his political intentions on March 10, 1939 at the 18th Congress of the CPSU(b). First, he reminded bourgeois politicians that "the first imperialist war brought victory to the revolution in one of the largest countries. They are afraid that the second world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or more countries. Secondly, reproaching England and France for the policy of non-intervention, he

began to talk about his plans for participation in a future war - ostensibly about others, but in fact about himself: "... the policy of non-intervention means condoning aggression, unleashing a war - therefore, turning it into a world war. In the policy of non-intervention, there is a desire, a desire - not to prevent the aggressors from doing their dirty work, not to prevent, say, Japan from getting involved in a war with China, or even better with the Soviet Union, not to prevent, say, Germany from getting bogged down in European affairs, getting involved in a war with by the Soviet Union, let all participants in the war get bogged down deep in the mire of the war, encourage them to do so on the sly, let them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, come onto the stage with fresh strength, come out, of course, "in the interests of peace" and dictate their conditions to the weakened participants in the war. And cheap and

nice"[1287]23. Those for whom this passage of Stalin's speech was intended understood perfectly well what was at stake. And there is documented evidence of this. On the night of August 23-24, 1939, immediately after the signing of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Stalin and Molotov had a conversation with Ribbentrop in the Kremlin. The official German recording of the conversation, in particular, says: "Further on, Mr. Molotov raised his glass to Mr. Stalin, while noting that Stalin, with his speech on March 10 of this year, which was well understood in Germany, "laid the beginning of a turn in political relations "»[1288]24.

It is no coincidence that at the same time at the XVIII Congress it was decided to create military departments under the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the national republics, regional committees, regional committees, city committees and district committees of the CPSU (b). Stalin's words about the need to "keep all our people in a state of mobilization readiness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no "accident" and no tricks of our external enemies could take us by surprise" [1289] 25, became the guide for their activities.

Stalin's political intentions, which he had nurtured all these years, patiently prepared and waited for the right moment (suffice it to compare his speeches at the January plenum of the Central Committee in 1925 and at the XVIII Congress in March 1939), in August 1939 manifested themselves in real political events.

At present, the fundamental fact is recognized in Russian historical literature that "it was the USSR that was the first to raise the question of the need to restructure political relations" with [Germany](#)[1290]26. L.I.

Gintsberg —

convincingly proved that the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939 was preceded not only by Stalin's speech at the XVIII Congress of the CPSU (b), but also a number of concrete steps towards Germany, in particular, the removal of the Jew M.M. Litvinov from the post of People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and the appointment of Molotov in his place, at that time the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, to which Hitler, speaking on August 22 before his highest generals justifying the need for a pact with the USSR, said: "The replacement of Litvinov was of decisive importance"[1291]27. The impetus for the real preparation of the Soviet-German pact was Molotov's first conversation as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR with the German Ambassador to Russia F. Schulenburg on May 20, 1939, during which Molotov bluntly stated: "We came to the conclusion that for the success of economic negotiations, create an appropriate political base. Without such a political base, as the experience of negotiations with Germany has shown, it is impossible to resolve economic [issues](#)"[1292]28.

By August 19, almost all the preparatory work had been done. On this day, a trade and credit agreement was concluded between the USSR and Germany. At the same time, Molotov handed F. Schulenburg a Soviet draft non-aggression pact[1293]29. On the ~~same~~ day, an inspired Stalin delivered his keynote speech. Whether he spoke at a meeting of the Politburo, to which representatives of the Comintern were invited, or, conversely, it was an information meeting of representatives of the Comintern, which was attended by some members of the Politburo, or in general it was a meeting at Stalin's Kuntsevo dacha, it is still impossible to reliably establish. In the surviving sources there are no clarifying signs of either one or the other, much less the third. In the usual protocol of the Politburo of August 19, as noted above, this issue is not listed. But even in the "special" protocols of the Politburo for August 1939 (and not only for August!) there are no traces of preparations for political cooperation with Germany. The objections of opponents are also caused by the noted presence of representatives of the Comintern at a meeting at

Stalin. As evidence, the fact is cited that in the diaries of the secretaries who recorded the stay of certain persons with Stalin, on that day there were no leaders of the Comintern. At the same time, it is recognized that "... the records of the secretaries on duty cannot be considered exhaustive, since they did not record Stalin's meetings

at his Kuntsevo [dacha](#)"[1294]30. However, the absence of traces of this meeting in fixing sources cannot serve as proof that such a meeting did not take place and that Stalin did not make any speech. "Leave no trace" was the most important principle of Stalin's policy, especially in cases where he wanted to keep his actions secret. As for the very fact of Stalin's connection with the Comintern and representatives of foreign communist parties and providing them with relevant information and instructions, at present ~~this~~ is no longer a [secret](#)[1295]31. True, it is not known exactly how the meeting of the Politburo on August 19 took place and how Stalin spoke, because the question itself and his speech were extraordinary, extraordinary. YES. Volkogonov, recognizing the fact of the meeting of the Politburo on August 19, 1939, let slip about the Thunderstorm plan. Unfortunately, in subsequent discussions and publications of historians, the question of this plan remained unclear. What is "Thunderstorm"? The general code name of the offensive plan being developed (according to M.I. Meltyukhov, for the period from October 1939 to mid-June 1941, five variants of the plan for the operational use of the Red Army in the war with Germany) ~~or~~ the name of the 1941 mobilization plan only., according to B.V. [Sokolov](#)[1296]32. In the latter case, it also remains unclear which plan is meant - from March 11 or from May 15, 1941. But in any case, the Thunderstorm plan was much narrower

than Stalin's speech, which had a program-strategic nature and did not fit into any separate plan. And yet, traces always remain, as did this text written down by someone from the workers of the Comintern in every sense of Stalin's significant speech, which was undertaken not only with a specific goal (the goal is an ideal object and thus quite easily hidden), but also for follow-up a

objects are real and therefore difficult to hide. The direct connection of what was proclaimed in the speech with the actual development of events is its unconditional and fundamental justification. It is reasonable to assume that such justification could be made post factum. But there are certain test dates in history, and such a date regarding Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939 is his own refutation of this speech in Pravda on November 30, 1939. After it, all the facts and historical events that coincide with those proclaimed in this speech are absolutely cannot be explained post factum and are direct proof of the historical fact of this [speech\[1297\]33](#). Subsequent events 1939–1940 (war with Finland and capture

of Bessarabia) and 1944–1948. confirmed Stalin's plans. Indicate the boundaries of the "socialist camp" in Europe for 1949, i.e. 10 years ahead, in 1939, only the one who claimed to create this camp could, and only under exceptional historical circumstances that made it possible to realize these claims, and thereby not only indicate the author of the speech, but also historically confirm his authorship.

No "café-chanting" politicians, to whom Stalin redirected the authorship of his speech of August 19, 1939 in a refutation of November 30, no intelligence and counterintelligence could bear such a forecast before the cataclysm of World War II. But in this case, Stalin did not just predict, but acted as a political figure, the executor of his declared intentions. Circumstances developed in such a way that allowed him to realize precisely these intentions, excluding the implementation of other intentions (for example, the capture of all of Europe), turning many of his calculations into miscalculations. Finland was not mentioned in the speech of August

19, 1939, representing a gap, the only "blank spot" in Stalin's Eastern European geopolitical claims. (The absence in the text of Czechoslovakia, which Hitler received under the Munich Pact, can be explained by the conditions of the moment of preparing his own agreement with Hitler). The absence of Finland in Stalin's speech could not be accidental. It is also indicative that the moment he chose to refute the speech - November 30, 1939 - was the moment

provocative Stalinist attack on Finland. Not to connect this speech with Stalin's policy towards Finland, since it is not mentioned in the speech, means the intellectual limitation of the analysis, given by Stalin himself. Finland is not mentioned precisely because he was already preparing a war against it, and also because the presence of Finland in the "socialist camp" did not have any serious geopolitical significance. Thus, the silence about Finland in the speech of 19 August 1939 is evidence against Stalin's refutation of 30 November. Events 1941–1944 were not envisaged by Stalin in his speech on

August 19, 1939, but this is also explained in the speech itself by his hope for a long-term "employment" of Germany in Europe. The miscalculation is explained by the weakness of Stalin's military-strategic consciousness in 1939. The failure of Stalin's scheme for the development of events from 1939 for the next few years, given by him in his speech on August 19, does not weaken, but, on the contrary, strengthens the version of Stalin's authorship of this speech. As for the events of

1944-1945. and nearest

subsequent years, they directly confirm the Stalinist intentions of 1939 for the Sovietization of Eastern Europe. Even the state treaty with Austria, concluded in 1955, but prepared as early as 1949, i.e. during the life of Stalin, and his changing attitude towards the creation of the GDR are in the context of the geopolitical concept that he expressed on August 19, 1939.

At the same time, it should be recognized that there are serious scientific and historical difficulties and mysteries associated with this text that need to be resolved. It is necessary because the scientifically substantiated establishment of the Stalinist authorship of the speech on August 19, 1939 fundamentally and radically changes the general concept of the Second World War, puts an end to many prejudices, speculations and insinuations. A special study of the speech of August 19 is required with an analysis of all the facts related to this problem, which can be formulated as follows: if Stalin is the author of the speech, then what was the role of the Soviet Union in unleashing the Second World War, its course and its results? This problem, in turn, is divided into three sub-problems: 1) establishing the authorship of the speech, 2) the correspondence of the content of the speech to the content of the Stalinist military and

diplomatic policy, as well as his domestic policy, 3) determining the meaning of speech as expressed intentions for understanding actions to realize these intentions, including inevitable temporary changes in intentions, changes in circumstances, mismatches of intentions and results. Ultimately, the problem is not so difficult for the

modern level of historical and linguistic research - it is by no means a Homeric question of incriminating a tyrant. In resolving this problem, there are still more political difficulties than scientific ones, which indicates the moral immaturity of the situation. But after all, this is precisely the social role of historical science, in order to contribute to the moral improvement of society by the light of truth over the past. In addition to Stalin's own speech on August 19, 1939, his intentions are confirmed by the

existing recording of a conversation with him made by G. Dimitrov, which took place on September 7, 1939 in the presence of Molotov and Zhdanov. Although it must be said that even today some authors, such as L.A. Bezymensky, for some reason, call this entry "Dimitrov's judgments", which "could serve as the basis for conjectures and judgments that are in great demand in Western journalism", which "does not give the right to pass off versions as facts and turn them into the subject of serious historiographic research »[1298]34. Nevertheless, a record of this conversation exists and, as F.I. Firsov, "reveals the instructions received

by the leadership of the Comintern from Stalin, and also characterizes Stalin's position in that [situation](#)"[1299]35.

Here is that entry:

"Stalin: a war is going on between two groups of capitalist countries (the poor and the rich in terms of colonies, raw materials, etc.) for the redivision of the world, for dominance over the world! We don't mind if they fight well and weaken each other. Not bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries (especially England) is shaken by the hands of Germany. Hitler, without understanding and not wanting to do this, upsets and undermines the capitalist system.

The position of the Communists in power is different than that of the Communists in opposition. We are the masters of our own home. The communists in the capitalist countries are in opposition, there the bourgeoisie - master.

We can maneuver, push one side against the other, so that we better tear ourselves apart. The non-aggression pact helps Germany to some extent. The next moment is to push the other side.

The Communists of the capitalist countries must come out resolutely against their governments, against the war. Before

opposition of the democratic regime to the The
fascism of the war was absolutely correct. During a war between imperialist powers, this is no longer correct. The division of capitalist states into fascist and democratic has lost its former meaning.

The war caused a radical change. The united popular front of yesterday was to alleviate the plight of the slaves. Under the conditions of the imperialist war, the question of the abolition of slavery was raised. Today stand today on the position of yesterday (the united popular front, the unity of nations) means to slide into the position of the bourgeoisie. This slogan

removed.

The Polish state used to be (in history) a nation state, so the revolutionaries defended it against division and enslavement. Now - the fascist state oppresses Ukrainians, Belarusians, etc. The destruction of this state in the present conditions would mean one less bourgeois fascist state! What would be bad if, as a result of the defeat of Poland, we spread the socialist system to new territories and populations.

We preferred an agreement with the so-called democracies and therefore negotiated. But the British and French wanted to have us as farmhands and, moreover,

pay nothing for it. We, of course, would not have become farm laborers...

It must be said to the working class: the war is going on for world domination; the masters of the capitalist countries are fighting for their imperialist interests. This war will give the workers, the working people, nothing but suffering and deprivation. Speak out resolutely against the war and its perpetrators. Expose the neutrality of the bourgeois neutral countries which, while advocating neutrality at home, support the war in other countries for profit. It is necessary to prepare and publish the theses of the Presidium of the ECCI"[1300]36.

Thus, it is difficult to deny that the content of G. Dimitrov's note is in full agreement with what Stalin spoke about on August 19, 1939. Even the most desperate skeptics are forced to admit that Stalin had such intentions, for whom the goal of participating in a future war is to expand the front of socialism, because "The experience of the last twenty years shows that in peacetime it is impossible to have a communist movement in Europe so strong that the Bolshevik Party could seize power. The dictatorship of this party becomes possible only as a result of a great war. We will make our choice, and it is clear..."[1301]37. By deciding to make a pact with Hitler, Stalin knew that

by doing so he was encouraging him to attack Poland. He also knew that after this action of Hitler, England and France, bound by mutual agreements with Poland, would declare war on Germany. I also knew that, from the experience of the First World War, Hitler was most afraid of a war on two fronts. To push the opponents head-on, and then, after waiting for the most convenient moment, to take the stage himself - this was the style of Stalin's actions in politics, which he clearly demonstrated back in the 20s. during the internal struggle. Hitler started the Second World War with his attack on Poland on September 1, 1939, but provoked him to this, pushed Stalin.

Asking the question "Who started the Second World War?", Viktor Suvorov "went too far", claiming that Stalin started it on August 19, 1939. His obsession with the idea of emphasizing the role of

The USSR in unleashing the war, and not the desire to justify the actions of Hitler, which his opponents accuse him of. That was precisely the Jesuit style of Stalin's actions in politics, that he seemed to have nothing to do with it. So it happened with the Soviet-German agreement of August 23, 1939 - as a result, Hitler went down in history as an aggressor, instigator of the war, and Stalin as the "liberator" of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, which Soviet historiography, following Stalin, claimed for decades. Stalin's phrase "I will deceive, deceive Hitler!", which he said after the signing of the Soviet-German treaty on August 23, 1939, was then remembered by many[1302]38. The same idea of deceiving the refrain pervades Zhdanov's draft notes that he made during the preparation of the Soviet-German treaty, perhaps even listening to Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939. But, undoubtedly, he was one of the few privy to Stalin's plans. It is he, in particular, who owns the article "The British and French governments do not want an equal treaty with the USSR", published in the newspaper Pravda on June 29, 1939. Among these entries there are very significant ones: "Will it be possible to fool Hitler ... Is it too late ... Germany does not understand ... Hitler does not understand that they are preparing a knife in his back ... —

"[1303]39. In addition, there is evidence of B.I. Nikolaevsky that Stalin "always dreamed of an agreement with Germany and, moreover, a big agreement to fight against the Anglo-Saxons. He was a staunch supporter of the Haushofer version of geopolitics, and Haushofer himself (Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) - a German sociologist, one of the main representatives of geopolitics, who justified the aggressive policy of the Nazi leadership) sent secret reports to Stalin for many years. And Molotov knew what he was talking about when, in his speech to the Supreme Soviet at the signing of the treaty with Hitler, he spoke of—

Stalin's brilliant foresight [1304]40 And later, Stalin rarely spoke on this topic, and the notes were generally preserved by a lucky chance. On September 9, 1940, he spoke during a discussion in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of A. Avdeenko's film "The Law of Life". "We are expanding the front of socialist construction," he said, "this is favorable for mankind, because Lithuanians, Western Belarusians, Bessarabians consider themselves h

and all the other bastards. This is from the people's point of view. And from the point of view of the struggle of forces on a world scale between socialism and capitalism, this is a big plus, because we are expanding the front of socialism and shrinking the front of capitalism. Of course, making a statement on behalf of the Lithuanians, Western Belarusians and "Bessarabians" that they consider themselves happy, Stalin somewhat exceeded his authority, but his vanity is redeemed by the emphasis he made at that moment on the struggle of forces on a global scale, to which,

however, , clarification is required: the front of socialism expanded together with the front of fascism. After the war, the remaining traces were cleaned up. Therefore, it is no coincidence that there are so many disagreements about Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941 to graduates of military academies in the Kremlin. Moreover, different people retained very different impressions of that speech, especially if they remembered it after [the war](#)[1306]42. Taking into account all these circumstances, one should more believe the record made by K. Semenov. In his now widely publicized reply to Major General of the Panzer Troops, who toasted Stalin's peaceful foreign policy, Stalin stated: "Permit me to make an amendment. A peaceful policy ensured peace for our country. Peace politics is a good thing. For the time being, we carried out a line of defense - until we rearmed our army, did not supply the army with modern means of struggle. And now, when we have reconstructed our army, saturated it with

equipment for modern combat, when we have become strong, now we need to move from defense to offensive. In defending our country, we must act offensively. From defense to move on to a military policy of offensive operations. We need to reorganize our education, our propaganda, agitation, our press in an offensive spirit. The Red Army is a

modern army, and a modern army is an offensive army"[1307]43. Here we should note another remarkable circumstance, which can be regarded as significant. While preparing to address the graduates of the military academies in the Kremlin

of the Barbarossa plan, delivered a speech "in front of several thousand graduate officers" that had an anti-Soviet orientation[1308]44. Considering Stalin's secrecy in—

politics, it would be difficult to hope that he would put his visa on the surviving copy of "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and its allies" as of May 15, 1941. [1309] 45 This document gives a very real assessment of the actions of Germany, which "at the present time keeps its army mobilized, with deployed rears" and which "has the ability to warn us and deliver a surprise strike." In this regard, the task is to "preempt the enemy in deployment and attack the German army at the moment when it will be in the deployment stage and will not have time to organize the front and the interaction of the military branches." It was assumed that "the Red Army will launch offensive operations from the front of Chizhov, Motovisko with the forces of 152 divisions against 100 German divisions ...". Further, the document considered plans for the grouping of the armed forces. To fulfill this plan, it was planned to carry out the following measures, "without which it is impossible to deliver a surprise attack on the enemy both from the air and on the ground: 1. To carry out a covert mobilization of troops under the guise of reserve training camps; 2. Under the guise of an exit to the camps, make a

hidden concentration of troops closer to the western border, first of all, concentrate all the

armies of the reserve of the High Command; 3. Covertly concentrate aviation on field airfields from remote districts and immediately begin to deploy aviation rear; 4. Gradually under the guise of training camps and rear exercises

deploy rear and hospital base" [1310]46. —

V.D. Danilov noticed that the "Considerations" mentions six more documents that are still unknown. These are: "Plan for the

Strategic Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in case of war with Germany";

"Plan of planned military operations in case of war with Germany";

"Deployment scheme", on the map 1:1,000,000, in 1 copy; Cover Deployment Scheme, on 3 maps; "Scheme of the correlation of forces", in 1 copy; "Basing of the Air Force in the West", 3 [maps](#)[1311]47. "Considerations on the Strategic Deployment Plan..." was not and could not be an initiative document, the idea to prepare which would have arisen independently from G.K. Zhukov and S.K. Timoshenko after Stalin's speech on May 5, 1941, as he presented it many years later to the historian V.A. Anfilov Marshal Zhukov in 1965. And the historian V.P. Popov considered strong evidence that "Stalin was not going to be the first to attack Germany, since he fully represented the real balance of forces on both sides and the quality of Soviet military planning. Indeed, it is surprising, - Popov writes further, - that the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff seriously suggested that the leader of the country implement a plan to defeat a strong enemy, which was developed in haste, in ten days. There was something to be angry about! For comparison, we point out the following fact. The German General Staff of the Ground Forces (OHK) began developing a specific strategic and operational plan for an attack on the USSR back in July 1940, then this plan was constantly improved and refined in accordance with the build-up and concentration of Germany's military power. After the signing of the Barbarossa plan by Hitler on December 18, 1940, the Germans began to carry out the final stage of preparing troops for the invasion. The Soviet plan, prepared at random (to please the leader), testifies to only one thing - the extreme self-confidence of our General Staff, bordering on criminal irresponsibility"[1312]48 .

However, the situation was quite the opposite. In a special chapter, it has already been said that since the late 1920s. in the USSR, mobilization plans were drawn up every year in case of war, improved and refined, as in Germany, with the buildup and concentration of military power. This was within the competence of specially created mobilization departments or employees specially allocated for this purpose, who, within the framework of secret departments (special sectors), were engaged in mobilization affairs. All work was strictly confidential. As for the preparation of mobilization plans before the war, then

On July 25, 1940, the Politburo of the Central Committee adopted a special resolution on this issue "On the development of mobilization plans for 1940 and 1941." The decree was immediately given the stamp "special folder"[1313]49.

No one in the country had a solid impression of the state of affairs, including the state of the armed forces in the 1930s, except for Stalin. Before the war, a few more people were dedicated to the preparation. On November 16 and 18, 1940, the Politburo adopted special decisions that obliged the directors of engine and aircraft factories from that moment on "to send their daily reports on the number of engines (for each type of engine) and aircraft (for each type of aircraft) received by the military representatives to the People's Commissariat of Aviation Industry encrypted with his signature in one copy, indicating in this encryption the following addresses:

NKAP (People's Commissariat of the Aviation Industry) - Shakhurin, Copy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist

Party of Bolsheviks - Stalin Copy of the

Council of People's Commissars of the USSR - Molotov Oblige the NKAP comrade Shakhurin to send copies of ciphers from plant directors with daily messages on the day they are received to comrade Stalin and comrade Molotov"[1314]50.

In the pre-war period, the Politburo, judging by the protocols, was most concerned with the preparation for war. Several resolutions for 1940 can be cited as an example: from May 15 - on the organization of serial

production of the aircraft

"I-26" designed by Yakovlev at the plant number 301,

dated May 19 and 20 - on the assignment to the Osoaviakhim of the USSR for the preparation of mandatory contingents in 1940 and on

aircraft, on May 28 - on an increase in the program for the production of KB tanks in 1940 at the Kirov plant of Narkomtyazhmash,

dated June 4 - on the construction of tunnels under the river. Dnieper and under the river. Amur, dated June 5 - on the production of T-34 tanks in 1940 and on the

production of KB tanks, dated June 19 - on the organization of the production of tanks of the "KB" type at the Chelyabinsk Tractor

Plant. Stalin, dated June 22 - on the introduction of the "100" aircraft into mass production in the version of a dive bomber, dated July 17 - on the armament of tanks,

of November 22 - on the involvement of the population of Lvov, Droboych, Volyn and Eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR for defensive work,

of December 7 - on the program for the production of aircraft and aircraft engines in 1941 and on ammunition for aircraft guns, etc.—

[1315] 51 Most decisions of the Politburo had the heading "special folder".

On July 10, 1940, the Politburo adopted a resolution "On liability for the release of low-quality products and for non-compliance with standards by industrial enterprises." This resolution approved the draft Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, according to which "the release of such products was classified as anti-state For to wrecking. the release of low-quality or incomplete products and for the release of products in violation of the mandatory standards of directors, chief engineers and heads of technical control departments of industrial enterprises, be brought to trial and, by a court sentence, subject to imprisonment for a term of 5 to 8 years"[1316]52 . The decision of the Politburo of November 22, 1940 emphasized the responsibility of people's commissars and plant directors for the—priority

execution of orders for the aviation industry[1317]53. —

On October 26, 1940, the Politburo approved a list of enterprises and construction sites, to which permanent inspectors of the People's Commissariat of State Control of the USSR, established by the Politburo's decision of May 26 of the same year, were— appointed[1318]54. They opened a list of enterprises of the people's commissariats of the aviation industry (all factories were numbered. - I.P.), weapons and ammunition[1319]55. The preparations for the war went on uninterrupted. "We prepared with colossal effort," Molotov told F. Chuev, "more preparation, in—my

opinion, is impossible"[1320]56. The strictest secrecy in the development of the military industry in general is the main reason for the discord in the assessments of the armed might of the Red Army. On the one hand, this is the conviction of many Russian historians who wrote and continue to write about the low combat readiness of the Red Army (not only personnel, but also weapons), and on the other hand, this is an opinion that has already developed in the 1930s. some West

letter of the former Russian diplomat E.V. Sablina to another diplomat - V.A. Maklakov dated April 17, 1939 with reference to the data of the English historian B.I. Pers said that "Russia is currently the most powerful military state in the world. The invincibility and effectiveness of the Russian armies supposedly are not subject to any doubt. The size of the Russian armed forces is phenomenal and so is the "industrial base", ie. supply. Russia ... has ten thousand tanks. Its air fleet reaches 17,000 airplanes..."[1321]57.

The calculations of N.S. Simonov, who came to the conclusion that the indicator of direct military spending in the national income of the USSR in pre-war 1940 was only 17.2%. He adjusted this indicator to take into account budgetary expenditures for financing the military-industrial people's commissariats, Osoaviakhim, the State Reserves Administration, the Civil Air Fleet Administration and other paramilitary organizations of the country and received a "militarization coefficient" of 24.6%. For comparison, he cited data on the share of military expenditures of Nazi Germany in the national income of the country in 1938 - 23.5%, noting that this percentage in relation to the greater than in the USSR, the amount of national wealth [1322]58 .

However, such a "militarization coefficient" raises very serious doubts, if we remember that in the course of industrialization, mainly military plants were built and huge sums were spent on the purchase of weapons in other countries. The desire to hide the real costs of developing the military industry was one of Stalin's top priorities. The literature has long noted that "low defense spending" in the USSR is a "purely statistical phenomenon." It is known that part of the expenditures of civilian ministries went to military purposes: for example, the construction of military installations, barracks, etc. These expenses were not included in the budget of the Ministry of Defense, expenses for military schools, on the contrary, were included in the budget of the Ministry of Higher Education, etc. But all these facts are of secondary importance. The main explanation lies in the artificially created low cost of weapons, due to large subsidies received by heavy and mining

industries. The source of these subsidies was First of all, the turnover tax on consumer goods. Excluding of this factor, some figures in the history of our five-year plans look absolutely fantastic[1323]59. —

In recent years, there have been more and more figures in the literature, which more realistically reflect the state of affairs in 1939–1941. [1324]60:

	January 1, 1939	June 22, 1941	Growth in % to 1939
Personnel (thousand people)	1943 297		5572
Divisions (estimated)	136	312.5	230
Guns and mortars (thousand units)	55.8		117.6 211
Tanks (thousand units)	18.4	23.3	127
Combat aircraft (thousand units)	17.5		24.5 140

Some Russian historians confidently argue for Stalin that "the last thing he wanted to do was deliver a 'preemptive strike'" because after the Finnish campaign he had a clear idea of low combat power of the Red Army"[1325]61. However, the data testify to the contrary. About failures in the Soviet-Finnish Stalin, of course, knew the war, but the number of dead Red Army soldiers did not was of particular importance to him. The main thing for him was just weapons of the Red Army. In this sense, Stalin assessed her actions are quite normal, as evidenced by his speech at the meeting of the highest command staff of the Red Army on April 14, 1940: "... our troops did a good job, defeated the Finns and pressed Finns." As a result, "our army has become strong with both feet on the rails of a new, real Soviet modern army"[1326]62. For — the formation of such an optimistic assessment was of considerable importance the experience of Khalkhin Gol, when, according to G.K. Zhukov, "the Japanese, apparently, do not expected from the Red Army the use of such a powerful

technology" (500 Soviet aircraft against 300 Japanese and a large number of armored units)[1327]63. It is precisely the confidence in the combat power of the Red Army that explains Stalin's reaction to the foreword by A.S. Yeruslimsky to the writings of Bismarck, prepared in 1940. The historian allowed himself to write about the historical fear of the Germans to fight on two fronts. In response, Stalin said: "Why are you scaring them (the Germans)? Let them try"[1328]64. He uttered literally the same phrase "let them try" in response to a message from the Yugoslav ambassador about Germany's intention to commit aggression against the USSR at a banquet on the occasion of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia on the night of April 5-6, 1941 [1329]65.

It is no coincidence that the ninth (May) issue of the Bolshevik magazine for 1941 published a letter from Stalin to members of the Politburo, which contained an assessment of the well-known article by F. Engels "Foreign policy of Russian tsarism." This letter was written on July 19, 1934, but then Stalin postponed its publication. One of the main shortcomings of F. Engels's article, he considered his criticism of the foreign policy of tsarist Russia: "Characterizing the aggressive policy of Russian tsarism," Stalin wrote, "and paying tribute to the abominations of this policy, Engels explains it not so much by the need of the military-feudal-merchant elite of Russia in access to the seas, seaports, in expanding foreign trade and mastering strategic points, but rather in the fact that at the head of Russia's foreign policy was supposedly an all-powerful and very talented gang of foreign adventurers who, for some reason, were always lucky and in everything, who miraculously managed to overcome everything and all sorts of obstacles on the way to its adventurous goal, which surprisingly deftly deceived all European rulers and finally achieved what made Russia the most powerful militarily state.

Such an interpretation of the question in the mouth of Engels may seem more than unbelievable, but unfortunately it is a fact"[1330]66.

At the end of May 1941, the covert redeployment of Soviet troops to the western border began, which indicates the beginning of the implementation of the plan laid down in the "Considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the forces of the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Germany and

its allies" as of May 15, 1941. A number of directives of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S.K. Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G.K. Zhukov, which cannot be ignored. The first package of directives no later than May 20, 1941 was sent to the commander of the troops of the Western Special Military District, the Kiev Special Military District and the Odessa Military District, and also no later than May 30, 1941 to the commander of the troops of the Baltic Special Military District. The commanders

of these districts, together with the chiefs of staff and the chiefs of the operational departments of the headquarters, were to develop a detailed plan for the defense of the section of the state border entrusted to them and a detailed plan for air defense "in order to cover the mobilization" ("to cover the mobilization"). All actions were supposed to be carried out according to the 1:1000000 map indicated in the

"Considerations ..."[1331]67. The second package

of directives from the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army was received by the commanders of these districts on June 12-13, 1941. They reported in detail about the arrival of troops. "Open telephone and telegraph conversations related to the arrival, unloading and disposition of troops, even without the names of units" were strictly prohibited. No one, except for the Commander of the District Troops, a member of the Military Council and the Chief of Staff of the ~~district~~,

was supposed to know about the impending [operation](#)[1332]68. In

order to correctly evaluate these actions, it is necessary to take into account Stalin's disinformation, which played the most important camouflage role in the mechanism of his rule. During the preparations for the war, disinformation was given particular importance. Let me remind you of the revelations of G.K. Zhukov about the misinformation of the Japanese troops during the preparation of the offensive at Khalkhin Gol in his report "The nature of the modern offensive operation" at a meeting of the top leadership of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940: "The question of surprise, the question of camouflage was, is and will be the main element in victory both in operation and in battle. Based on these considerations, the command took all measures and thought out quite thoroc

I will not dwell on all the details of these events. They boiled down to creating with the enemy

the impression that we are not preparing to attack, but preparing to defend. For this, all measures were taken, including disinformation and the use of a broadcasting station that imitates trench work and all kinds of engineering work at night. Various special leaflets were issued to ensure the holding of defensive measures, etc.

Various reports were broadcast on the radio, characterizing the mood of the command in preparing a defensive operation. And the Japanese, as it turned out later, really did not expect an impact until the hour and did not know about the impending attack.

Special care was taken when reporting the plan of the operation to the General Staff in Moscow, and the date of the strike was reported, in fact, on the eve of the operation itself —

”[1333]69 In conclusion, G.K. Zhukov again emphasized: “Given the exceptional importance of surprise, all methods of camouflage and deception of the enemy must be widely introduced into the Red Army. Camouflage and deception must run like a red thread in the training and education of troops, commanders and —

staffs”[1334]70. It must be said that the method of disinformation was also widely used on the part of Germany. This largely explains the calmness with which Stalin perceived numerous reports of an imminent German attack on the USSR. He was sure that "...Hitler and his generals are not such fools as to fight simultaneously on two fronts, on which the Germans broke their necks in the First World War" and that "...Hitler does not have enough strength to fight on two fronts, but Hitler will not go on an adventure”[1335]71. —

From the Soviet side, the flow of disinformation was extremely wide. This is the strictest prohibition for the commanders of the western military districts to redeploy army forces directly to the border; prohibition for our pilots to shoot down German reconnaissance planes that regularly flew deep into Soviet territory in the first half of 1941, while at the same time forbidding Soviet pilots before the war itself to fly closer than ten kilometers to the state border. This is permission for the Germans to search for the graves of German soldiers and officers who died in the First World War in the Soviet border strip (moreover, Stalin understood that the Germans would not look for graves, but conduct ground

reconnaissance). This is scrupulous observance by the Soviet Union of the trade agreement with Germany until the night of June 22, 1941, with unceremonious violations of it by the other side. This is a massive, and in fact demonstrative, dismissal of the command staff of the Red Army in May and June 1941. And finally, this is Stalin's unspoken order to stage R. Wagner in opera theaters as often as possible, to perform his music on the radio and on the stage, which, as you know, Hitler loved very much[1336]72. To this must be added the well-known TASS statements of May 9 and June 13, 1941, written by Stalin. In the first case, there is a direct indication that "the text of the refutation belongs to I.V. Stalin." It refuted the report of the Domei Tsushin agency from New York that "the concentration of troops on the western borders is being carried out on an extremely large scale", and emphasized that "there is no "concentration of large military forces" on the western borders and is not expected

The TASS report of June 13, 1941, published in the newspaper Izvestia the next day, appeared just at the moment when the troops were arriving at the border. On this occasion, it said the following: "... the rumors that the USSR is preparing for a war with Germany are false and provocative; ... the summer training camps of the Red Army reserves and the upcoming maneuvers are being carried out now, their goal is nothing more than training of spares and checking the operation of the railway apparatus, which, as is known, is carried out every year, in view of which it is at least [absurd to portray these measures of the Red Army as hostile to Germany](#)"[1338]74.

All these facts of Stalinist disinformation gave rise to a number of authors to talk about the pacification of Germany in April-June 1941, about the desire to prevent war with her, not to give Hitler the slightest reason to cavil at the Soviet Union, which he would use to attack, which, in fact, as rightly pointed out by M.I. Meltyukhov, is not confirmed by the materials known today[1339]75. It is difficult to convince historians

who take Stalin "at his word" even with obvious facts. It is known that after his speech on May 5, 1941, before the graduates of the military academies of the Red Army in the Kremlin, a deliberate "leakage" of information was organized. The one that was intended for the German side stated that Stalin, after

comparing the forces of Germany and the USSR "tried to prepare his adherents for a" new compromise with Germany "". This message was conveyed by Ambassador F. Schulenburg to Berlin. Another version, intended for England, said that although "the Red Army is not yet sufficiently prepared", war with Germany is "inevitable" and the USSR "is trying to delay the armed conflict until the autumn." According to the version of the English journalist A. Werth, Stalin allegedly called relations with England "still unfinished"[1340]76. Even

while agreeing that Stalin was preparing for an offensive war, modern historians talk about the inability of the Red Army to attack in 1941. As an alternative, they put forward 1942 or even 1943. Meanwhile, the question of the specific moment of the offensive within the year is not of fundamental importance in this context, and the desire to focus all attention on the discussion of this particular issue inevitably leads away from the need to conclude that during the entire period of the 1930s. Stalin was preparing for an attack on Europe, which threatened not only the Sovietization of European countries, but also the death of the European civilization.

At the same time, the literature provides a lot of evidence of criminal carelessness and irresponsibility in preparing the Red Army not only for defense, but also for the offensive[1341]77. All this does not negate the main conclusion, but it is a confirmation that, trying to delve into all the details of military training, Stalin was incompetent in matters of warfare. Just before the beginning of the inevitable denouement, the decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee on March 24, 1941, which the NKVD was entrusted with the construction of the 251 (!) Airfield for the People's Commissariat of Defense, ~~was~~ worth[1342]78. According to the testimony of Soviet marshals G.K. Zhukov and A.M. Vasilevsky and a number of other sources of the war years, Stalin learned to fight only towards the end of 1942. However, the mechanism of his power was such that no one in the system he created, at least on the eve of the war, having experienced a state of horror before a possible arrest, did not dare to express his own opinion. According to Zhukov, "members of the Politburo represented by Molotov, Zhdanov, Malenkov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Kalinin and others were in complete agreement with Stalin in his assessments of the situation and all forecasts

Nazi [Germany](#)"[1343]79. In addition, as already noted, Stalin did not pay much attention to chaos and disorder. Not only did they not change his general line, but they also played a camouflage role in his policy.

Taking into account this feature of the Stalinist leadership, it is difficult to agree with the alleged picture of the Stalinist offensive that V. Suvorov painted in *The Icebreaker*: world about the beginning of the great liberation campaign of the Red Army. The artillery of the Red Army was superior in quantity and quality to the artillery of the rest of the world. Titanic reserves of ammunition were concentrated near the Soviet borders. The rate of fire of Soviet artillery is rapidly increasing, turning into a hellish roar on a thousand-kilometer front from the Black Sea to the Baltic ...

Black pillars of smoke over the airfields. These black pillars are a landmark for Soviet planes that go wave after wave... Artillery, having fallen silent for a minute, again, as if reluctantly, begins its mighty conversation. Artillery is moving from artillery preparation to artillery escort. Batteries began to speak, focusing their fire on distant targets. Slowly but inexorably, the rate of fire picks up again. More and more artillery regiments enter the battle, joining the many-voiced [choir](#)..[1344]80. —

In this case, V. Suvorov argued as a military man, and not as a historian, taking into account all the features of Russian reality in the 1930s. It is more than likely that the offensive of the Red Army would not have been so organized and fast, but would have been accompanied by huge losses. But what significance did these sacrifices have for Stalin in his plans?! In the words of Mamardashvili, "people, their numbers do not matter, especially if they are victims - they can be hidden, dispersed, dispersed, as if ... nothing ~~had~~

happened"[1345]81. Ultimately, History decreed otherwise. After the German offensive on June 22, 1941, almost all the results of the long-term preparation of the Stalinist government for war fell into a "black hole". V.D. Danilov summarized the data available today on the losses of Soviet troops in the first weeks of the war. By mid-July

170 Soviet divisions that took the first blow from the German military machine, 28 were completely defeated, 70 divisions lost over 50% of their personnel and equipment. Particularly severe losses were suffered by the troops of the Western Front. Of the total number of divisions defeated on the Soviet-German front, 24 were part of this front. The remaining 20 divisions of this front also found themselves in a catastrophic situation. They lost in forces and means from 50 to 90%.

During the first three weeks of the war, the Red Army lost a huge amount of military equipment and weapons. In divisions alone (excluding reinforcements and combat support), losses amounted to about 6,500 guns of 76 mm caliber and above, more than 3,000 anti-tank defense guns, about 12,000 mortars, and about 6,000 tanks. During this time, the Air Force lost 3,468 aircraft, including a significant number of new designs. Already by noon on June 22, during the bombing of Soviet airfields, the Germans destroyed 1,200 aircraft, of which over 800 were on the ground. The losses of the Soviet Navy were: 1 leader, 3 destroyers, 11 submarines, 5 minesweepers, 5 torpedo boats and other vessels.

By the end of 1941, the Red Army had lost almost the entire first strategic echelon - the most trained personnel troops. Only by prisoners of war, as it is now established, losses during this time amounted to about 3.9 million people ... [1346]82. These data

on losses should still be seriously clarified. Their comparison, for example, for tanks and aircraft with the data of the table for 1939-1941, given above, shows a reduction in tanks by 25.75%, and in aircraft - by 14.15%. Thus, with such losses, the Red Army would have had several times more tanks and aircraft than the Wehrmacht, which absolutely does not correspond to the situation of that time. Generalizing statistical information is another sore and still not fully clarified problem of military historiography. How difficult the road to truth is is evidenced by the evolution of the number of casualties of the Red Army and the civilian population during the Second World War. To this it is necessary to add information available in the literature that by the winter of 1941 the enemy occupied the territory, on

in which about 40% of the population lived before the war, 63% of coal was mined, 68% of iron was smelted, 58% of steel was smelted, 84% of sugar was produced, i.e. a huge part of what was created in the pre-war [five-year plans](#)[1347]83

[was lost](#). One can imagine what Stalin went through in the days after June 22, 1941, when he realized the magnitude of the failure that had taken place. Only on July 3, on the twelfth day after the attack of fascist Germany, did he finally come out to the people with an appeal, unexpected for everyone, "Brothers and sisters!" On

May 24, 1945, speaking in the Kremlin at a dinner in honor of the commanders of the Red Army, Stalin returned to the beginning of the war: "Our government made quite a few mistakes, we had moments of desperate situation in 1941-1942, when our army retreated, left our native villages and cities in Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the Leningrad region, the Baltic states, the Karelian-Finnish Republic, left because there was no other way out. Another people could say to the Government: you have not lived up to our expectations, go away, we will install another government that will make peace with Germany and ensure peace for us. But the Russian people did not agree to this, because they believed in the correctness of the policy of their Government and made sacrifices in order to ensure the defeat of Germany. And this confidence of the Russian people in the Soviet government turned out to be the decisive force that ensured the historic victory over the enemy of mankind - over fascism. Thanks to him, the Russian people,

for this [trust](#)!"[1348]84. ... As a result, events began to develop according to a different scenario, and Stalin received only half of Europe. But already in April 1945, during the reception of the government delegation of Yugoslavia, he unexpectedly said that Germany would quickly recover from the defeat. And further, anticipating the alignment of forces on the world stage by this time, he declared: "... The war will end soon, in fifteen or twenty years we will recover, and then again"! Citing these words of Stalin in his book, M. Djilas wrote down his feeling: "There was something terrible in his words: a terrible war was still [going on](#)"[1349]85. There is also evidence that the American Ambassador A. Harriman asked Stalin what he was probably pleased with

divides Berlin? And Stalin replied: "Tsar Alexander reached Paris"[1350]86.

The foreign policy activity of the Stalinist government in subsequent years is a special topic. It should only be noted that until the very end, Stalin did not abandon his plans either for the further expansion of the socialist front, or for a new war that would contribute to their implementation. In his last work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR, in the section in which he considered "the question of the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries," Stalin again returned to this idea of his. "After the First World War," he wrote, "it was also believed that Germany was finally put out of action, just as some comrades now think that Japan and Germany are completely put out of action. Then, too, there was talk and noise in the press that the United States of America had put Europe on rations, that Germany could no longer get on its feet, that from now on there should be no war between the capitalist countries. However, despite this, Germany rose and stood on its feet as a great power in some 15-20 years after its defeat, breaking out of captivity and —

embarking on the path of independent development"[1351]87 . According to the political observer of radio station "Freedom" G. Akhminov, back in the early 1960s. Having analyzed this passage from Stalin's work, taking into account the general context of that time, Stalin, speaking about the future, proceeded from the existence of a strong capitalist Germany. Speaking about the current situation, he constantly used the expression "Germany (Western)". In his calculations of the future there

was neither the German Federal nor the German Democratic Republic, there was only one Germany. On March 10, 1952, it became known that the Soviet government had radically changed its point of view on the German question: it no longer opposed the rearmament of Germany, but insisted that Germany receive an independent national army. This idea stemmed from Stalin's work completed six weeks earlier. If Stalin wanted

see in advance that Germany and France would have independent armed [forces](#)[1352]88. —

However, these were not only intentions, but also actions. At least the fact that virtually all the equipment that survived in East Germany, suitable for the production of tanks, warships, aircraft, artillery pieces, chemical weapons of mass destruction, has already been relocated to the USSR speaks volumes. Particular attention was paid to the search and export of what was related to the atomic bomb and rocket technology. All this was carried out in the strictest secrecy[1353]89. And in the spring of 1952, Stalin, unexpectedly for the high military command, decided to urgently form 100 front-line aviation jet bomber divisions. A significant part of the new aviation formations was located on the northern coast, in Chukotka, in Kamchatka, where the feverish construction of ice and stationary airfields, supply bases, and living quarters for personnel began. To form 100 aviation divisions, a huge aircraft fleet was needed. Above the plan, the industry was required to produce over 10,000 bombers as soon as possible. In addition, there was an intensive development of aviation atomic [weapons](#)[1354]90. Only the death of Stalin saved the world from the consequences of his a

CONCLUSION

The policy of Stalin's power in Russia and abroad in the 1920s-1930s. will continue to cause controversy and ambiguous reactions for a long time to come. In these decades, the party state has kept its activities so secret that it is still not only impossible to document many of its actions, but also to understand their true meaning. Until now, awareness of the underground nature of Stalin's power is both a social and scientific problem. An illustrative example: at a meeting of the Association of Historians of the Second World War at the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences in December 1997, a well-known specialist in the history of the eve of the war, Dr. ist. sciences, prof. V.A. Anfilov, objecting to the supporters of the point of view about the preparation of the USSR for an offensive war, said: "Is there at least one document where Stalin would say that we are preparing an attack on Germany? There is no document! Everything is taken from the ceiling..." (highlighted by me. – I.P.)^[1355]1.

That was the distinguishing feature of the mechanism of Stalinist power, that all documents were classified as "secret", "strictly secret", "as a cipher", "special folder", etc. There was a whole system of destruction of "used" documents. Stalin himself, and after his death, his comrades-in-arms and followers more than once gave orders to clean up the archives. Stalin did not trust paper with his biggest secrets. Moreover, he did not talk about his plans and deeds. And if he did, then he was lying. Mystery and lies for 30 years have been

indispensable elements of the mechanism of its

domination,

inseparable components of the ideocracy, which sets a special vision of events that narcotically distorts their presentation and thereby affects both the events and their explanation. The most obvious

ideocratic distortion was the process of the so-called building of socialism, which it is quite legitimate to call Stalin's. "Even before the war," writes E. Tachaeva, "our country overcame illiteracy and spiritual slavery before the masters. It was a golden age of talent and hard work. We had theaters and artists, musicians and writers, artists and athletes of such talent that no vaunted Western

civilization. All this is the result of the fact that we were building socialism precisely at the time when I.V. Stalin, who removed as unnecessary rubbish whole layers of parasites - stockbrokers, bankers, businessmen, in a word, intermediaries of bloodsuckers, who are an inevitable evil under capitalism. Our grandfathers and fathers built a society of social justice in those years, this gave rise to the wild anger of people who were accustomed to profiting from the labor of others, and their henchmen, but aroused deep respect for the Soviet state of the best people of Western countries who lived in that difficult time"[1356] 2 .

According to O.A. Platonov, "the most important geopolitical result of Stalin's policy was the creation of a single political space from Berlin, Sofia and Tirana to Beijing and Pyongyang, which is almost 1/4 of the Earth. This political space has become a determining factor in world development. Ideologically, this political space was opposed to the system of predatory consumerism and parasitism of the Western world, and the dynamics of the world system created by Stalin had a successful, offensive character, displacing —

elements of Western civilization, forcing it to constantly retreat"[1357]3. The ideocratic vision of Stalin's socialism turned out to be so strong and tenacious that not only apologists of Stalin's power remained subject to it for many years, for whom Stalin's power is still a model of "how one can manage Russia"[1358]4 . The general positive assessment of Stalin's socialism is shared to some extent by the majority of modern philosophers, political scientists and historians. This position is most clearly expressed by V.M. Mezhev in a publication under the characteristic title "Attitude to the Past is the Key to the Future": "In the Russian version of socialism, which served as a model of modernization specific to a traditional country, one cannot fail to see an element of enlightening faith in the strength and power of the scientific mind, capable of building a society on strictly rational beginnings. ... It is necessary and possible, of course, to condemn the methods by which the task of modernizing Russia was solved during the period of Bolshevik rule. But after all, the task itself was somehow accomplished, putting Russia on a par with

the Russian revolution in all its tragedy and grandeur will receive the same historical recognition and justification as the European revolutions have in the history of their countries.

And perhaps, with such an excuse, the—

true revival of Russia will begin. Despite certain objections and warnings expressed in modern literature^[1360]6, the concept of modernization has become a new paradigm to explain the events of the 1930s. According to a number of historians, Stalinism “corresponded to the objective tasks of the transition from a traditional society to an industrial one”, it “corresponded to the global trends in the development of civilization in the 20th century ... ^[1361]7 into the super-industrial”^[1362]8. Speaking specifically, the Stalinist regime, from their point of view, was a kind of “catch-up bourgeois modernization”, and its particular cruelty was explained by the fact that an epoch of two hundred years long fit into it, incredibly short in time: mercantilism and the French Revolution, the process of industrialization and the imperialist war economy merged together. The bureaucracy in power, in order to consolidate its internal and external domination, accelerated industrialization, starting to accelerate the creation of productive forces and mechanisms corresponding to bourgeois society. At the same time, it assumed the function that neither capital in pre-revolutionary Russia nor the revolutionary Bolsheviks could fulfill. Marx's prediction came true: “If Russia tends to become a capitalist nation along the lines of the nations of Western Europe, ... it will not achieve this without first converting a significant part of its peasants into proletarians ...”. Such a social upheaval was accomplished by the Stalinist dictatorship.”^[1363]9 In the general course of modernization not only “industrialization” and “cultural revolution” are considered, but also “the policy of complete collectivization of the countryside”. All these transformations “in general corresponded to the national and state interests of the country, which was also an important factor in their social support, being a matter of special pride in the Soviet period of national history” ^[1364]10. In this context, there is a place for mass terror, which,

caused by the struggle for power in the party elite and Stalin's personal aspirations, served as a means of adapting traditional society to modernization[1365]11. Thus, instead of trying to understand and explain how, as a result of the construction of Stalinist socialism, Russia was thrown back in agriculture to the pre-reform era of Alexander II., in the sphere of industrial organization - to the times of Peter the Great, and in the system of political relations with their practice of state repression - by the time of Ivan the Terrible, Russian social scientists convince themselves and society that in the 1930s. the historical development of Russia was carried out progressively, along an ascending line. This means that that social memory has already been violated in the genes, which I. Dedkov was sad about, who back in the late 1970s. left wonderful lines in his diary: "... And they will poke my nose and say: look, this is paradise, and you are a fool, you thought we were deceiving you, and they will hit my head on the hard edge of that paradise, like on a table, and again, and again - face - on the firmament of paradise, and, remembering the innocent tears of my children, I will understand and admit everything, so long as they do not shed, - I will give my life, I will bleed, let them go at least, let them live, walk on the ground, crush the grass, to look at the sunny world, - and I will still pray in secret - may the memory be preserved in our children, may it endure and overcome everything, and may they get the courage to coincide with violence, violence builds nothing "[1366]12. Unfortunately, already in a damaged form, the memory was passed on to the middle generation of historians, who speak and write with irony about the "moralizing layman"[1367]13. And after them, representatives of the younger generation. Thus, it seems to one of them, a Hegel specialist N. Plotnikov, that for Soviet history "the problem lies in the excess of moralism about it; it is necessary to develop an objective, neutral historiography"[1368]14. By the way, the last words were spoken at a special seminar "Moral Lessons of Soviet History: Experience in Confronting Evil", which was held in Switzerland in August 1992. In such conditions, when not only history itself, but

also the methodology of history were distorted by the totality of the the myth of socialism and get rid of the "charm" of Stalinism, it is possible only by taking as a basis a categorical moral imperative,

because it is only from a moral point of view that the problem of interpreting the sources of Stalin's time can be solved. In any other case, an apology is obtained, which is demonstrated not only by publications representing the apologetic trend in modern Russian historiography, but also by the works of Western revisionist historians, and close supporters of the so-called objectivist approach among Russian historians, who also wittingly or unwittingly justify the actions of the Stalinist government and thus, they objectively find themselves on the side of its defenders.

"Instilling" his socialism, Stalin proceeded from Russian stereotypes, and the stereotypes of political reaction turned out to be the most suitable for him - omnipotence, enslavement, terror, as well as great power and militarism. Thus, Stalin's plan for the construction of socialism, and extremely simplified, took shape as the concrete implementation of his vision of socialism, which followed from his goals, which had one basis - power. The immediate goal was to achieve such a strong power inside the country, "which any government in the world could envy", and the long-term goal was to spread power outside, which, in his opinion, a military victory could give.

socialism.

From real actions to achieve these goals and Stalin's plan to build socialism crystallized.

1. The basis of this plan was the creation of a secret system of power, which took shape as a result of the secret party state reform of 1922-1923. Since that time, there has been a transition from a certain duality of the political system - the Communist Party and the Soviet state, which existed after October 1917, to a new stage in the centralization of power - the formation of a party state. This state was formed during the political campaigns of the 1920s, such as: a) the policy of "party dictatorship"; b) rebuilding the empire; c) removal of Lenin from the leadership of the party; and d) suppression of the new economic policy. In these political campaigns, Stalin and Co. pushed precisely those tendencies that were beneficial to them in their political interests.

In those conditions, it was much easier to retain power, relying on the tested and selected people who made up the party apparatus, on the nomenklatura, tying them with a system of various privileges. The hierarchy of party committees, headed by appointed secretaries, formed the backbone of Soviet statehood. The top of the party received an exceptional opportunity to carry out its policy in secret both from society and from ordinary communists, which led to the strictest secrecy in which the party state operated. All the cardinal issues of the life of the country were decided not even at meetings of the highest party bodies (which were not constitutional, but officially recognized power in the USSR), but by a narrow circle of party leaders headed by the General Secretary of the Communist Party. In Russia, the state has traditionally played a self-contained role in the social and economic life of society. However, such an all-encompassing and all-pervading role of the state, as in the period of Stalinist totalitarianism, has not yet been in its history. All the problems of Soviet society were ultimately closed to the authorities.

2. An inevitable consequence of the centralization of power was the ousting of private enterprises from the sphere of industrial production and the final approval by the end of the 1920s. systems of state-owned industry with the working class expropriated by the state.

3. This was followed by the forcible nationalization of the peasantry, which Stalin called "collectivization." As a result of this action, the social revolution that began in 1917 was transferred to the countryside and covered the remaining 80% of the Soviet population. Speaking with the closing remarks at the February-March 1937 plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin let it slip, saying that "it was one of the most dangerous periods in the life of the party"[1369]15. Only by winning the war against the peasantry, it was possible to declare the implementation of the plan for building socialism in one, separately taken country.

4. The next block in the Stalinist building of socialism was industrialization, which is more correctly called quasi- (or pseudo-) industrialization in order to overcome its ideocratic vision. Speaking about the results of industrialization at the pre-election meeting of voters of the Stalin district of Moscow on February 9, 1946,

Stalin compared the data of 1940 and 1913. on the preparation of the country for defense, which, in his opinion, was expressed in the production of “15 million tons of pig iron, that is, almost 4 times more than in 1913; 18 million 300 thousand tons of steel, that is, 4.5 times more than in 1913; 166 million tons of coal, that is, 5.5 times more than in 1913; 31 million tons of oil, that is, 3.5 times more than in 1913; 38 million 300 thousand tons of marketable grain, that is, 17 million tons more than in 1913; 2 million 700 thousand tons of raw cotton, that is, 3 and a half times more ~~re~~ than in 1913” [1370]16. It must be added that everything Stalin talked about was required for the production of weapons.

The real content of Stalin's industrialization was the creation of a military industry and the militarization of the country. According to Yu.N. Davydov, “each step towards the creation of this technique was a new step towards the self-affirmation of totalitarianism, the realization of its highest aspiration - the will to power ... opening before it the very possibilities that made totalitarianism a reality of precisely the 20th century, and no other, a century that flowed under the sign of colossal, amazing scientific and technological achievements and [discoveries](#)”[1371]17. As a result of the military-industrial development set in the 1930s, the USSR produced for decades the same amount of weapons as the rest of the ~~the~~—

world. For these purposes, up to 80% of the national income and production resources began to go. By the beginning of 1991, the Soviet Union had: military spacecraft, nuclear warheads, intercontinental missiles and nuclear submarines - more than all the nuclear powers combined; more tanks and chemical warfare agents than the rest of the world; destroyers, frigates, cruisers and aircraft carriers - more than the United States, France, Germany combined. By this time, there were more than 5 thousand military [factories in the country](#)[1372]18. To them

it is necessary to add also the enterprises focused on their service. Real modernization

is a broader process that includes not only industrialization, but also progress in the mechanism of government, relations between people and, finally, in the development of the individual himself, which implies his freedom and initiative. Real modernization, like genuine industrialization, does not require millions of victims, does not corrupt the people morally, does not alienate them from the results of their labor. The structure of war-oriented Soviet industry, laid down in the 1930s, is the main stumbling block of modern transformations in domestic industry, since it is not subject to reform. In addition, the consequences of Stalinist reforms not only in agriculture, but also in industry - mass lumpenization and marginalization of the population, the school of camps and special settlements through which 1/3 of the Soviet population went through - did not contribute in any way to the creation of the type of worker that a higher level presupposes. social production. F. Engels wrote very significant words about the lumpen proletariat and that "any worker leader who uses these tramps as his guard or leans on them proves by this alone that he is a traitor to the movement"[1373]19 .

5. An integral element of the Stalinist plan was also passportization, as a result of which the entire population of the country was "under the hood" of the state. In rural areas, according to the decree of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of December 27, 1932 "On the establishment of a unified passport system for the USSR and the mandatory registration of passports" and the decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of April 28, 1933 "On the issuance of passports to citizens of the USSR on the territory of the USSR ", passports were issued only in state farms and in territories declared "restricted". The rest of the peasants did not receive passports. Only after more than forty years they were formally equalized in rights with other segments of the population of the USSR - on August 28, 1974, the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On measures to further improve the passport system in the USSR" was adopted, which provided

issuance of a passport of a citizen of the USSR of a new sample for all Soviet citizens who have reached the age of 16 [1374]20.

6. An obligatory component of the system of government created by Stalin was mass violence. Only if this component was present in it, the system acted more or less effectively, achieving the solution of the tasks set by the authorities. With the weakening of the system, the imbalance of various blocks increased, violence began crashes V the independence of individual departments grew, and so on. The Great Terror, as the final operation for the construction of Stalinist socialism, was in essence not only an operation against high-ranking appointees, who were all pawns in the "game" conceived and carried out by the higher authorities. It was a large-scale "cleansing" of the population of the country from all potentially active and thinking people in the country who did not succumb to the distorting influence of the ideocracy, and therefore, were anti-Soviet, socially alien elements for the Stalinist government, which were subject to liquidation.

Built towards the end of the 1930s. the edifice of disenfranchised Stalinist socialism was crowned with a grand decoration in the form of the most democratic Constitution. The bitter irony of History shines through in Stalin's request to Kaganovich on October 2, 1935, to send him the constitution of Switzerland, a country with long democratic traditions, as a model for preparing the Constitution of the USSR[1375]21. Stalin spoke of "complete democratization of the country's political life" when he summed up the construction of his socialism at the 18th Congress of the CPSU(b). This was the height of his hypocrisy. Otherwise it is impossible to evaluate the arguments about democracy and human rights in a country that has survived "collectivization" and terror. Why did he need such reasoning? Probably, the fact is that "Stalin was afraid of few people, but constantly and until the end of his life he was afraid of freedom - after killing her, he fawned before her dead" and therefore was afraid "to take a step without mentioning her name"[1376] 22 .

After the victory achieved within the country, Stalin directed the mechanism of his power to prepare the final victory of socialism, which for him was associated with the coming war, the plan of his participation in which he had been hatching for many years.

Neither Marx nor Lenin envisioned such construction. Marx's principle of socialism is the principle of the transformation of bourgeois law into a period of transition from capitalist to communist society, which itself represents "a period of revolutionary transformation of the first into the [second](#)"[1377]23. Under communism, according to Marx, the withering away of both law and the state should have taken place. The principle of transformed bourgeois law under socialism is the principle of equal rights, the principle of equality. However, the principle of law is not limited to the principle of equality. The principle of law is inherent in a person as a subject, and therefore is the most important characteristic of a legal society. This is exactly what Marx did not see. The principle of law for a person brought up in a legal society is as natural as water and air, and therefore unnoticed. This most important principle of social structure can only be realized from the outside, when comparing different societies - with and without law. Nevertheless, it is extremely important to understand in the context of our presentation that Marx, even with such a truncated understanding of law as his, considered socialism as a legal society. Thus, Stalin's socialism without rights, with an inalienable foundation in the form of an all-pervading and all-encompassing power, and Marx's socialism, based on the principle of equality, are completely at odds.

Lenin, as already mentioned, took as a basis the activity side of the teachings of Marx, and what the latter had as a means of revolution - the "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat", i.e. dictatorship for the period of the revolution, made his main goal. The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat by Lenin became the goal of the socialist revolution. Precisely because of this circumstance, Lenin was a transitional link between Marx and Stalin. Lenin revised the Marxist principle of transformed bourgeois law, rejected not only its form of bourgeois law, but law in general, although he retained the content - equality, which in Russian conditions was formulated as a principle of justice. Lenin considered socialism itself primarily as new social relations, and the main thing for him was not to build socialism, but to create conditions for socialism. The period of "war communism" was a social defeat for Lenin. Realizing this fact and finally accepting

decision to switch to the NEP, he made it a priority to hold out until the start of the world proletarian revolution in the West. One of the ways to hold out was the implementation of Lenin's ideas about cooperation. Lenin did not see any ideas about the forcible imposition of

socialism "from above". Stalinist socialism appeared to the world in the form of universal state serfdom, and, moreover, it appeared to be turned outward with its further plans - to spread its omnipotence on a global scale. For this, the accelerated creation of modern military equipment and the militarization of the country were carried out. It took decades for the West to understand the true nature of Soviet socialism. However, not everyone saw Stalinist Russia through the eyes of A. Barbusse and L. Feuchtwanger. Smart and far-sighted people back in the early 30s. understood the far-reaching plans of the contemporary Genghis Khan on the tank. The German philosopher and historian O. Spengler (died in 1936) owns not only the phrase that "socialism means power, power and again power", but also the following remarkable text: "The Bolshevik government has nothing to do with the state in in our sense, what was Petrine Russia. Like the Kipchak, the kingdom of the "golden horde" in the Mongol era, it consists of a dominant horde - called the Communist Party - with leaders and an all-powerful khan, as well as a vast submissive and defenseless mass. Little has been preserved of real Marxism here, except for some names and programs. In reality, there is a purely Tatar absolutism that pits the whole world and plunders it, knowing no boundaries, except, perhaps, foresight - cunning, cruel, using murder as a daily means of power, instantly threatening with the possibility of a new-

Genghis Khan, who will turn Asia into one roll and Europe" [1378]24. Stalin's great power turned out to be the most solid foundation of Stalin's socialism, on which the real problems of Russia are now closed. "For the first time," writes A. Yanov, "Russia rebelled against this curse in 1917, resolutely renouncing its imperial status and declaring itself a democratic

insignificant in comparison with the power of the imperial revenge, based on a 500-year tradition. Over the course of several years, the republic was crushed, the empire restored, and its traditional role in world politics restored. But for this she had to change the mask. Yesterday's gendarme of Europe became the standard-bearer of the world proletarian revolution"[1379]25.

However, even after the fall of the communist regime, many modern authors and politicians, including those who call themselves democrats, could not overcome the syndrome of great power. They are seriously concerned about the search for a national idea that will revive the former greatness of Russia. The subject of numerous discussions about its future is still not society, but the state. It is extremely difficult to perceive the very idea that the future of Russia is not possible on adherence to a great power, but on a decisive rejection of it, that only with the reorientation of the attention and means of the state and society to human needs and the corresponding political, economic, social changes, the final liberation of Russia is possible. from the ideocratic fetters of Stalinist socialism and its real revival.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

brief reference

Irina Pavlova is an independent historian, Doctor of Historical Sciences. In August 2003, she left the position of leading researcher at the Institute of History of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where she worked for 23 years.



She began her life as a researcher by studying the history of the Red Guard in 1917-1918, but most of all she was interested in the history of Stalin's Russia. In the 1970s, after graduating from Novosibirsk State University, she was lucky enough to meet people who were dissidents and had access to forbidden literature. Their understanding of Soviet reality, as well as reading samizdat and tamizdat, had a huge impact on her perception of Soviet history and her development as a historian. By the beginning of perestroika, it was fully prepared to solve the problem of revising the pro-Stalinist concept of Soviet history. According to her, it was the best time in her life.

As a member of the coordinating council of the Novosibirsk Memorial Society, she met and talked with people who suffered during the communist regime, wrote down their memories,

organized conferences, seminars and meetings dedicated to the memory of people who died during the years of repression. As an editor-compiler, she prepared for publication three issues of the almanac "Return of Memory", published in Russia in 1991-1997. In those years, her articles often appeared in Russian newspapers. She was among those who "discovered" the repressed poet Günter Türk and participated in the publication of the first collection of his poems.

Irina Pavlova is the author of more than 120 scientific publications, of which she considers the books on the mechanism of Stalinist power published in Russia in 1993 and 2001 to be the most important. They are the result not only of her many years of work in the archives, but also of discussions at her home seminar. The most valuable for her were conversations about Russian history with her best friend, historian and

philosopher Viktor Doroshenko. However, her books are little known not only because of their negligible circulation (500 and 300 copies, respectively), but also because they were coolly received by the community of historians, "not noticed" or simply ignored. Since the mid 1990s. in Russia, the reverse, in comparison with perestroika, began the trend of interpreting its past, although the publication of previously secret documents continued and continues to this day. You can get an idea of the political atmosphere and historiographical situation in such a regional scientific center as Novosibirsk by reading [the notes of Nikolai Gladkikh](#) ("Pavlova's Defense: Subjective Notes on One Historical Defense"). He did them while attending Irina Pavlova's defense of her doctoral dissertation on April 1, 2002, a defense that lasted almost nine hours.

Her publications were perceived by the academic community as extremely ambiguous. Her opponents, for whom there is no difference between totalitarianism and democracy, call her "a detractor of national history", "a remnant of the Cold War", and her position is ideological. The story with the article "Modern Western Historians on Stalinist Russia in the 1930s" is indicative. (Criticism of the "revisionist approach"), published in Russia in the journal "Otechestvennaya istoriya" (1998. No. 5), and then in the USA. The reaction of her colleagues in "Otechestvennaya istoriya" (1999. No. 3) was so

rude, that the well-known American historian Robert Tucker defended it. His letter was eventually also published in Otechestvennaya istorii (2000, no. 4). Irina Pavlova is convinced that

with the beginning of the great power reaction in modern Russia, it becomes extremely clear that in the near future a new revision of Soviet history by both Russian and Western historians will be required. The objectivist approach so popular today, which in fact turns out to be a new apology for communist power, should give way to a scientific approach to the study of Soviet and post-Soviet history of Russia.

Irina Pavlova was born in Siberia in 1952. She currently lives in the USA in Charlottesville, Virginia. She has two children: a son, a graduate student at Northwestern University, and a daughter, a fourth-year student at the University of Virginia.

[**Email Irina Pavlova**](#)

notes

Notes

1

1 Kurashvili B.P. The historical logic of Stalinism. M., 1996. S. 277.

2

2 Sokolov A.K. Course of Soviet history. 1917 - 1940. Textbook.
allowance for universities. M., 1999. S. 177, 181-182.

3

3 Tretyakov V. Stalin is our everything. Russian reformism as a dictatorship // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. 1999. 22 Dec.

4

4 Andreev G. Do not build heaven, but prevent hell // Literary newspaper. 1997. No. 51-52. – 24 Dec.

5

5 Stalin would be glad // Arguments and Facts. 1996. No. 11.

6

6 Outsider - a man of the question (about M.Ya. Gefter) // Century of the XX and the world. 1996. No. 1. S. 19.

7

7 Karyakin Yu. Diary of a Russian reader. From notebooks.
Peredelkino, 1996 // October. 1997. No. 11. S. 141.

8 Afanasiev Yu.N. The phenomenon of Soviet historiography // National history. 1996. No. 5. S. 148, 154.

9 History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: In 6 vols.
4. Book. 2. M., 1971. S. 517.

10

10 See an excursion into the historiography of Stalinism in the book: Pavlova I.V. Stalinism: the formation of the mechanism of power. Novosibirsk, 1993. S. 7-36.

eleven

11 Korzhikhina T.P. The political system in the USSR in the 20-30s // Political systems of the USSR and countries of Eastern Europe. 20 - 60s. M., 1991. S. 17.

12

12 Book T.P. Korzhikhina 1986 in 1994 was republished at the Russian State Humanitarian University as a textbook. The events in it are chronologically brought to the end of 1991.

13

13 New and recent history. 1992. No. 2. S. 53.

14

14 Questions of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 12. S. 42.

15

15 Oct. 1991. No. 5.

16

16 Ivanovic St. Russian Communist Party. Berlin,
1924. S. 3-4.

17

17 News. 1992. July 3.

18

18 Korzhikhina T.P. The main features of the administrative-command control systems // Formation of the administrative-command systems (20-30s). Sat. articles. M., 1992; She is. Birth administrative-command control Administrative-command control // system. Problems and facts. Sat. articles. M., 1992; Korzhikhina T.P., Figatner Yu.Yu. Soviet nomenclature: formation, mechanisms of action // Questions of history. 1993. No. 7.

19

19 The ruling party remained underground. Publication by V. Lebedev // Source. 1993. No. 5-6. pp.88-95.

20

20 Trukan G.A. The path to totalitarianism. 1917 - 1929 M., 1994;
Gimpelson E.G. Formation of the Soviet political system. M.,
1995; He is. NEP and the Soviet political system. 20s. M.,
2000; Shishkin V.A. Power, politics, post-revolutionary economy.
Russia (1917 - 1928). SPb., 1997; Leonov S.V.
The Birth of the Soviet Empire: State and Ideology 1917 - 1922
M., 1997.

21

21 Oleh G.L. The party machine of the RCP(b) in the early 1920s: structure and functioning. Novosibirsk, 1995; Nikulin V.V. Power and society in the 20s. The political regime during the NEP. Formation and functioning (1921 - 1929). SPb., 1997.

22

22 Djilas M. The face of totalitarianism. M., 1992; Voslensky M. Nomenclature. The ruling class of the Soviet Union. M., 1991; Sviridenko Yu.P., Pashin V.P. Communist nomenclature: origins, essence, content. M., 1995; Pashin V.P., Sviridenko Yu.P. Personnel of the communist nomenklatura: methods of selection and education. M., 1998; Sarantsev I.V. Bolshevik ruling elite: emergence, formation and transformation. 1900-1939. Historical and sociological aspects. Saratov, 2001 and others.

23 Aksenov Yu.S. The apogee of Stalinism: the post-war pyramid of power // Issues of the history of the CPSU. 1990. No. 11; Zhukov Yu.N. The struggle for power in the leadership of the USSR in 1945 - 1952 // Questions of history. 1995. No. 1; He is. Secrets of the Kremlin. Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov. M., 2000; Ilyina I.N. Party nomenclature: forms and methods of secret leadership // USSR and Cold War. Ed. V.S. Lelchuk and E.I. Brewer. M., 1995; Pikhoya R.G. Soviet Union: History of power: 1945 - 1991. M., 1998 (2nd ed. Novosibirsk, 2000); Pyzhikov A.V. Configuration and functioning of power in the USSR. 1945 - 1953 M., 1999; Danilov A.A., Pyzhikov A.V. The birth of a superpower. USSR in the first post-war years. M., 2001 and others.

24

24 Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Sat. document / Comp. O.V. Khlevnyuk, A.V. Kvashonkin, L.P. Kosheleva, L.A. Horny. M., 1995. S. 7.

25

25 Jana Howlett, Oleg Khlevniuk, Liudmila Kosheleva, and Larissa Rogovaia. The CPSU's Top Bodies under Stalin: Their Operational Records and Structure of Command, Stalin - Era Research and Archives Project, Working Paper, no.1 (Toronto, 1996). The English version is expanded from their earlier article that appeared in Paris: "Les sources archivistiques des organes dirigeants du PC(b)R". Communisme, no.42/43/44 (1995): 15-34.

26 Khlevnyuk O.V. Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 1930s. M., 1996. S. 261.

27 Cohen S. Bolshevism and Stalinism // Questions of Philosophy. 1989.
No. 7. S. 68.

28

28 Eidlin F. Strength and impotence of communist power // Polis.
1991. No. 6. S. 84.

29 Avtorkhanov A.G. The origin of partocracy. Frankfurt am Main, (Additional ed.: vol. 1, 1981; vol. 2, 1983); Power technology. Munich, (M., 1991); Feinsod M. Smolensk under Soviet rule. Smolensk, 1995. (First published in New York in 1958); Tucker R. Stalin: The Path to Power. 1879 - 1929. History and personality. M., 1991; Tucker Robert C. Stalin in Power. The Revolution from Above, 1928 - 1941. N.-Y., L., 1990 (Tucker R. Stalin in power: history and personality. 1928 - 1941. M, 1997); John Lowenhardt. The Soviet Politburo, USA, 1982; Rosenfeldt Niels E. Knowledge and Power. The Role of Stalin's Secret Chancellery in the Soviet System of Government. Copenhagen, 1978; Stalin's special departments. Copenhagen, 1989; Schapiro Leonard. The General Department of the CC of the CPSU // Survey. 1975 Vol. 21. No. 3 (96); Gill Graeme. The Origins of the Stalinist Political System. Cambridge, 1990.

thirty

30 Tucker R. Political culture and leadership in Soviet Russia. From Lenin to Gorbachev // USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology. 1990. No. 5. S. 70.

31 Pipes R. Russia under the old regime. M., 1993; He is. Creation of a one-party state in Soviet Russia (1917 - 1918) // Polis. 1991. No. 1.

32 Avtorkhanov A. Technology of power. M., 1991. S. 128-137.

33 He is. Memoirs. Chapters from the book // October. 1992. No. 8. S. 153

34 See for more details: Pavlova I.V. Modern Western Historians on Stalinist Russia in the 1930s. (Criticism of the "revisionist" approach) // Patriotic history. 1998. No. 5.

35 Getty Arch J. The politics of Stalinism // The Stalin Phenomenon. Ed. by Alec Nove. L., 1993. P. 118; Getty Arch J., Naumov OV The Road to Terror. Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939. Yale University Press, 1999. P. Xii, 7, 12-13, 15, 571-572, 584-585.

36 Manning R. Belsky district, 1937. Smolensk, 1998, p. 91.

37

37 Rosenfeldt Niels E. Stalin's special departments. P. 79.

38 Mechanisms of Power in the Soviet Union / Ed. By Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Bent Jensen and Erik Kulavig / Foreword by Robert C. Tucker. Macmillan Press LTD, 2000.

39

39 Rosenfeldt Niels E. Stalin's special departments. P.9.